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the Integrated  
A CRITICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDY  
IN THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL IDEAS.

AN ESSAY

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## INTRODUCTION.

This study makes no attempt at a comprehensive history of ethics. It rather approaches some representative theories from the standpoint of the thesis that morality is the socialized behaviour of the integrated personality. The interest is primarily in what tendencies these various theories consider to be innate in man; in their treatment of the socialization of the individual; and of the integration of the personality; in their suggested solutions to the ego-alter conflict; and in their consideration of religion as an integrative force within the personality.

The experimental section makes no attempt to measure morality or moral traits, for it is difficult, if indeed it be possible, for a laboratorial test situation, which would be a necessary prerequisite to such measurement, to elicit natural moral reactions from subjects. Furthermore, the objective measurement of morality would necessitate the establishment of a norm as a standard which, when it has been secured, is, after all, a somewhat arbitrary gauge for measuring what many think to be incommensurable. Henri Clavier (1) speaks to the point in these words: " There is no algebra or arithmetic of the soul, neither a physics, a chemistry, nor a physiology ".

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(1) " L'Idee de Dieu chez l'Enfant ", p.8.



This study, rather, tries to discover what development of moral ideas takes place in the mind of the child in early adolescence, in that period of growth when self-consciousness and moral responsibility are thought to become manifest.

The method used is the group questionnaire. Since words are but the symbols of ideas, it is assumed that ethical ideas and moral vocabulary develop together. It may be objected that words carry varying shades of meaning for various children; but this difficulty inheres in language itself. It may be further held that the questionnaire measures intelligence by means of a moral vocabulary; but even if this be the case, such measurement of intelligence does not exclude a simultaneous measurement of moral ideas.

The questions of the test are based upon the theory that central to the development of moral behaviour is the development, within society, of the self-regarding sentiment.

Some writers hold that morality is merely custom, a social phenomenon. Others hold that ethics treats of what ought to be, that it is constituted of those principles which determine the true worth of ultimate ends of conduct. The present essay presents the thesis that the criteria of morality are two: first, socialization of behaviour; second, integration of the personality around a worthy master sentiment.

Although "meta-psychological" theories are not legitimately a part of psychology, this essay, in one instance, dares to trespass slightly upon metaphysical territory, because in this case that field is not wholly foreign to the

present thesis. This transgression is noted where made.

"Ideas" are considered to be simply the conditions of one's thinking upon any subject - the "enduring cognitive dispositions and systems of dispositions".

"Concepts", in addition, are thought of as partaking of the nature of the universal rather than of the particular.

"Ideals" are those constructs of the imagination and reflection which embody highest values; they serve as archetypes for the determination of the copy. Ideals are mental constructs "in which needs find their fulfilment". (1)

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(1). E.T. Mitchell: "The Logic of Ideals."

## Chapter I.

## ANCIENT THEORIES.

## Section I.

Socrates, 470 (?) - 399 B.C.

The roots of our thesis are grounded in the systems of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge and vice with

## PART ONE.

ignorance, thus making ignorance of one's true good to be the

source of the relation of classical ethical theories to the

thesis that morality is the socialized behaviour of the in-

tegrated personality. On the other hand, " folly is most akin to depravity".

Virtue, that is, the knowing and the isolated doing of the good, means the doing well by each person whatever he undertakes. Morality is a personal efficiency, each in his own social station: for example, "Kings and rulers are not those holding the sceptres --- but those knowing how to rule". (1)

Virtue is the quality which makes men perform his unique mission efficiently.

Socrates shows a relationship to exist between the good of self and of society: the issues of good actions are beneficial to both the agent and others. All the members of society benefit from the virtues of each: "Try rather to take heed

(1). Xenophon: "Memorabilia", Book IV, Chap. VI, Sec. 8.

(2). Xenophon, op.cit., Book III, Chap. IX, Sec. 16.

## Chapter I.

## ANCIENT THEORIES.

## Section I.

Socrates. 470 (?) - 399 B.C.

The roots of our thesis are grounded in the systems of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge and vice with ignorance, thus making ignorance of one's true good to be the source of all one's wrongdoing. Knowledge of the good involves good conduct: "just men are those who know what is just concerning men" (1). On the other hand, "folly is most akin to depravity".

Virtue, that is, the knowing and the included doing of the good, means the doing well by each person whatever he undertakes. Morality is a personal efficiency, each in his own social station: for example, "Kings and rulers are not those holding the sceptres --- but those knowing how to rule".(2) Virtue is the quality which makes man perform his unique mission efficiently.

Socrates shows a relationship to exist between the good of self and of society: the issues of good actions are beneficial to both the agent and others. All the members of society benefit from the virtues of each: "Try rather to take heed

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(1). Xenophon; " Memorabilia ", Book IV, Chap.VI, Sec. 6.

(2).Xenophon, Op.Cit., Book III, Chap.IX, Sec. 10.



to yourself; and do not neglect the affairs of the city, if there is any power in you to make them better. For as these go well, not only the other citizens, but also your friends, and you yourself not least, will benefit". (1).

Virtue and justice are generally goods; but after all, "every one wishes for his own good, and would get it if he could".

#### Criticism.

In demonstrating " the superiority of virtue to vice by an appeal to the standard of self-interest " (2), Socrates really bases virtue upon a prudential egoism. However, such can not, obviously, be a satisfactory solution of the ego-alter problem.

Furthermore, in maintaining that virtue is knowledge, Socrates must admit either that vice is involuntary, or that ignorance is voluntary. Either horn of the dilemma is difficult to harmonize with a morality of a free human agent.

#### Section II.

Plato. 427 - 347 B.C.

Plato, as Socrates, identifies virtue and knowledge. The highest attribute of man is to know virtue. The good is that which any one or any thing is meant to be. The Idea of the Good is the source of all other Ideas: "In the world of knowledge, the form of the good is received last and with difficulty, but when it is seen, it must be inferred that it is the cause

(1). Xenophon, Op.Cit. Book III, Chap. VII, Sec. 9.

(2). Sidgwick, " History of Ethics ", p. 31.



of all that is right and beautiful in all things ". (1)

"Reason grasps the power of dialectic, the hypotheses, making them, not ends, but, as it were, underpositions or stepping stones and starting points, so that, coming to the un-assumed, to the source of all, finally arrives at the Idea ".

(2). "Dialectic" means to Plato the force which drives the mind toward knowledge, or union with the Real. The "Idea" is Reality; only Ideas truly exist. "Hypotheses" are assumptions obviously true.

### Integration.

Plato divides the soul into the appetitive part ( τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν ), the spirit part ( τὸ θυμοειδές ), and the rational or philosophic part ( τὸ λογιστικόν ). (3). Reason is that in man which enables him to live for something, to have ideals. (4). Each of these three parts of the soul has its special virtue: temperance, courage, and wisdom, respectively. The correctly proportioned, and thus harmonious union of these three virtues, constitutes the fourth and supreme soul-virtue - justice (δικαιοσύνη ). Until a complete personal integration is effected by means of the union of mind with Reality, " The Idea ", that is, until truth be attained and the " travailing of the soul " is thus allayed, man does not experience inner peace. It is such an integrated personality that has "set his

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(1). " Republic ", Book VII

(2). Op.Cit. Book VI, Chap. XXI, Sec. 511, B, C.

(3). R.L. Nettleship, "The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic", from "Hellenica", Ed. E. Abbott, p.72.

(4). R.L. Nettleship, "Lectures on the Republic of Plato", Chap. X.

house in order and is master of himself and is his own best friend, harmonizing his three-fold being as three chords naturally harmonious ". (1). Thus integration of personality might be said to mean for Plato the supreme soul-virtue, justice, effected by the attainment of truth. This condition would be the highest good - that which is most worth having.

Justice is self-regarding, in that the control of passions by Reason issues into happiness: orderliness of mind is the foundation of happiness.

Internal disorder or lack of harmonious integration becomes manifest in bad conduct. Ignorance is a cause of such unharmonious conduct: "the just man appears as being good and wise, and the unjust as ignorant and evil".(2).

Within the ordered hierarchy of the elements of the healthy mind, Reason sits supreme: "It is necessary for Reason to rule in the wise, who thus has control of his whole self, and has his spirit for his obedient ally ". (3).

#### Socialization.

Justice in the state, as the harmonious cooperation between different persons, and justice in the individual, as harmonious cooperation between the different elements of the soul, are to Plato, in essence, identical, for in society we see but man " writ large ". Thus, " a man is just in the same way a city is".( 4 ). (5).

(1). " Republic ", Book IV, Chap. XVII, Sec. 443, C, D.

(2). Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. XXI, Sec. 350, C.

(3).Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap. XVI, Sec. 441, E.

(4). Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap. XVI, Sec. 441, D.

(5). Nettleship, " Lectures on the Republic of Plato", Chap. IV.

The disinterested sentiment as such is not directly and plainly recognized by Plato. In the state, which arises as the result of the need of adjustments between individuals, the various individuals exercise their respective specialized functions : rulers are to rule wisely, soldiers to fight bravely, and the industrial classes to work with energy and thrift. The individual's well-being is reached only when perfect justice reigns in every soul.

#### Religion.

Plato recommends that in his state the gods should be set forth as the authors of good; thus morality may be supported by religion. He admits this procedure might involve a pious fraud, but the end would justify the means.

#### Criticism.

Although Plato may be criticized for seeming to hold to a division of the " soul " into " faculties " - an anticipation of an erroneous psychology of later times - still, his ethics contains some psychological beginnings which foreshadow the need of socialization of personality, if that personality is to be "good". Furthermore, he notes that personality is complex, but capable of integration. Such a socialized, integrated personality is Plato's just man - the embodiment of virtue.

Plato, however, does not satisfactorily show how social justice is identical with personal justice, how socialization of personality is identifiable with psychological integration of personality: he fails to note any other-regarding tendency,



the recognition of which and the inclusion of which within the integration of the personality would make possible the inclusion of socialization within integration; but there is more included in integration than socialization. ( See Part II ).

### Section III.

Aristotle. 384 - 322 B.C.

Innate.

Aristotle is unique among ancient moralists in that, basing his ethics in a most modern way upon psychology, he considers the "material of moral activity to be the whole gamut of the emotions or the emotional dispositions". Regarding man's innate passions he writes that "passions are any emotions on which pain and pleasure follow, because of which men differ in their decisions: such as anger, pity, fear, and any other such emotions, and also the emotions opposite to these". With the exception of  $\chi\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma$ , these passions which Aristotle names exist in pairs or opposites.

Moral virtues are neither inherent in man's nature, nor contrary to it: moral excellence is rather the result of habit. What is inherent is a potentiality, a disposition, or " $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ ". " $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ " is the capability of feeling emotion or " $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ". Virtue (" $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$ ") is a set of the mind (" $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\varsigma$ "): it is a " $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ " which has been made the object of deliberative choice and reason. (1).

(1). See also Brown: "Mind and Personality" pp. 214 - 215.

## Socialization.

Aristotle notes the importance for morality of the socialization of man through experience, and by way of the social training of these innate human possibilities. Man's moral potentialities may be socialized into virtues: "Intellectual virtue for the most part has its genesis and growth in teaching, and therefore needs experience and time; but moral virtue ( $\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ ) develops from habit ( $\epsilon\acute{\theta}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ), whence its name, with a slight change from habit ( $\epsilon\acute{\theta}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ): thus it is evident that none of the moral virtues ( $\epsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\omega\upsilon$ ) comes to us by nature". (1).

## Ego-Alter.

Although it is natural, and a duty, for a good man to love himself, because his noble life is profitable both for himself and others, still, he needs friends who shall be the recipients of his overflow of kindness and shall complete his well-being. Mutual kindness completes the well-being of the good, between whom alone it can exist, by enlarging through sympathy that consciousness of life which is itself a good. A friend is the greatest of external goods, and is also an inner spiritual possession - he is a "second self": " $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ ". (2).

The preeminent social virtue, uniquely involving one's behaviour to another, is justice. However, "if men are

(1). "Nicomachean Ethics", Book II, Chap. I, Secs. 1-2.

(2). Op.Cit. Book IX, Chap. IX, Sec. 10.



friends, there is no need of justice; but even though they are just, they need friendship; and the principle of justice seems to be most especially of the nature of friendship".(1).

### This highminded Integration.

Well-being ("εὐδαιμονία") involves the unimpeded activity of the soul. This unimpeded activity is attained through the moral virtues which become thus also the means adopted by Reason to acquire its freedom. They are the forms by which Reason as a powerful integrating force would regulate the individual soul. When Reason is thus freed, and the soul regulated and integrated for unimpeded activity, man can perform his proper function well: he is virtuous, and without internal conflict: he wills actions that strike a happy mean in their effect. "There is excess and defect in evil, but there is a mean in virtue". "Virtue is purposeful habit, being in the mean relative to us, defined by reason as the wise man would define it". This mean, defined as the wise man would define it, is, "from the point of view of the best and right, extreme".(2).

To Aristotle, "highmindedness", loftiness of spirit, is the culmination of the virtues. "He seems to be great-souled who, being worthy, rates himself so". (3). The man who is "μεγαλόψυχος" evaluates himself neither more highly than he should which would be vanity, nor lower than he should, which would be littleness of mind. He possesses a healthy self-

(1).Op.Cit. Book VIII,Chap. I, Sec. 4.

(2).Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. VI, Secs. 13,14,15,17.

(3).Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap.III, Sec. 3.

respect: it might be said that the sentiment of self-regard is manifested within him : self-assertion and self-abasement are correctly proportioned.

This highminded man attains the supreme end of conduct - "the good at which everything aims". That is, "εὐδαιμονία," well-being, happiness, is the possession of the "μεγαλόψυχος" or highminded man. This well-being is an end in itself, "for we always seek it for itself, and never for the sake of something else".(1). This happiness is obviously not a mere summation of pleasures, but a condition existing within a man whose will is "trained in the tradition of virtue, and acting in a duly ordered material environment".(2).

#### Criticism.

In his politics, Aristotle deals with the well-being of the state, and in his ethics he concentrates upon the well-being of the individual; the result is, that he does not satisfactorily deal with the socialization of the individual: "the relations of man to man and citizen to citizen are insufficiently handled".(3). He seems indeed, to over-emphasize the influence of society upon the individual (4), and in doing so, he has difficulty in finding place for free will, in case a person deliberately chooses a recognized evil. Even though

according to nature ----- "life according to law". The

- (1).Op.Cit. Book I,Chap.VII,Sec.3.
- (2).Wallas, " The Great Society", p. 110.
- (3).Jackson, Article "Aristotle" in "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics".
- (4). See Bain, "Mental and Moral Science", Vol.II,p. 513.

For this, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things,

(1)A.S.Staley, "Aristotle's Conception of the State",p.174.

he holds to personal responsibility, the voluntariness of which he conceives fails to exclude determinism: that is, present actions may still be considered as only the issue of character already formed. Responsibility is thus pushed ever further back, and becomes difficult to capture.

This over-emphasis of the supremacy of society or the state is readily explicable when it is remembered that to the Greeks the state does not exist for the benefit of its citizens, but rather, the citizens derive from the state their being, welfare, and rights. It is only in the state that the citizens can realize their respective ends, that is, be moral.(1).

Again: although Aristotle's conception of friendship appears to be a lofty one, it tends, after all, in its practical disregard of an altruistic benevolence, to become only a prudential egoism. There is here no solution to the ego-alter problem.

#### Section IV.

#### Greek Stoicism.

#### Innate.

To the Stoics, all men are, through their reason, sons of Zeus, and therefore, brothers within the " City of Zeus ". This rational or moral life is identified both with the " life according to nature ", and " life according to law ". The Stoic Chrysippus is credited with saying that this " rational life " means "to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things,

(1).A.C.Bradley,"Aristotle's Conception of the State",p.174.

and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this world".

At the same time, the Stoic holds the first principle of nature to be self-preservation or self-love. But the foundation of all virtue is a life of subordination of self to the more general interests of the family, country, mankind, and the whole universe. Self-subordination and universal brotherhood are Stoic fundamentals.

#### Ego-Alter.

But this universal brotherhood does not mean to the average Stoic that he should "erect the happiness of another into a direct object of his own positive pursuit". It means only the discouraging of those self-regarding emotions which place one in hostility to others - one should respect the self of the other as well as his own self.

#### Integration.

The Stoic deals not only with this outer harmonization but also with inner integration of personality. His psychology stresses "the essential unity of a rational self that is the source of conscious human action". (1). The true and proper object of desire is an inner unity which entails a tranquil inner freedom - a psychological integration - a self-sufficiency - a self-realization. Reason is supreme in this integrated self. An immoral life is a life uncontrolled by Reason.

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(1). Sidgwick, "Outlines of the History of Ethics ", p.73.



Any passion is a morbid, disorderly condition of the soul, a soul-disease. Apathy, which is either the control of, or the absence of, emotions, is the chief quality of the good, that is the reasonable or wise, man.

#### Religion.

In Stoicism, religion is emphasized as being closely associated with morality. The Reason within man is a particle of the divine substance, and the pure life of that divine spark means the exercise of reason, or of wisdom. In proportion as man exercises Reason, he is a Son of Zeus, and is likewise, in that proportion, moral.

Closely associated with the theory of human participation in the divine substance is the doctrine that, since God or Zeus is the author of all but evil, the highest good is to enter voluntarily into harmony with him and to submit to the inevitable laws of the universe.

#### Criticism.

Stoicism, particularly in its earlier days, is to be criticized for its negative attitude toward feeling. It tends to identify reason and will and to maintain that emotion is not a good. Although affect is not the total essence of the good life, it certainly, as Stoicism disregarded, enters into its constitution. Affect, indeed, is not isolable from cognition and conation: it is inherent as a constituent element in the "massive sensation complex". (1). The affective ele-

(1). Aveling, "Feeling and Emotion".

ment is more than a mere disordered condition of reason, which should be suppressed; it is an essential, inescapable element of any personal reaction.

An issue of the tenet that affect is something that should be suppressed, is the Stoic doctrine that pleasure is not good and should not be an end of conduct. It is true that all desire is not for pleasure, but it is also true that pleasure may be a good, a legitimate element in the end of conduct.

A third criticism of Stoicism is its tendency to over-emphasize a submissive resignation on the part of the personality, at the expense of the free creativeness of the human mind.

Zeno. 342- 270 B.C.

As the founder of Stoicism, a brief mention of Zeno is in place. Zeno is Socratic in identifying virtue and knowledge.

Innate.

The highest good is a life conformable to nature. Notions of "the good and just come to the mind by nature".(1). Thus Zeno seems to hold to some sort of an innate potentiality for morality.

Integration.

Touching upon an inner integration of personality, Zeno states that the "virtue of the happy man is the perfect happiness of life, when everything is done according to a harmony with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the universal governor ".(2). Zeno here apparently in-

(1).Diogenes Laertius,"Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers", Book VII,Sec.53.Huebner,Vol.II, p.121.

(2).Op.Cit.,Book VII,Sec.88.

timates the desirability of a kind of inner integration - a harmony between the natural endowment of a man and his ideals.

## Section V.

### Roman Stoicism .

Epictetus. 60 - 140. A.D.

Stoicism passed in due time to Rome, where it was, strangely and yet naturally enough, represented by the social extremes, the slave Epictetus and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

### Innate.

Epictetus makes Zeus say: "I have given you a part of myself --- the ability for using appearances".(1).

### Socialization. Ego-Alter.

The nature of Zeus is "*vous*". (2). If Zeus has thus shared his nature with man, all reasoning men are brothers.

### Integration.

The man in whom Reason is active, who enters into his divine sonship, experiences an inner serenity, an integration following from his realized sonship. "The function of virtue" is "serenity". (3).

Epictetus holds that whatever there is instinctive in man as the son of Zeus, is therefore the source of right con-

(1). Epictetus, "Discourses", Book I, Chap.I, Sec. 12.

(2). Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. VIII, Sec.2.

(3). Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. IV, Sec. 5.

duct: "all done according to nature is done rightly".(1).

The highest of Stoic tenets, the universal citizenship of man in the city of Zeus, is expressed by Epictetus thus: " ---- chiefly to rational creatures is it the natural gift to be the only things to commune with God, intertwined with him through the reason given him; why should not such a one say that he is a citizen of the universe?" " And why not a son of God?". (2).

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. 121 - 180 A.D.

Ego-Alter.

Marcus Aurelius is unique as a Stoic, and as a Roman Emperor, in that he considers beneficence both a duty and a satisfaction. "A characteristic of the reasonable soul is to love those next to it". (3).

Religion.

United with this tenet there is an intensified religiousness: "Everything is harmonious to me that is harmonious to Thee, O Universe". "Reverence the gods and help men" is the summary formula of a good life; and its two parts are inseparable, for injustice - the refusal of the aid which nature fashioned us to give to other rational creatures - is itself impiety. "Love even those who do you wrong", for they are kinsmen who err through ignorance.

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(1).Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. XI, Sec.5.

(2).Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. IX, Secs. 4, 5.

(3). Marcus Aurelius, "To Himself", Book XI, Sec.1.



### Integration.

Such a life, lived in conformity with the divine Reason within, is a life of integrated harmony, for he who gives all his individual energy to the good of all "will make all his actions homogeneous and will therefore always be (consistent with) himself". (1).

Even while loving and helping others, this man who is "consistent with himself" need not cease loving himself, "for it is pardonable for every one to seek his own good". (2).

### Criticism.

To Marcus Aurelius, morality involves a proper proportioning of self-love and altruism, but the method of the practical harmonization is left unexplained. The problem of Self versus other is only stated, it is not solved. His failure to harmonize the two tendencies is flagrantly manifest in his inconsistent persecution of his Christian subjects.

### Section VI.

Epicurus. 341 - 270 B.C.

Stoicism is egoistic in emphasizing the desirability of the suppression of all passions, which suppression issues into an apathetic, unruffled tranquility of mind; the Epicureans are also egoistic, emphasizing as they do the desirability of an untroubled calm within the soul.

Epicurus refers the standard of virtue and vice to

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(1). Op.Cit. Book XI, Sec. 20.

(2). Op.Cit. Book XI, Sec. 16.

pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the only good and pain is the only evil. Moral virtues are not ends in themselves, but are indispensable means for getting the greatest possible enjoyment out of life.

By happiness, however, is not meant "the pleasures of the debauchees --- but the absence of pain in the body and the freedom from confusion in the soul. And of all these, the beginning and the greatest good is prudence". (1). Prudence is only a wise selection of pleasures.

#### Integration.

There are pleasures to be found in rest and freedom from disturbance. Pleasure inheres in inner serenity. "For this purpose we do everything - that we might neither suffer nor fear; and when all this happens for us, every storm of the soul is stilled". (2). After the removal of pain or confusion, pleasure admits of variation only, not of increase.

#### Ego-Alter.

Epicurus considers the ego-alter relationship as a reciprocal agreement between men living in companionship with each other; both justice and friendship are based upon reciprocity. "The justice of nature is an expression of expediency or agreement for refraining from harming and being harmed, each by the other". (3).

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(1). Diogenes Laertius, "Lives and Opinions", Book X, Secs. 131-132. Huebner's Edition, Vol. II, p. 583.

(2). Op. Cit. Book X, Sec. 128. Huebner, Vol. II, p. 580.

(3). Op. Cit. Book X, Sec. 150. Huebner, Vol. II, p. 604.

### Religion.

Epicurus uses theology only as a means of dispelling man's fear for the gods which causes him unhappiness. He theorizes that the gods are not active in the world: "their condition is not one of agency, but of tranquil, self-sustaining fruition". (1).

### Criticism.

Epicurus is to be criticized in laying undue emphasis upon the enjoyment of feeling; he mistakenly identifies pleasure with the content of the good, whereas it dare be considered only as an element within the good.

Moreover, pleasure can not be considered as a sole motive for action. All deliberated rational acts do not aim at pleasure. All men do not judge pleasure to be the highest good. Pleasure per se is not completely satisfying. Nor is pain per se unpleasant: it is not, psychologically, essentially an unpleasant experience always to be avoided. "Pain is a sensation and it is a sensation that at different intensities may be pleasant, indifferent, or unpleasant". (2).

Furthermore, Epicurus is unsatisfactory in basing friendship upon mutual utility. He tries to "free his egoistic hedonism from anti-social inferences" by praising devoted friendship, but a troublesome paradox appears when he bases

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(1). Bain, "Mental and Moral Science", Part II, p. 530.

(2). Titchener, "A Textbook of Psychology", p. 227.

that friendship upon pure self-interest. The ego-alter problem is insoluble by basing altruism upon an egoistic expediency.

#### Section VII.

Plotinus. 205 - 270 A.D.

Neo-Platonism, a school of thought which developed in the early centuries of the Christian era, was an attempt to assimilate the doctrines of Plato with Christian mysticism.

Of the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus is the most representative. He holds that the soul fell from its original condition of holiness, and as a consequence and penalty, was united with a material body. The supreme goal of human action is to rise above this debasing corporeal incarnation, and to lead once again the former spiritual life. "Therefore it is essential for the soul to become intellect, likewise to commit the whole soul to the intellect, and to establish it in it, so that what the intellect itself sees, the soul may carefully receive and through the intellect itself may contemplate even the Good; and not using any sense --- with the very first of intellect, contemplate the Most Pure". (1).

#### Socialisation. Integration.

The socialisation of the individual and the harmonisation of the ego-alter interests are quite secondary to the absorbing ecstasy of this contemplation of the eternal verities. This union with the Good - becoming like Deity - is

(1) Plotinus, "Opera Philosophica", "Enneades", book VI, Chap. IX, Sec. III, p. 460 of edition of 1860.



## Chapter II.

## CHRISTIANITY AND MEDIAEVAL THEORIES.

## Section VII.

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(1).Plotinus, "Opera Philosophica", "Enneades", Book VI, Chap. IX, Sec.III, p. 760 of edition of 1580.

Virtue. In this union, thought is transcended, and consciousness itself is superseded by pure ecstasy; and there results a "freedom from the other concerns of this life, a life unaccompanied by the affairs of the world, a flight of the alone to the Alone". (1).

#### Criticism.

In Plotinus there is intimated an integration which is effected by way of the absorption of the individual into the Good, but this is accomplished at the cost of self-consciousness. Practical socialization of personality is not effected.

#### St. Augustine. 353 - 430 A.D.

The Church Fathers may be represented by St. Augustine, whose theories partake of both Christianity and Platonism.

Augustine does not emphasize the solution of the ego-alter problem, but he hints at self-realization as being desirable good for man: defection from real existence to that which has less of life is to fail of one's highest goal. (2).

An inner peace results from the rest which the soul has in God: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our soul is restless until it rest in Thee". (3). In a dualistic fashion, Augustine maintains that the supreme good is this inner harmony, effected when "the flesh no longer contends against the spirit". (4).

(1). Op.Cit., Book IX, Chap. XI, p.771.

(2). Augustine, "De Civitate Dei", Book XIII, Chap.VII.

(3). Augustine, "Confessions", Chap. I.

(4). "De Civitate Dei", Book XIX, Chap. IV.

### Innate.

The germ of love is supernaturally implanted in man. Faith springs from this love. It is not "in our power to live rightly unless he helps us in our believing and praying - he who has given us even our faith". (1). From love and faith, which are inseparable, springs hope, of which the supreme desire is the Highest Good - the pure love of God.

### Integration.

Love of God is the integrating factor in which all of man's faculties reach perfection, and all his yearnings, which are essentially religious, are completely stilled and satisfied. Without love to God, human personality is incomplete.

### Criticism.

Approaching ethics with a churchman's theological bias, Augustine considers love to be a supernaturally implanted germ which is basic to the trinity of theological virtues faith, hope, and love. He presses the passivity of man's moral incapacity and the aggressiveness of the Divine Agency to such a point, that with difficulty does he reconcile human freedom with his theory.

Furthermore, the Augustinian approach to ethics by way of a God-given faculty of love, leaves the psychic constitution of man unanalyzed and therefore unexplained.

(1). Augustine, Op.Cit., Book XIX, Chap. IV.

## Section VIII.

### The Scholastics.

St. Thomas Aquinas. 1226 - 1274.

We take as our representative of the mediaeval scholastics St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Thomas is a disciple of Aristotle. At times, however, he deserts his master in favour of Plato or Plotinus whom he finds theologically more satisfactory.

### Socialization.

He shows his Aristotelian discipleship by saying that "it is habits that are good or bad" (1). Both master and disciple emphasize habit to be the result of training and experience.

### Innate.

Those virtues which, at a later time, are destined to be called the Cardinal Virtues, Thomas holds to be potentially innate in man, though not in a perfected degree ( "fecundum perfectionem" ). (2). Human virtues are good habits, each virtue denoting "some perfection of a potentiality". (3).

Furthermore, God has given to man a knowledge of the immutable general principles of natural law as it relates to rational creatures; and also a conscience - a disposition

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(1). "Summa Theologica", "Ethicus", Question 55, Part II, First Part, Second Number.

(2). Op.Cit. Question 63, Art. I.

(3). Op.Cit. Question 56, Art. I.



which prompts man to "a realization of these principles in his conduct" and "which protests against their violation".

That he may make a place for the virtues faith, hope, and love, Aquinas deserts the ancient philosophers. These three "are termed theological virtues; for they have God as their object in that through them we rightly relate ourselves to God; then because they are implanted in us by God alone; then because such virtues are given to us only by divine revelation in the Sacred Scriptures". (1).

There are intellectual virtues and actual virtues: virtues of mind and virtues of action. Actual virtues, virtues manifest in actions, are the result of putting a power or habit to actual good use. For morality, mere intellectual virtue is insufficient: "for well-doing it is required that not only reason be well-disposed through a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that the appetitive power be well-disposed through the habit of moral virtue. Then just as appetite is distinct from reason, so is moral virtue distinct from the intellectual". (2). Prudence is right reason thus applied to conduct.

#### Religion.

Aquinas holds that it is toward God that all things are really, though unconsciously, striving in their pursuit of Good.

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(1). Op.Cit. Question 62, Art. I.

(2). Op.Cit. Question 58, Art. 2.

## Ego-Alter.

This love toward God expands into love toward God's creatures, and thus ultimately includes even self-love. In the religious love to God, the human personality, with its divergent interests of Self and alter can be integrated and harmonized around the idea that both Self and other are God's creation.

## Criticism.

As long as Aquinas follows Aristotle, his method is a scientific analysis of the human psychic endowment; but in considering faith, hope, and love to be God-given faculties, he becomes guilty of a faculty psychology, with its lack of analysis and explanation.

Aquinas, in the next place, does not account for an integration of human personality in a satisfactory way. Ego interests and alter interests, even though ego and alter are both God's creation, are not shown, for that reason, to be either harmonious or identical.

Finally, Aquinas does not successfully harmonize the two tenets: first, man is free to choose good or evil; second, man is absolutely dependent upon divine grace for his goodness.

## Criticism.

Although Grotius intimates a belief in a peculiarly hu-

11. "De Jure Belli ac Pacis", Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 10.  
12. Op. Cit. Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 9.

## Chapter III.

## MODERN THEORIES TO LOCKE.

## Section IX.

Hugo Grotius. 1583 - 1645.

Hugo Grotius occupies a position of transition between the ancient and modern theories.

## Innate.

To him, natural law is part of divine law which follows from the essential nature of man, who is by nature social and reasoning. "Natural right is a dictate of right reason, showing that there is a moral turpitude or moral necessity in any act as a result of its agreement or disagreement with rational nature itself, and consequently that such an act is either forbidden or commanded by God the Author of nature". (1).

## Ego-Alter.

Grotius posits a reciprocity or mutual compact entered into by men to refrain, each from harming his neighbour, and from interfering in his acquisition and enjoyment of earth's stores. "One is obliged to place no hindrance in the way of another by whom the same permission is given him". (2). Such a state - a state in which individuals and families lived, with no other laws than such "natural laws" as prohibit mutual injury and mutual interference - is the "state of nature".

## Criticism.

Although Grotius intimates a belief in a peculiarly hu-

(1). "De Jure Belli ac Pacis", Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 10.

(2) Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 9.

man "appetite" for peaceable association with one's fellows, which is fundamental to moral living, he says nothing about any innate tendency to regard others.

Furthermore, his theory of non-interference in the relation between fellow-men, as each appropriates what he can of nature's common goods, is only a prudential egoism: it does not solve the ego-alter problem.

### Section X.

Thomas Hobbes. 1588 - 1679.

Hobbes's materialism states that everything real in the world is in space and time, and is, therefore, either matter or motion. Motion is the most universal cause in nature. This fundamental notion determines his psychology: passions are interior beginnings of voluntary motions; will is the last appetite of deliberation, the last motion in a delayed or suspended series of motions.

### Innate.

For such a thorough-going materialism, all human desires are considered as reducible to the single desire for power. There exists in man "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death". There results, therefore, between men who are thus constituted, a state of war unless there is found some power beyond to keep them in awe. "Covenants without a sword are but words".

On the other hand, Hobbes holds that there are innate in man some "passions" which make for peace, ameliorating the



otherwise wholly harsh universal state of war. Such are the tendencies toward "commodious living" and the fear of death.

For Hobbes, how Socialization. of power is not as inter-

Man's desires are purely self-regarding, directed either to the preservation of his life or to the attainment of pleasure. In society, however, man consents, under mutual compact, to relinquish some of his rights: he is "willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself". (1). Hobbes conceives of the state as a supreme political authority enforcing this reciprocity and assuring to each individual security in attaining his own desires. Self-interest is the inner criterion of morality; the state is the external criterion. of Hobbes, which resolves into phases of self-

regard the most appa Ego-Alter. of man tendencies and emotions

The application of Hobbes's principle of exclusive egoism to the solution of the ego-alter problem develops a negative golden rule which he puts forth as a summary of his nineteen laws of morality: "do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself". (2). Friendship is desirable because it increases a man's feeling of power when he thinks he can not only accomplish his own desires, but also assist

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(1). "Leviathan", Chap. XIV, p.87. "Encyclopaedia of Religion

(2). Op.Cit. Chap.XV, p. 108.

a friend in accomplishing his. He fails to bridge the gulf be-

Integration. He fails to

For Hobbes, however, this love of power is not an integrating force producing an inner harmony. Felicity for Hobbes means rather "continued success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desires"; it is not a "repose of a mind satisfied" (1). question of free will. For he in-

consistently holds Religion. cal egoism which presupposes

Religion as well as morals Hobbes makes a political matter, defining it as "a fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed".

Hobbes by impl. Criticism. justifies good actions with those

Hobbes errs when he considers man to be solely egoistic in pursuing the gratification of his own desires, and when he disregards any innate social affections in man. Any theory, as does that of Hobbes, which resolves into phases of self-regard the most apparently unselfish tendencies and emotions of man, even to the extent of considering friendship a mere boomerang contributing to the satisfaction of the individual's selfish will to power, is obviously an incomplete account of human nature. Men may, and do at times, desire the good of others, and do so in response to an innate urge which is as elemental as self-love.

Hobbes's axiom that motion is the exclusive ultimate re-

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(1). Woodbridge, Article "Hobbes", "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics".

ality involves him in errors. He fails to bridge the gulf between this mere moving matter and sensations. He fails to make the transition between mere sensations and ethical thinking. Rational deliberation is mistakenly thought of as a mere "see-saw of conflicting animal impulses". Blind to selective attention on the part of man, Hobbes adopts a crude deterministic view on the question of free will. Yet he inconsistently holds to an ethical egoism which presupposes a permanent, self-conscious, self-asserting mind which is more than a mere collection of phantasmata possessing no causal efficiency.

Hobbes by implication identifies good actions with those that prolong life, and with those that give pleasure, and with those that satisfy desire; but proof of this identity is lacking.

Finally, Hobbes refutes himself. He begins with an exclusive egoism, but concludes with the theory of an absolute social authority over the individual.

## Section XI.

René Descartes. 1596 - 1650.

Hobbes's sensationistic materialism is opposed by a Cartesian idealism. Descartes aims at reconciling the spiritual and physical, soul and body: the world and man, mind and matter, are really one. In seeking happiness within, where alone it is to be attained, one must begin with an attitude of universal doubt: "de omnibus dubitandum est". But Car-

tesian doubt is not a stubborn skepticism, but is rather only the mental attitude which is necessarily precedent to a justifiable belief.

For Descartes, only one proposition is indisputable: because a man possesses consciousness, it must therefore be inferred that he exists - "cogito, ergo sum". A man thinks even when he doubts, and man as a thinker must exist even when his senses deceive him.

Integration.

Objects sensed "are not perceived because they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood". Descartes thus makes understanding or Reason to be the basis of man's comprehension of objects. Reason may also give man a just appreciation of the value of good and evil, and his good judgment regarding them enables him to resist the influence of his passions. If one clearly saw that what he is doing is wrong, it would be impossible for him to sin, so long as he saw the thing in that light.

Innate.

The passions are "the perceptions or the sentiments or the emotions of the soul which are uniquely joined to it, and which are caused, supported, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits". (1). A small gland in the brain is

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(1). "Oeuvres de Descartes", Adam and Tannery, Vol. XI,  
"Passions de l'âme", Art. 27.

(2). Op. Cit. Art. 20.

(3). Op. Cit. Art. 52.



"the chief seat of the soul" (1), whence it spreads throughout the body by means of "spirits", nerves, and blood. The movement of these spirits causes passions (2), and passions are accompanied by movements of the body. (3).

The passions depend absolutely upon the actions which bring them into function. In fact, the Cartesian system makes all the various psychological manifestations to be rationally explicable by purely mechanical means and causes. The will, on the other hand, is thought of as always free; the action or will of the soul can only be indirectly affected by the body. "There is no soul so feeble that it is unable, if well guided, to acquire an absolute power over the passions". (4).

#### Religion.

Descartes says man's consciousness of God is prior to his consciousness of self. For man could not doubt or desire, could not be conscious of any lack within himself, could not know himself to be imperfect, if he did not have within himself the idea of a perfect Being, in comparison with whom he recognizes the defects of his own nature.

#### Criticism.

Descartes leaves unresolved the mind-matter antithesis with which he started and which he aimed to resolve: he does not explain how the movement of the passions can be altered

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(1). Op.Cit. Art. 32.

(2). Op.Cit. Art. 51.

(3). Op.Cit. Art. 38.

(4). Op.Cit. Art. 50.

by Reason; he does not show how man's unifying Intelligence can endow inert matter with such relationships as to make them intelligible to man; and the theory that the human body is only a complicated machine, to know whose beginning and governing laws is to know all, issues into materialism; but the theory that conscious thought is the philosophical fundamentum issues into a Kantian idealism. Free will and a mechanical psychology as a result are not harmonized.

In holding that will and intellect are united in the moralized man, Descartes lacks psychological analysis: will and intellect are not isolable entities or faculties whose union results in moralization, but are rather only personality in several functional aspects.

## Section XII.

Nicolas Malebranche. 1638 - 1715.

### Innate.

Malebranche says that Reason is the means of intercourse between reasoning men, and between men and God. "Thus by means of Reason, I have, or can have, some intercourse with God, and with all other intelligent beings, in that all have something in common with me, Reason".(1).

Just as God, a reasoning being, prefers some things to others, so man, a reasoning creature, can also discover that some things are more perfect than others. "It is certain

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(1). "Traite de Morale", Chap.I, Sec. 3, p.2.

that God loves things in proportion as they are worthy of love, and I can discover that there are some things more perfect, more valuable, and consequently more lovable than others". (1).

### Religion.

Reason, which man shares with God, is the basis of moral discriminations and judgments. Because men are rational creatures, "their virtue and perfection is to love reason, or rather, to love order". (2). That is, the love of order, submission to the immutable and necessary order, is Virtue.

### Integration.

Thus, man's duty "consists in willing submission to God's law and to follow order. --- we can know this divine order by union with the Word." (3). This "union with the Word" is effected by means of the "reason of man". The "reason of man" is universal, being the "wisdom of God Himself".

### Criticism.

A universal Reason, the wisdom of God, can not well be invoked as the means of integration of such diverse elements as self-interests and other-interests. Such a blanket-theory does not explain the integration. Reason itself, as being personality functioning, needs explaining.

(1). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. IV, pp. 2 - 3.

(2). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. XIX, p.13.

(3). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. XXII, p. 17.

(4). See also Rogers, "Short History of Ethics", pp. 143, ff.

## Section XIII.

Benedict, Baruch de Spinoza. 1632 - 1677.

## Ego-Alter.

Spinoza agrees with Hobbes that "the laws of social morality are originally determined by contracts between opposing interests"; but "it is only among men of undeveloped reason that these laws are to be regarded as merely external adjustments between opposing forces". Spinoza differs from Hobbes in holding that among rational beings, self and alter are harmonized in their interests because inwardly the interests of all rational beings are truly identical, in that "Reason is everywhere at harmony with itself". (1). Increased knowledge abolishes any distinction between the interests of ego and of alter.

## Integration.

"Beatitudo", Aristotle's "*εὐδαιμονία*", well-being, is virtue itself rather than a mere reward for virtue. It is the experience of an integrated personality, and consists in the peace of mind arising from the recognition of and submission to the laws of nature which are unalterable and perfect. That is, "those things which do not follow from our nature we should bear; ever to await each issue of fortune with equanimity, and to bear it; seeing that all things follow with the same necessity from the eternal decree of God just as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles

(1). See also Rogers, "Short History of Ethics", pp. 143, ff.



equal two right angles". (1).

Reason is the integrating force; it is Reason that controls man's emotions, if they are controlled, and in this control consists man's freedom and happiness. Integration of personality, through the operation of the Reason, in controlling the emotions, constitutes happiness and freedom.

#### Innate.

Intuition, which is one kind of cognition, is the basis of man's ability to make moral judgments: "Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is given ---- a third, which we shall call intuition". (2). Intuition "teaches us how to distinguish the true from the false". (3). Here there is an innate basis for ethical discrimination.

#### Religion.

The relation of religion to ethics is well set forth by Spinoza in these words: "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself: nor do we rejoice in it because we control our lusts, but on the other hand, because we rejoice in it therefore can we control our lusts. --- Blessedness consists in love toward God, --- which love springs from intuition --- therefore it is virtue itself. Again, in proportion as Mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand; --- therefore, in proportion as the Mind rejoices in this divine love or

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(1). "Opera Posthuma", "Ethica", Part II, Prop. 49, p.92.

(2). Op.Cit. Part II, Prop. 40, Note 2, p. 78.

(3). Op.Cit. Part II, Prop. 42, p. 79.

blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. --- it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness because he has controlled his lusts, but on the contrary his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself".(1).

#### Criticism.

Spinoza is to be criticized for ignoring the free creative ability of the human mind. He says: "In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to the willing of this or that by a cause, which in turn is determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so on to infinity". (2). As we try to show in Part II of this essay, neither absolute determinism nor perfect freedom maintains in human personality; the only determinism which fulfills the requirements of both a psychology which is scientific and an ethics which allows for freedom, is self-determinism.

#### Section XIV.

##### The Cambridge Platonists.

Ralph Cudworth. 1617 - 1688.

##### Innate.

Cudworth represents an English Platonic intuitionism. Opposing the sensationism of Hobbes, Cudworth holds that sensations, being subjective, passive, and transient, give no knowledge of ultimate reality even in the field where they function, namely, in the physical world. Ultimate reality

(1). Op.Cit. Part V, Prop. 42, p. 263.

(2). Op.Cit. Part II, Prop. 48, p. 85.

is rather apprehended by Reason, intuitively: Reason is active, and not merely passive in its apprehension, as are sensations. Distinctions of good and evil are essential and eternal: it is the very nature of the good to be good; even God can not change this condition after He has created it. "No positive commands whatsoever do make anything morally good or evil, just and unjust, which nature had not made such before". (1). Thus, distinctions of good and evil, having objective reality, are intuitively known through an active Reason.

#### Religion.

This knowledge of good and evil is possible because man participates in the Divine Reason. All ideas are universal conceptions, Platonic "Ideas". Such real, eternal Ideas, both scientific and ethical, all of which are intuitively knowable by man, can subsist only in an eternal mind; therefore God exists.

#### Criticism.

Rational intuitionism tends mistakenly to disregard the affective elements involved in moral problems.

Furthermore, it disregards objective elements in such a practical way, that, as a merely subjective theory, it has difficulty in grounding morality upon a universal authority.

At the same time, however, it is to be remembered that

(1). Cudworth; "A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality", Chap. V, Sec. 5.

there is an element of truth in intuitionism: that is, the highest general principles, qua highest, must be accepted intuitively, for they are not further reducible.

In the next place, Cudworth gives no explicit reply to the question: "When private interests conflict with social interests, what motive has man for preferring the latter?".

Henry More. 1614 - 1687.

More's Platonism is hedonistic: true happiness is said to consist in pleasure which the soul derives from a sense of virtue. This pleasure, apprehended not by the intellect, but by a "boniform faculty," is the motive to virtuous conduct.

Innate.

On the other hand, More says that virtue is an intellectual force of the soul. He apparently considers it to be something innate in man. It "rules over animal suggestions or bodily passions in such a way that in separate actions it easily attains that which is absolutely and simply the best".(1).

This intellectual force of the soul, Right Reason, may be ultimately resolved into "noemata" or moral axioms.(2). These noemata are principles which are in themselves immediately seen to be true - clear and manifest. More's noemata number twenty-three.

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(1). More, "Opera Omnia", "Enchiridion Ethicum", Chap.III.  
(2). Op.Cit. Chap. IV.



### Religion.

Noema XXI states that it is better to obey God than man and our own desires.

### Criticism.

More's hedonism holds that every man should have, to enjoy, that which is his own, and this too, without interference; but to the problem arising when social interest conflicts with private interest, More offers no solution.

The individualized form of the problem, the ever-present self-other problem, is noted by More in Noema XIV: "Whatever good you wish bestowed upon you in given circumstances, you ought yourself to bestow upon another in the same circumstances, so far as can be done without injury to a third party". But this only states the problem: it does not solve any conflict arising between interests of self and of other.

### Section XV.

Richard Cumberland. 1632 - 1718.

Cumberland bases morality upon the one supreme law of rational regard for the common good of all: "The greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all constitutes the happiest state of each and of all, in so far as it can be made the happiest by them, and is necessarily required for the state which they can attain; and then the common good will be the supreme law".(1). "Moreover the sum of these laws is

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(1). Cumberland; "De Legibus Naturae", Chap. I, Sec. 4.

called benevolence or universal love".(1).

#### Socialization.

Cumberland is thus a precursor of utilitarianism. Individual happiness is best secured through the promotion of the general good. "There is no greater power in men by which they may procure for themselves and others a collection of all goods than the desire of pursuing, each his own happiness, and at the same time, the happiness of others". (2).

#### Innate.

Reason is the faculty which determines the best means or actions of promoting happiness. Conscience is Reason, or the knowing faculty in general.

Cumberland says he has not discovered that there are innate ideas of the "laws of nature", whereby conduct is to be guided.

#### Criticism.

Although Cumberland does make a statement which is consistent with the golden rule - "It is inconsistent that one decide to act one way regarding himself and another way regarding others who participate in the same nature" (3), - still he does not offer a clear solution to a possible conflict between the individual's good and the universal good. His utilitarianism seems rather to be only a socialized ego-

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(1). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. 9.

(2). Op. Cit. Chap. I, Sec. 6.

ism. The "happiest state of each" seems to be considered the ultimate goal of the conduct of each.

## LOCKE TO KANT.

### Section XVI.

John Locke. 1632 - 1704.

#### Innate.

John Locke may be considered the founder of English empiricism. He holds that knowledge of general principles is indirectly, inductively, derived from various experiences of sense and action. No ideas are innate, not even an idea of God - an idea which would be innate if any were; therefore, there are no innate ideas at all: "though the knowledge of God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of Him is not innate --- I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it". (1). It follows that neither are moral principles innate; although they may be intuitively learned.

#### Socialization.

Man's ideas of morality are the generalizations made upon moral actions. These ideas result from: first, discernment of the pleasure and pain of mankind; second, comprehension and interpretation of the laws of God, nation, and public opinion; third, education and custom. Of these three sources, education and custom add most to man's moral ideas. "If we therefore examine it aright, we shall find that the

(1). Locke; "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Book I, Chap. III, Sec. 18.

## Chapter IV.

## LOCKE TO KANT.

## Section XVI.

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 (1). Locke; "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Book I, Chap. III, Sec. 18.



measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame --- whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place". (1).

### Integration.

Locke is silent on the nature of disinterested action, considering the summum bonum for the individual to be the procuring of pleasure and the avoiding of pain: "That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil or deprive us of any good". (2). The pursuit of happiness tends to become Locke's integrating motive for the personality.

### Religion.

Locke returns to Deity as the final authority in morality: "The divine law --- is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude, and by comparing (their actions) to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions, that is, whether as duties or sins, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of

(1). Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 10.

(2). Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. XX, Sec. 2.

the Almighty". (1). By the exercise of Reason, man may discover not only his moral duties to God, which become his highest moral rule, but also the very existence and attributes of God.

#### Criticism.

Locke's hedonism erroneously disregards man's innate other-regarding tendencies in favour of a single exclusive self-regarding tendency.

#### Section XVII.

Samuel Clarke. 1675 - 1729.

To Clarke, morality can be "placed among the sciences capable of demonstration, from self-evident propositions as incontestible as those in mathematics".(2).

The duties of man may be divided into three branches: first, duties toward God; second, duties to others, which include justice or doing as one would be done by, and universal love of benevolence which is the promoting of the welfare or happiness of all; and third, duties to one's self, such as self-preservation, temperance, and contentment.

Clarke is a rational intuitionist. The discernment of duties is by the Reason - mere intellectual apprehension. The cognition of them is a sufficient motive to a rational being for performing them, irrespective of any pleasure or pain which might be involved.

(1). Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 8.

(2). Clarke: "Sermons at Boyle's Lectures", Vol. II, p. 84.

These particular duties are based upon certain fundamental "rules of righteousness" which are known intuitively as eternally right, fit, and natural, and which require no support outside themselves. "Virtue and goodness are truly amiable, and to be chosen for their own sake and intrinsic worth". (1).

#### Religion.

In Clarke's system, morality is supported by religion. The more cheerfully and steadily are men's wills determined by the revealed will of God, by that much are they the more excellent and the more in harmony with the eternal, immutable obligations to morality which are incumbent upon them. These obligations are made thus incumbent upon men by the very nature and reason of things.

Ethical obligations are thought of as enforced also by a belief in immortality and future rewards and punishments.

#### Criticism.

Clarke may be criticized, first, on his disregard of the affective element in the moral judgment. A disregard of this element does not answer such psychological egoism as that of Hobbes; and a refutation of Hobbes must precede any safely grounded ethics. Until this refutation is accomplished, "the utmost demonstration of the abstract reasonableness of social duty only leaves us with an irreconcilable antagonism between the view of abstract reason and the self-love which is

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(1). Op.Cit. Vol.II, Sec. VII, p. 97.

allowed to be normal in man's appetitive nature". (1).

A second criticism is, that Clarke leaves egoism and altruism unharmonized. He recognizes the just demands of the interests of others upon the individual, but to a conflict between interests of Self and of others, he offers no solution.

### Section XVIII.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury.

1671 - 1713.

Shaftesbury is the first moralist to emphasize as central the line of thought that there is a normal harmony between man's social affections and his reflective self-love, and to stress the importance of the emotional impulses which prompt to social duty.

### Innate.

The affections or passions natural to an animal are either those "which lead to the good of the public"; or those "which lead to private good"; or those which "are neither of these, nor tending either to any good of public or private, but contrariwise, those which may be therefore justly styled unnatural affections". (2).

Shaftesbury has been styled an aesthetic intuitionist, because he holds that moral distinctions arise from a "moral

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(1). Sidgwick; "Outline of the History of Ethics", p.183.

(2). Shaftesbury; "Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times", Vol. II, "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit", Book II, Part I, Chap. I, Sec. III, pp.86-87.





sense", which is affected by the moral qualities of actions just as the sense of beauty is affected by the beauty of objects, and as man's body is affected by the physical qualities of objects.

### Integration.

Moral goodness is beauty in the sphere of the affections, for it implies a harmony or fitness of parts within a whole, to which "the heart can not possibly remain neutral". (1). If some affections are "in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of inequality in the conduct, and incline the party to a wrong moral practice". (2). Sentient happiness results from the affective harmony which is the essence of virtue. The criterion of the correctness of this proportion between parts is the tendency to promote the good of all men.

### Ego-Alter.

Goodness depends upon the coexistence of innate impulses of two kinds: social affections and self-love. "To be well-affected towards the public interest and one's own is not only consistent but inseparable. --- In order that virtue be the result, --- there must be maintained a just proportion, balance, and harmony of these different elements". (3).

Furthermore, "--- moral rectitude or virtue must --- be

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- (1). Op.Cit., Book I, Part II, Sec.3, p. 30.
- (2). Op.Cit., Book II, Part II, Sec. I, p. 92.
- (3). Op.Cit., Book II, Part I, Sec. I, p. 81.

the advantage, and vice the injury and disadvantage of every creature".

### Criticism.

Shaftesbury is to be criticized on his failure to achieve any real harmonization or identity between public and private good: that is, "to prove the exact coincidence of the two points by any close or cogent reasoning". Although claiming a normal harmony exists between the two, he does not show how this harmony is possible. Conflict, in fact, may actually exist; and although Shaftesbury speaks of a balancing of the two coexistent impulses, he does not offer any method of harmonization in case of a conflict.

In the next place, the gratification of the social feeling within man may be, in his theory, purely egoistic: the possibility remains that altruism may be based only upon egoism. Shaftesbury really maintains an hedonistic attitude.

In the third place, Shaftesbury inconsistently derives a knowledge of an objective good from a subjective moral sense.

Finally, Shaftesbury, holding that no speculative opinion can "exclude or destroy the moral sense", gives the appearance of substituting "taste" in contradistinction to Reason and Conscience as the ultimate standard of right and wrong. But "taste" is not fundamental in moral evaluation: it is resolvable into a sense of the beautiful. Furthermore, it requires much exercise for its development and culture before it becomes functionally efficient.

## Section XIX.

Bernard de Mandeville. 1670 - 1733.

## Innate.

The "Fable of the Bees" is a satire upon artificial society, which aims at exposing the "hollowness of the so-called dignity of human nature". Mandeville, considering that the passions are evil, and that the spring of human conduct is almost wholly these passions, holds that the real basis of society is the evil of human nature. By the substitution of reason, passions are to be eliminated.

## Ego-Alter.

On the problem of the relationship existing between "self-interest" and "other-interest", Mandeville holds that man "centres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates but for his own sake": that is, one's concern for others is HIS concern, after all. We not only have no innate love for others, but we are also even regardless of the effect of our conduct upon them. Pity seeks only its own relief from the experience which evokes it, and not any benefit for the object of pity; it should therefore be curbed if any benefit to society is to be produced.

## Socialization.

Mandeville claims that morality, being unnatural to man, results from the "skillful management of wary politicians" (1)

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(1). "The Fable of the Bees", "An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue", p. 37.

who have succeeded in persuading men that it is best for everyone to prefer the public interest to his own. This "socialization", if it can be called such, is effected by the contrivance "honour", which is only an imaginary recompense for the thwarting of the self-interest in the interest of society. Thus virtue becomes purely artificial - a device of scheming men "who played on the pride and vanity of the 'silly creature man' ". *an act of rationalism and hedonism: "happiness is significant for morals and hedonism: as it is reducible to truth".*

*criticism.* **Criticism.**

The Mandeville furnishes an incomplete and a very unflattering picture of human nature. He is to be criticized for his disregard of practically all man's innate social tendencies.

In the second place, he confuses virtue with ascetic suppression. Native impulses are not to be annihilated, as though they were evils; rather are they to be organized and controlled, as being potentially good. *not law of the religion*

In the third place, although a person's impulse is his own impulse, still, it can not, for that reason, be called an evil self-love. "If it aims at one's own aggrandizement, it may be called self-love; if it aims at others' welfare, it is hardly such".(1). *Ego-Altru.*

#### Section XX.

William Wollaston. 1659 - 1724.

#### Integration.

For Wollaston, morality is based "in the nature of

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(1).Lamprecht,Article,"TheFable of the Bees","Journal of Philosophy", Vol. 23, 1926, p. 561.



things"; if things but "speak for themselves", they "proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity": that is, the nature and relation of things determine their moral character. Bad action contains the denial of the truth: "Immorality implies the truth of the proposition, and then acts as if it were not true; 'or practically' denies the admittedly true proposition".

Wollaston's theory is really an approach to the reconciliation of rationalism and hedonism : "happiness is significant for morals only in so far as it is reducible to truth". "The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other. --- Nothing can produce the ultimate happiness of any being which interferes with truth". (1). Harmony of the two is a matter of religion; but this is not a revealed religion. By religion Wollaston means nothing else but "an obligation to do what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done".(2). "The great law of the religion of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, is - that every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; or that he should treat everything as being what it is".(3).

#### Ego-Alter.

In estimating things truly, the Self must not disregard other; the individual must be socialized if he is to be con-

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- (1). Wollaston; "The Religion of Nature Deliniated", "Of Moral Good and Evil", Sec. II, par. 14, p. 40.
  - (2). Op.Cit., Sec. II, par. 14, p.25.
  - (3). Op.Cit., p.26.

sidered moral. "When things are truly estimated, persons concerned, times, places, ends intended, and effects that naturally follow, must be added to them". (1).

#### Criticism.

In spite of the consideration given to these conditions by a person, Wollaston fails to show how the interests of the considering person and the interests of the person considered are identical: that is, the ego-alter problem remains unsolved.

#### Section XXI.

Joseph Butler. m1692 - 1752.

Joseph Butler has been styled an autonomic intuitionist because he held that man is morally a law unto himself - autonomous.

#### Innate.

There are three innate emotional principles of the human mind: impulses, some of which are altruistic; a calculated self-concern; and the deliberative and regulative principle of reflection, namely, conscience. The social affections, which work toward social harmony, and benevolence, which seeks directly the good of others, are as natural to man as the egoistic tendencies. "There are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature that we were made for society, and to do good to our fellow creatures, as that we were in-

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(1). Op. Cit., Sec. I, par. 6.

tended to take care of our own life and health and private good". (1).

As a guide of man's higher nature, conscience is supreme over the natural passions and instincts; "follow nature" is a reasonable rule, only if it be recognized that man's nature is constituted for virtue as truly as for vice. Regarding conscience, Butler says it "is a superior principle of reflection --- which distinguishes between the internal principles of one's heart, as well as his external actions: which passes judgment upon himself and them; --- which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly. --- It carries its own authority with it; -- it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature". (2).

#### Integration.

Butler holds that the two authorities within, "Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way" (3), that is, to the goal, happiness. "The nature of man considered in his public or social capacity leads him to a right behaviour in society, to that course of life which we call virtue. --- But men are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally

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(1). Butler; "Fifteen Sermons", Bernard. Sermon I, p.27.

(2). Op.Cit. Sermon II, pp. 45, 54.

(3). Op.Cit. Sermon III, p. 57.

so to both by the same actions". (1). Man's unhappiness results either from a lack of a cool and reasonable concern for himself; or, if he does so consider wherein lies his chief happiness, he does not act accordingly. If men did so act, all society would become an harmonious whole.

Although happiness is a goal for man, his desire is not aroused by the anticipation of its own satisfaction, but rather seeks its appropriate object directly. Butler thus escapes a psychological hedonism. It follows, that love of neighbour may be considered to be disinterested, even though it directly ministers to personal happiness. And furthermore, man's happiness depends as surely upon his permitting the functioning of this benevolent impulse as upon the functioning of any other of his innate impulses.

#### Integration.

The inward law of conscience is obligatory, and under its authority man's nature would be a system, with all his active principles functioning in such a way that they would promote and not oppose the end for which they were given him. Conscience and self-love are coordinate: neither needs to be subordinated to the other. Social and private happiness are not mutually exclusive and antagonistic. Conscience is a guide to general happiness in which one's own is included by a beneficent Creator.

(1). Op. Cit. Sermon I, p. 37.



### Criticism.

Butler does not give satisfactory grounds for the harmonization of the interests of self and the obligatoriness of conscience. This harmony can not be satisfactorily accounted for on the assumption that the beneficence of the Creator precludes any inherent antagonism between them. If conscience is considered to be supreme, no other criterion can be consistently considered as sharing that finality: in Butler's case, his hedonism, manifested in his theory that the end of self-love is personal well-being or pleasure, and his purism which considers conscience final, are harmonized, but on the basis of an inconsistent assumption.

### Section XXII.

Francis Hutcheson. 1694 - 1747.

#### Innate.

Hutcheson believes in "the inherent beauty of goodness", intuitively appreciable by a "moral sense". "This perception of moral good is not derived from custom, education, example, or study". (1). Rather, "we have a distinct perception of beauty or excellence in the kind affections of rational agents, whence we are determined to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us, independent of our will". (2).

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- (1). Hutcheson; "An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil", from "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue", Sec. I, par. VII, pp. 133-134.
  - (2). Op.Cit. Sec. I, par. I, pp. 118-119.

This moral sense does not suppose any "innate ideas, knowledge, or practical proposition". Hutcheson means by it "only a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions when they occur to our observation, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them". (1).

The moral faculty is, for Hutcheson, the moral standard, but it does not give unconditional knowledge of its objects, for it improves with experience. This possibility of improvement explains any differences in the moral standards of different men, ages, and nations.

#### Ego-Alter.

Besides this moral sense or conscience, which is a first "calm determination" of action, there are within man a second and third, namely, self-love and love of others or benevolence.

Hutcheson seems to identify benevolence with virtue, considering the true spring of virtuous action to be "some determination of our nature to study the good of others; or some instinct, antecedent to all reason from interest, which influences us to the love of others; even as the moral sense above explained determines us to approve the actions which flow from this love in ourselves or others".(2).

(1). Op.Cit., Sec. I, par. VII, p. 135.

(2). Op.Cit., Sec. II, par. IX, p. 155.

This benevolence is disinterested: although its practice gives pleasure to the benevolent one, that pleasure can not be directly obtained by practicing benevolence for the purpose of obtaining that pleasure. "All the passions and affections justify themselves". They are neither chosen for their concomitant pleasure, nor voluntarily brought upon ourselves with a view to private good ---", but are evoked by the "uneasiness" inherent in them : "in the pleasant passions, we do not love because it is pleasant to love; we do not choose this state because it is an advantageous or pleasant state: this passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper object, a morally good character". (1).

#### Integration, Religion.

Personal integration is for Hutcheson a proportionate balancing of innate tendencies. Benevolence and the moral sense are by nature harmonious; religion is the efficient means of integrating all three elements, self-love, benevolence, and the moral sense. Integration of these, through acknowledgment of God, issues in the highest personal happiness.

In his attitude toward happiness, Hutcheson approaches the utilitarian criterion: "the virtue is in a compound ratio of the quantity of good and the number of enjoyers". (2).

#### Criticism.

Even though a moral sense theory were acceptable,

- (1). Op.Cit., Sec. II, par. VIII, p. 154.  
 (2). Op.Cit., Sec. III, par. VII, p. 177.

Hutcheson's concept of such a sense or innate conscience is vague. He is not clear whether it is a mere passive faculty or "taste", or whether it is also an active, rational, cognitive, judicial faculty which passes judgments, as well as feels and acts instinctively as the feeling prompts.

He furthermore seems ready to admit that the moral sense varies from man to man. But by admitting its variability, Hutcheson precludes the possibility of securing, by means of the moral sense theory, an acceptable ultimate authority for morality.

A final criticism of Hutcheson is, that he fails to give an explanation as to the method of harmonizing self-love and other-love: he does not make clear how the three "calm determinations", moral sense, self-love, and benevolence, can coincide.

#### Section XXIII.

David Hartley. 1705 - 1757.

Hartley applies associationism to ethics, holding "the deduction of all our moral judgments, approbations, and disapprobations from association alone". (1). Virtues are associated in experience with rewards; vices are associated in experience with punishments; and "this association in experience, repeated, will at last beget in us a general, mixed, pleasing idea and consciousness when we reflect upon

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(1). Hartley: "Observations on Man", Chap. I, Sec. II, Prop. 12, p. 499.



our own virtuous affections or actions; a sense of guilt and anxiety when we reflect on the contrary; and also raise in us the love and esteem of virtue and the hatred of vice in others". (1).

Benevolence is not an innate feeling: it is developed by a detailed process: "the benefits we receive from the virtues of others, and contrary mischiefs from their vices, lead us first to love and hatred of the persons themselves by association". (2). The love for the people exhibiting the virtues, and the hatred for those showing the vices, are then transferred, by association, to the virtues and vices themselves.

Moreover, man is expected to assume at least, the appearance of benevolence; and the pretense begets the real feeling. Again, praise, blame, and mutual exchange of benefits become associated with the feeling of benevolence, so that there develops a tendency to be benevolent apart from any expectation of reward.

#### Ego-Alter. Religion.

The ideal aim of man, though probably not attainable in this life, is to continue his development toward benevolence until self-interest is completely subordinated to it. But "benevolence can never be free from partiality and selfishness until we take our station in the Divine Nature and view everything from thence". Until this ideal be attained, Hart-

(1). Op.Cit., p. 495.

(2). Op.Cit., p. 496.

ley admits the necessity of substituting for the general rule of universal benevolence several other rules less general and more immediately practicable: among which are obedience to Scripture; preference of closely related persons to strangers and of benevolent, religious persons to others; and regard to the moral sense of ourselves and others.

Another religious tenet of Hartley's is that the feelings connected with virtue are strengthened by meditation on God, prayer, and by the hopes and fears regarding a future life: "All meditations upon God, who is the inexhaustible fountain --- of all perfection --- and also all kinds of prayer--- transfer by association, all the perfection, greatness, and gloriousness of his natural attributes upon his moral ones, that is, upon moral rectitude". (1).

Innate.

Hartley holds that an authoritative moral sense is not innate. Rather, " --- all the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, and the- pathy, as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of our natures, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice". (2). Hartley says that it "will be necessary in order to support the opinion of a moral instinct, to produce instances where moral judgments arise in us, independently of

(1). Op.Cit. p. 497.

(2). Op.Cit. p. 497.

prior associations determining thereto". (1).

### Criticism.

We criticize Hartley for his sweeping associationism which is made to explain the derivation of all the more complex mental phenomena, including those involved in volitional morality, from simpler physiological sensations; mental development is thought of as consisting of an "aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct". But the process is rather, we think, a segmentation of what is originally continuous. In other words, the unity of the moral agent is, for an ethical psychology, the point of departure. Psychology begins with the reacting individual, an individual which is a unit. Association itself needs explanation as well as the unity for which it is offered as an explanation. The acceptable explanation lies probably in an affective continuity of interest of the individual.

In the next place, Hartley offers no solution to any chance conflict ( which is left possible ) between his several less general maxims, as one might attempt to apply these to any specific deliberate acts. And as an ultimate guide, Hartley's moral sense, based as it is upon the pleasures and pains of sensations, is hardly trustworthy.

### Section XXIV.

Adam Smith. 1723 - 1790.

### Innate.

For Adam Smith, the ethical standard is the judgment of

(1). Op.Cit. p. 498. -----

a supposed well-informed impartial spectator or critic who is one of two persons into which a man divides himself. This spectator in his approval and disapproval of one's actions, represents the rest of society and is at the same time to be identified with conscience, a "sense of propriety" which seems to be a demigod within the breast to whom God delegates authority. The general rules of morality "are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety approve or disapprove of". (1).

#### Ego-Alter.

The moral faculty is not an innate "moral sense", but is rather a general "fellow-feeling with any passion whatever"(2): that is, it is reducible to sympathy. "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the future of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it". (3). Sympathy is the ultimate element into which moral sentiments can be analyzed.

Smith does not analyze the motives leading to self-sacrifice for others, but he does recognize its existence.

(1). Smith; "The Theory of the Moral Sentiments", Part III, Chap. IV, p. 224.

(2). Op. Cit., p. 5.

(3). Op. Cit., Part I, Sec. I, Chap. I.



### Religion.

Smith ignores the existence of a revelation of moral and religious truths, and grounds for himself a natural religion upon an accepted benevolent and just administration of the universe.

### Criticism.

By means of sympathy, Smith accomplishes a psychological explanation for the force which "conscience" can exert. We agree that sympathy is basic in the moralizing of the non-moral individual, but would hold in addition, as we attempt to show in Part II, that the moral sentiments are different from and more complex than mere sympathy.

Furthermore, Smith's conception of sympathy is at times confused. He fails to distinguish clearly between primitive passive sympathy and active benevolent sympathy, and to show the relation between the two.

Neither does he solve the ego-alter problem. He notes the existence of innate other-regarding tendencies, and says that the happiness of alter is necessary to the happiness of self; but on the one hand conflict between the two remains possible and to a possible conflict Smith offers no solution; and on the other hand there is here a tendency to make happiness of self the criterion of the good - to base altruism on egoism.

In maintaining the inerrancy of the guidance of the "impartial spectator", Smith fails to explain the variation in moral standards of individuals, and in moral customs of

various ages and communities. A subjective moral sense does not, alone, furnish a satisfactory basis for an objective morality. Neither does it account for the great influence which social usages exert upon the individual consciences.

Finally, Smith does not successfully harmonize the two tenets: first, the "impartial spectator" is a product of society; second, this spectator is a demigod within the breast to whom God delegates authority. In other words, Smith fails to keep separate the naturalistic method and the intuitional method in ethics.

#### Section XXV.

William Paley. 1743 - 1805.

Paley says that "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness". (1). The standard here is two-fold: the will of Deity and utility or human happiness.

Moral obligation depends upon the command of God: "the will of God is our rule", and is to be learned "by His express declarations, when they are to be had; and which must be sought for in Scripture". (2).

One decides moral questions by estimating the tendency of the various possible actions to promote or diminish his happiness, considering also his eternal happiness: I am

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- (1). Paley; "The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy", Book I, Chap. VII.
- (2). Op.Cit., Book II, Chap. IV.

urged to keep my word "by a violent motive ( namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, or punished for it if I do not ), resulting from the command of another ( namely God )". (1).

Paley implies the absence of any disinterested sentiment and of any innate moral distinctions.

#### Criticism.

Paley, urging as he does, morality "for the sake of everlasting happiness", is to be criticized for basing morality upon a mere prudential egoism.

#### Section XXVI.

Jeremy Bentham. 1748 - 1832.

Jeremy Bentham is utilitarian. The supreme end of conduct is "the greatest happiness to the greatest number": "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. --- The principle of utility ( of greatest happiness or greatest felicity ) recognises this subjection ---. By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: --- if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a par-

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(1). Op.Cit., Book II, Chap. III.

ticular individual, then the happiness of that individual".(1).

#### Innate.

Men are induced to obey useful rules by one of "four sanctions or sources of pain and pleasure": physical, political, moral or popular, and religious. "Of these four, the physical is altogether, we may observe, the groundwork of the political and moral: so it is also of the religious in so far as the latter bears relation to the present life". (2).

Although Bentham gives the intellect or Reason a large place in making up the moral faculty of man, he conceives of it as merely cooperating with man's sensibilities to pleasure and pain. Other constituents of the moral faculty are : good will or benevolence, love of amity, and the dictates of religion with a view to the happiness of others; and Prudence with a view to the individual's own happiness. Happiness is the mere presence of pleasure and the absence of pain.

#### Religion.

Religion is one of the moral sanctions, but men often pervert it into an enemy of utility. Bentham distrusts scriptural interpretations as being only the distorting amplifications made by individuals, who thereby reveal their own "presumptive will". But if man could obtain a clear statement of the divine will, Bentham holds that revelation would be the revelation of a will desirous of securing happiness for man.

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(1). "Works", (Bowring), Vol. I, Chap. I, p.1.

(2). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. II, p. 14.



## Ego-Alter.

Bentham notes the claim of socius upon self when he speaks of considering motives "according to the influence which they appear to have on the interests of the other members of the community, laying the interests of the party himself out of the question". (1). He further states that "the dictates of utility are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened ( that is, well advised ) benevolence". (2).

Bentham mentions an entity to which some ascribe the unifying of personality, namely, "disposition"; but Bentham says it is fictitious, and that "it is with disposition as with everything else - it will be good or bad, according to its effects; according to the effects it has in augmenting or diminishing the happiness of the community". (3).

## Criticism.

In ascribing to pleasure and pain, man's "two sovereign masters" the function "to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do", Bentham becomes guilty of psychological hedonism.

Furthermore, in his later works, Bentham assumes that the conduct conducive to general happiness always coincides with that which conduces most to the happiness of the agent. But by Bentham's method of hedonistic calculation, it is difficult,

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(1). Op.Cit., Chap. X, Sec. XXXIV, p. 56.

(2). Op.Cit., Chap. X, Sec. XXXVI.

(3). Op.Cit., Chap. XI, Sec. II.

in complex social conditions, to prove this universal harmony of interests.

In his earlier writings, however, Bentham plainly says that the only interests which a man at all times can find adequate motives for consulting are his own. This earlier attitude classifies Bentham as an egoistic utilitarian.

The ego-alter problem is thus left really unsolved by Bentham: for if, in the calculation, "every one is to count for one, and no one for more than one", what motive would induce an individual to prefer such an equitable distribution of pleasures to an increase in his own?

#### Section XXVII.

Richard Price. 1723 - 1791.

Innate.

"Morality is eternal and immutable", says Price.(1). The conceptions "right" and "wrong" are "single ideas", unanalyzable ultimates. All rational beings immediately and necessarily approve of moral actions when they see them: "To behold virtue is to admire her --- to perceive vice is the very same as to blame and condemn ---" (2). That is, moral ideas are derived from "the intuition of truth or immediate discernment of the nature of things by the understanding". But "in men it is necessary that the rational principle,

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(1). Price; "A Review of the Principle Questions and Difficulties in Morals", p.77.

(2). Op.Cit., Chap. II, p. 95.

or the intellectual discernment of right and wrong, should be aided by somewhat instinctive --- our Maker has wisely provided supplies for the imperfections ( of Reason ); and established a due balance in our frame by annexing to our intellectual perceptions sensations and instincts which give them greater weight and force".(1). "In short, the truth seems to be that, in contemplating the actions and affections of moral agents, we have both a perception of the understanding, and a feeling of the heart".(2). In these statements, Price maintains the existence of an affective element accompanying intellectual intuition of right and wrong, but subordinates the former to the latter.

#### Ego-Alter.

Although Price holds that "it is absurd to deny disinterested benevolence", he does not consider it to be the whole of virtue.

#### Criticism.

Price does not show how to resolve the difficulty which arises when this benevolent tendency conflicts with egoistic tendencies.

#### Section XXVIII.

Claude Adrien Helvétius. 1715 - 1771.

Helvétius seriously tries to reduce all morality to di-

(1). Op.Cit., Chap. II, p. 99.

(2). Op. Cit., Chap. II, p. 100.

rect self-interest. In this consistent attempt, he becomes purely materialistic, reducing all man's faculties to sensations, and differentiating man from beast only by an increased intricacy of organization. ~~he is the receiver and organizer of~~

~~sensations.~~                      Innate.

The only spring of human action is self-interest - pleasure and pain. Virtue coincides with private happiness, based upon self-love. "The most numerous class of men are entirely devoted to their own interests, never considering the general interest". (1). "Personal interest is the only and universal estimator of the merit of men's actions". (2).

Self-interest is, even to society, the sole motive for action and the only criterion of virtue: "--- the public, like particular societies, is, in its judgments, only determined by the motive of its own interest". (3). Virtue, for society, is only a desire of the general happiness: "Le mot de vertu, le desir du bonheur public". (4).

#### Criticism.

Helvétius, emphasizing only one aspect of the moral problem, mistakenly disregards, as other egoists have done, the social and altruistic elements innate in man. Neither does he offer any harmonization between self and socius: each person is, for himself, the end of all conduct.

(1). Helvétius; "De l'Esprit", Discours II, "De la Probité", Chap. II, p. 56.

(2). Op.Cit., p. 60.

(3). Op. Cit., Chap. XI, p. 133.

(4). Op. Cit., Chap. XIII, p. 155.



Further, man's faculties are not all reducible to sensation. An exclusive sensationism overlooks man's original psychic endowment, and disregards the presence of an initial unity or entity or Self to be the receiver and organizer of sensations.

Helvétius is mistaken also in holding to a psychological hedonism. Self-interest is not the sole spring of human action.

David Hume is an empiricist, holding that knowledge of general principles is not reached directly or intuitively, but is derived rather by way of induction from particular sensory and emotional experiences; in this process of attaining ideas, the function of reason is not to make discoveries, but rather to retain and coordinate what the senses offer. Hume consequently opposes the rationalism of Clarke and Overton: "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of any active principle as conscience, or a sense of morals".

Hume thus gives the account of his application of this inductive empirical method to ethics: "In order to attain this purpose (to discover the true origin of morals), we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: we shall exclude the complication of mental qualities which form what, in common life, we call personal merit; we shall consider every attribute of the mind which renders a man an object of esteem or affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit, or sentiment, or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame: --- the very

## Chapter V.

## SCOTTISH MORALISTS.

## Section XXIX.

David Hume. 1711 - 1776.

Innate.

David Hume is an empiricist, holding that knowledge of general principles is not reached directly or intuitively, but is derived rather by way of induction from particular sensory and emotional experiences; in this process of attaining ideas, the function of Reason is not to make discoveries, but rather to retain and coordinate what the senses offer. Hume consequently opposes the rationalism of Clarke and Cudworth: "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals".

Hume thus gives the account of his application of this inductive empirical method to ethics: "In order to attain this purpose ( to discover the true origin of morals ), we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: we shall analyse the complication of mental qualities which form what, in common life, we call personal merit: we shall consider every attribute of the mind which renders a man an object either of esteem or affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit, or sentiment, or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame; --- the very

nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides which are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blamable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived".(1).

For Hume, morality is "more properly felt than judged of". Feelings rather than Reason are the motives of all our voluntary actions. Hume practically holds to a psychological hedonism, and identifies the good with pleasure and the evil with pain. Upon his psychological hedonism he bases his arguments for utilitarianism: "Sympathy, becoming generalized by thought, yields public utility as the first universal standard of morality". "And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit, so no other will be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason ---". (2).

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- (1). Hume; "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals",  
Sec. I, par. 138, p. 173.
- (2). Op. Cit., "On Personal Merit", Sec. IX, par. 219, p.270.

But the "natural unprejudiced reason" is not an Hutchesonian "moral sense", an ultimate, unanalyzable instinct. Such a sense is, for Hume, derived; derived not only from self-interest and custom, but from sympathy - a fellow-feeling with the happiness and misery of others which is "a principle in human nature, beyond which we can not hope to find any principle more general". Sympathy becomes then "the chief source of moral distinctions". "The pleasure which arises from views of utility may be resolved into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy". (1).

But love of mankind as such, independent of personal qualities or services, or of relation to one's self, does not exist in man's mind. A general indefinite sympathy arises from frequently sympathizing with different persons.

#### Socialization.

As to the socialization of the elements in man, Hume says that associations of custom and tradition originate with education, and continue to operate in society partly because it is generally felt that virtues are of advantage to every person in the community, and partly because they naturally possess influence. Sympathy is the main root of moral obligation, but the latter is strengthened by the cooperation of public praise, education, and custom. Hume writes: "We may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane,

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(1). Op.Cit., Sec. IX, par. 221, p. 272.



beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction derived to society from his intercourse and good offices".(1). For example, "--- the necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue".(2).

#### Ego-Alter.

In the self-other relationship, Hume states in one place that justice in society rests finally on self-interest. However, a sympathy with others, it must be remembered, exists, according to other statements of Hume's, and although it is not considered as leading to unrecompensed self-sacrifice, it is taken to be one inducement to virtue. Hume notes the other-regarding tendencies in these words: "--- no qualities are more entitled to the general good will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection, and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others and a generous concern for our kind and species". (3).

The other inducement to virtue is self-love or prudence; these two together tend to promote the good both of self and of others.

#### Criticism.

Hume leaves the personality of man unintegrated, and ego and alter unharmonized. In his earlier writings, sympathy

(1). Op.Cit., Sec. II, Part II, par. 141, p. 178.

(2). Op.Cit., Sec. III, Part I, par. 163.

(3). Op. Cit., Sec. II, Part I, par. 140, p. 178.

means really only an altruistic hedonism. Interests of others are, in such a theory, only submerged into interests of self - there is no real harmonization. In his later writings, Hume's thought develops from this earlier egoism to a principle of benevolence, but he wavers between the two, and leaves the problem in an unsatisfactory state.

In the second place, we criticize Hume for his psychological hedonism. We believe, on the other hand, that actions are evoked by their appropriate stimuli or objects, and sometimes, irrespective of contingent satisfaction. As men eat, urged to do so by hunger, and not merely by the anticipation of the pleasure derived from eating, so a consciousness of duty may become a practical incentive to action, quite apart from any anticipation of pain or pleasure attached to that action.

A third criticism of Hume touches his theory that the self is a "bundle" of impressions, ideas, and feelings. The ethical Self, however, is, we think, more than such a "bundle": it is rather a reacting unity. Hume, moreover, in a way which is inconsistent with his "bundle" theory, seems to assume a continuing unity or self which is of such a nature that it can regard a remote good. (1).

Finally, to the hedonistic theory, particularly prominent in Hume's earlier writings, moral obligation means very little. There is little morality in an act which is performed

(1). See also Rogers; "A Short History of Ethics", pp.187 ff.

by a person who is so constituted that he must perform that act merely because he foresees the pleasure resulting from its performance.

### Section XXX.

Thomas Reid. 1710 - 1796.

To Reid is likely due the characteristic later form of Scottish philosophy - a philosophy of "common sense".

Reid says that "morals like all other sciences, must have first principles", and he points out the following.

#### " A. Relating to Virtue in General.

1. There are some things in human conduct that merit approbation and praise, others that merit blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame are due to different actions.
2. What is in no degree voluntary, can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame.
3. What is done from unavoidable necessity may be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but can not be the object either of blame or of moral approbation.
4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not.
5. We ought to use the best means we can to be well-informed of our duty ---.
6. It ought to be our most serious concern to do our duty as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds against every temptation to deviate from it ---.

### B. Relating to Particular Branches of Virtue.

1. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more distant, to a less; and a less evil to a greater.
2. As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and to act agreeably to it.
3. No man is born for himself only ---.
4. --- What we approve in others, that we ought to practice in like circumstances, and what we condemn in others, we ought not to do.
5. To every man who believes the existence, the perfections, and the providence of God, the veneration and submission we owe to him is self-evident." (1).

#### Ego-Alter.

As the third axiom above states, Reid acknowledges the obligations resting on man to consider the interests of others. Indeed, he considers our own "good on the whole" to include "that of others indirectly, through the 'Benevolent affections planted in our constitution', the exercise of which makes a 'capital part of our happiness' ". (2).

#### Integration.

Reid intimates that integration may possibly be achieved within a personality if the non-rational impulses are under

(1). Reid; "Essays on the Active Powers of Man", Essay V, Chap. I, pp. 370 - 377.

(2). James Seth; "The Scottish Contribution to Moral Philosophy", p. 36.



the control of the rational. The non-rational springs of action which per se are legitimate and yet are to be controlled by Reason are: first, mechanical instincts and habits; and second, the three animal principles which he terms appetites, desires, and affections.

All original and natural impulses are legitimate in their proper places, but the "regard for one's good on the whole" ( the sphere of prudence ), and a sense of duty ( the sphere of virtue ), are two coordinate Rational principles by the exercise of which these natural tendencies are to be governed.

#### Innate.

Reid favours an original internal power or moral sense by the free use of which moral judgments are made: "By an original power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the moral faculty, we have the conception of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation and our other moral conceptions; and by the same faculty we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; and the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties". (1).

This conscience, a faculty unique to man, comes to maturity by insensible degrees, through education, training,

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(1). Op.Cit., Essay III, Part III, Chap. VI, p. 243.

exercise, and habit. "There is a strong analogy between the progress of the body from infancy to maturity, and the progress of all the powers of the mind. The progression in both is the work of nature, and in both may be greatly aided or hurt by proper education." (1). Conscience is innate only in germ, but when matured, it can attain moral truth.

#### Religion.

Religion furnishes, in a due reverence to God, one of the fundamental moral axioms. For Reid, "Virtue without piety is incomplete". Natural theology also furnishes him a final reconciliation between virtue and prudence. "While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it is impossible that any man should, in the issue, be a loser by doing his duty". (2).

#### Criticism.

Reid fails to account for an integration of personality in a clear way, around any inclusive motive or ideal. He holds that all natural impulses are legitimate, but to any conflict between the functioning of these developing innate elements, Reid offers no satisfactory solution. In case of conflict between ego and alter, the interests of both of which are legitimate, Reid can only suggest as a solution

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(1). Op.Cit., Essay V, Chap. I, p. 379.

(2). James Seth, "The Scottish Contribution to Moral Philosophy", p. 36, quoting Reid, Op.Cit., Essay III, Part III, Chap. VIII.

that the exercise of benevolence furnishes happiness to the individual. The issue of this solution is that altruism has an egoistic basis.

### Section XXXI.

Dugald Stewart. 1753 - 1828.

#### Innate.

Stewart says that "The primary sources of our activity are the circumstances that influence the will. These are

I. Appetites, such as hunger, thirst, sex.

II. Desires for knowledge, which is curiosity; society; esteem; power, which is ambition; superiority, which is emulation.

III. Affections, including Benevolent and Malevolent.

IV. Self-love.

V. Moral faculty". (1). In addition to these sources of activity operative in man, there are the four secondary cooperating principles which Stewart calls decency, sympathy, a sense of the ridiculous, and taste.

When these principles "are suffered to pass the bounds of moderation", the word "passion" is applicable to them.

All these active principles, whether ultimate facts of man's mental constitution or resolvable into other more general facts, are "to be regarded as constituent parts of hu-

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(1). Stewart; "Outlines of Moral Philosophy", Part II, Chap. I, Sec. I, pars. 112 - 119.

man nature". (1).

Stewart does not reduce benevolence to egoism: "Notwithstanding the pleasure arising from the indulgence of the benevolent affections, these have nothing selfish in their origin". (2). But he does hold that "it is implied in the very idea of happiness that it is a desirable object; and therefore self-love is an active principle very different from those previously considered". (3).

#### Ego-Alter.

In motivating his attitude to others, man has inherent within him the two secondary principles of sympathy and a sense of the ridiculous. The latter renders trifling imperfections a source of amusement, thus arousing exertion to correct them.

In treating definitely of one's attitude to others, Stewart says: "Our duties to our fellows are benevolence, justice, veracity". (4). "Benevolence which is an object of moral approbation is a fixed and settled disposition to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures". (5). "Justice is that disposition which leads us, in cases where our own temper, passions, or interests are concerned, to determine and to act without being biased by partial consid-

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(1). Op. Cit., par. 139.

(2). Op. Cit., par. 146.

(3). Op. Cit., par. 161.

(4). Op. Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Sec. II, par. 351.

(5). Op. Cit., par. 329.



erations". (1). Veracity, he says, is instinctive: "There is in the human mind a natural or instinctive principle of veracity. --- Truth is always the spontaneous and native expression of the mind".(2).

Stewart also allows for duties to one's self. Self-love, or the desire for happiness, is morally as legitimate as benevolence. Prudence, temperance, and fortitude are the three duties to one's self. (3).

#### Integration.

For the harmonious integration of these elements of personality, Stewart might be said to offer the regulative functioning of Reason. "The constitution of man, if it were composed merely of the active principles ( of appetites, desires, affections ) would be analogous to that of the brutes. His reason, however, renders his nature and condition, on the whole, essentially different from theirs". (4). Beasts "are incapable of looking forward to consequences"(5); but "man is able to avail himself of past experience, in avoiding those enjoyments which he knows will be succeeded by suffering; --- he is able to form a general notion of Happiness and to deliberate about the most effectual means of attaining it". (6).

(1). Op.Cit., par. 332.

(2). Op.Cit., par. 357.

(3). Op. Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Sec. III, par. 388.

(4). Op. Cit., Part II, Chap. I, Sec. V, par. 154.

(5). Op. Cit., par. 155.

(6). Op.Cit., par. 160.

Stewart approaches the thesis of this essay when he says that cooperating with our moral powers in their influence on conduct is a "decency or regard to Character", which sense of decency exerts an influence of self-command and self-denial. This sense of decency is closely akin to the sentiment of self-regard, or self-respect.

Stewart speaks clearly to our thesis when he says: "It is necessary for us to form to ourselves some plan or system of conduct, in subordination to which all other objects are to be pursued".(1). In this way there is attained a happiness which arises "chiefly from the mind". (2). It seems that Stewart would but say that a peace of mind, or happiness, results from the integration of a personality, which integration has been effected by the acceptance, on the part of the person, of a sufficiently comprehensive ideal of conduct.

Stewart speaks of the authority exercised by an innate moral faculty or "moral taste" (3), which he calls conscience: "The various duties all agree with each other in one quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority - the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word Virtue". (4).

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(1). Op.Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Sec. III, Art. 3, par.375.

(2). Op. Cit., par. 387.

(3). Op.Cit., par. 198.

(4). Op.Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Art. IV, par. 422.

This sense of duty "is not resolvable into a regard to our happiness".(1). It judges right and wrong. The words right and wrong express simple ideas, or ideas "incapable of analysis". (2).

So, it "is absurd to ask why we are bound to practice virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation". (3).

#### Religion.

Stewart supports the immutability and eternalness of moral distinctions by summoning a belief in the goodness of God. " --- if moral distinctions be not immutable and eternal, it is absurd to speak of the goodness or of the justice of God." (4).

By an appeal to the same belief, he speaks of a future balancing of accounts between virtue and happiness: "That virtue is, even in this world, the most direct road to happiness, is a fact, but man knows that Deity governs by general laws, and when he feels himself disappointed in the attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in his lot, and consoles himself with the prospect of futurity".

Piety is a necessary complement to real virtue, leading man to consider conscience as God's vice-regent for his guidance, and conspiring with his desire for future happiness to

(1). Op.Cit., Part II, Chap. I, Sec. VI, par. 188.

(2). Op. Cit., par. 188.

(3). Op.Cit., Art. 3, par. 213.

(4). Op. Cit., par. 196.

stimulate him to virtuous actions, and issuing in his voluntary submission to God's will which he believes to be beneficently inclined toward him.

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Stewart is open to criticism on several counts. In treating of man's duties to his fellows, he speaks of justice as "That disposition which leads us, in cases where our own temper, passions, or interests are concerned, to determine and to act without being biased by partial considerations". It seems that this relationship between individuals should be broadened to cover every condition, not only those conditions where our own temper, passions, and interests are concerned. As McCosh shows in his edition of Stewart, Justinian, in his Institutes, gives a broader and more satisfactory definition: "Justice is the constant, persisting purpose to give to each the rights which are his".

Furthermore, Stewart's tenet that conscience, as God's vice-regent in man, is an innate faculty, a "moral taste", is open to criticism. There does develop in man a unique element, a socially developed self-consciousness which is basic to morality; but this "Anlage", or whatever name be applied to it, is not a specific instinct or faculty - it is rather a possibility, a germ, a seed, which, only through development in society, becomes a self-conscious power of evaluation which can properly be called conscience.

Finally, Stewart leaves unsolved the problem of self versus other. Although he admits the claims of both self-love





## Chapter VI.

## GERMAN THEORIES.

## Section XXXII.

Immanuel Kant. 1724 - 1804.

Innate.

Kant's "Practical Reason", moral consciousness, enables man to apprehend the unconditionally obligatory principles of actions: "Pure Reason is in itself practical, and furnishes man a common law which we call the moral law".(1). This practical reason is common to all men: "No one is wholly without moral sense; for in case of complete lack of this sensibility, he would be morally dead, and if ( to speak in the language of the doctors ) the moral power could not note any stimulus to this feeling, manhood would be degraded to bestiality --- and would become mingled with the mass of natural things in an irremediable way". (2).

Man is free to exercise this practical reason, and "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside the world, can possibly be regarded as unconditionally good, except a good will".(3). A will is good, not because of any effects it might produce, but in itself. A will is thus good for its own sake when its

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- (1). Kant; "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft", Theil I, Buch I, Hauptstueck I, Sec. 7.
- (2). "Metaphysik Anfangsgruende der Tugendlehre", Einleitung, XII, a. "Werke", (1838), Vol. V, p. 226.
- (3). "Metaphysic of Morality" Sec. I.

motive is a consciousness of duty. "Duty consists in the obligation to act from pure reverence for the moral law".(1). All other motives except duty are morally worthless, for they are all mere forms of inclination. The highest good is a free will which has as its object a purpose which comes as an independent, categorical imperative by way of the practical reason. (2).

The general form of this categorical imperative is: "Handle so, dasz die Maxim deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten koenne": "Act only on that maxim whereby you could, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law". (3).

The first special form which the categorical imperative takes is: "Ask yourself whether you could possibly, through your Will, consider to be a law of Nature of which you yourself are a part, the action which you contemplate". (4).

A second form runs thus: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end, and never as a means only". Kant holds to the intrinsic worth and dignity of one and of only one reality - rational nature. Every man, qua rational, has certain absolute rights which should never be violated. Man is an end in

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(1). Op.Cit., Sec. I.

(2). See "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft", Theil I, Buch II, Hauptstueck II, Sec. VII, p. 134.

(3). Op. Cit., Theil I, Buch II, Hauptstueck I, Sec. VII.

(4). Op.Cit., Theil I, Buch I, Hauptstueck II.

himself: " --- nur der Mensch, und mit ihm jedes vernuenftige Geschoepf ist Zweck an sich selbst". (1).

A third form of the imperative is stated: "Act as if the will of any other rational being, qua rational, were the legislator of thine actions".

#### Socialization.

It is assumed that the reason of one individual gives the same laws as the reason of any other, for these laws are universally and unconditionally binding, and do not derive their authority from the special characteristics of any one individual; each person may be considered an end in himself, determining the actions of all the others.

The community of such rational beings, each being thus subject to laws of his own making, which are universally binding, constitutes the Kingdom of Ends. By Kingdom Kant means "the systematic combination of different rational beings through the medium of common laws". Thus morality leads to a harmony between all rational beings, for reason can not be self-contradictory.

Happiness should be justly proportionate to a man's virtue. Therefore there are necessary three postulates of morality: first, God must exist as the necessary condition for realizing the just proportion between virtue and happiness, which happiness is the summum bonum; second, the will of

(1). Op. Cit., Hauptstueck III, p. 87.



rational man must be free; and third, the soul of rational man must be immortal in order to give man a sufficient opportunity in which to realize perfection.

#### Criticism.

Kant is open to criticism in assuming that self-love may be a morally right motive if one seeks happiness under the restraints which are imposed by every one else seeking his, and by the obligations one is under to help others in their pursuit of happiness. This assumption does not solve the ego-alter conflict - it merely states it. The question is unanswered: "How can the unselfish furthering of another's happiness be carried out, if that should conflict with one's own?". What Kant really does, is to "universalize egoistic actions, leaving the ego's as impervious spiritual monads".(1).

Kant is also vulnerable in considering feelings as "transitory accidents in self-consciousness" rather than essential constituents of it. We hold that the moral life as such implies affect. "If we dismiss feeling, we lose the entire content of morality, and what is left is only its empty form". (2). As Sir William Hamilton says: "Without the intervention of feeling, the cognition stands divorced from the conation, and apart from feeling, all conscious endeavour after anything would be altogether incomprehensible". (3).

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(1). See Hirst; "Self and Neighbour".

(2). Seth: "Ethical Principles", p. 165.

(3). Hamilton; "Metaphysics", p. 426, Vol. II.

Kant is also open to attack on his happiness principle: his moral law gives no reason why happiness should be proportionate to virtue, but so Kant holds. Furthermore, there is an inconsistency in first holding that action is essentially good if the motive of the agent is good, let consequences be what they may; and then maintaining that happiness must be an element in the summum bonum.

Finally, Kant is wrong in saying that "Wohlthun ist Pflicht", irrespective of the issues consequent upon any action in question. Man can foresee at least some of the consequences of his actions, and he is bound by this ability of foresight, as well as by the laws of morality, to consider those consequences, and to allow them to influence his actions. In fact, "the consequences, so far as they can be foreseen, are included in the act". (1).

#### Section XXXIII.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte. 1762 - 1814.

Fichte follows Kant in rational idealism. Reason and Self-consciousness are the ultimate explanations of morality. Morality is action; duty is self-consciousness realizing itself in the world of deeds.

The Infinite Ego, or Self-Consciousness, or Pure Intelligence, is Ultimate Reality; it is essentially free and self-determining. Individuality gives rise to a plurality of finite ego's which are the necessary manifestations of this

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(1). Rashdall; "Conscience and Christ", p. 11.

Infinite Self-Consciousness, which is basic to all consciousness, and which alone makes consciousness possible. A finite ego, then, is something, "only in so far as it posits itself, or contemplates and thinks itself as such". (1). A finite ego, a person, only knows what he really is, when he has recognized his identity with the Infinite Ego. This Infinite Ego is the "one primary and indubitable fact": the "eternal act or energizing", through which man lives, and "within which all existence is contained".

The finite ego becomes free, that is, is no longer externally controlled, when, by the action of the rational will, it assimilates to itself the non-ego. This freedom is, for Fichte, the summum bonum: the free self-conscious assimilation by the ego of objective nature. Thus knowledge alone accomplishes, for the ego, freedom. This knowledge is identified with right action. Every man knows his position, so no one can err as to his duty.

Integration.

Socialization.

Ego-Alter.

Since all individual ego's are equally manifestations of the Infinite Ego, exclusive egoism is unthinkable. This is so, for if each finite ego attended exclusively to his own good, disregarding and possibly antagonizing a fellow ego,

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(1). Fichte; "Deduction des Principes der Sittlichkeit", Sec. II, p. 29, "Werke", (1845), Vol. IV, Erstes Hauptstueck.

he would be revealing, by his egoism, something akin to anarchy within the essence of the Infinite Ego. Men must be more than egoists, for God is an harmonious unity.

### Criticism.

Fichte's philosophical rational idealism as applied to ethical theory, leaves much to be desired from a psychological standpoint. Fichte does not develop a method of integrating an individual personality into an harmonious whole. Indeed, it seems as though he intimates that the individual is in no need of such a process, being, as he is, only a necessary manifestation of the Ultimate Self-consciousness. There is shown here a lack of psychological analysis of the individual.

Fichte, in theory, accomplishes the solution of the ego-alter problem by attacking it from above; but the real problems which a personality, with his various and often conflicting instincts and tendencies, meets, are not practically met by this rationalism and idealism. By saying that the interests of A can not conflict with those of B because A and B are both the manifestations of G, leaves too much unexplained; the approach must be made to the problem from the under side - the side of the analysis of the personalities of A and B; and if this approach leads to the same conclusion, namely, that A and B may be united in their interests with G, well and good - but in this latter case, the psychological conditions actually inhering in the personalities of A and B



will have been dealt with.

In the next place, Fichte's rational idealism, ignoring as it does, the affective fundamentum in morality, does not furnish a complete explanation of morality. All reactions involve affect, and affect is, for morality, quite fundamental and essential.

Fichte is further open to criticism in his ultimate identification of the finite and the Infinite Ego's, of the human and divine self-consciousness, the unification of consciousness in a single Self. We believe, rather, that each human being is a Self, self-conscious; being both subject and object to himself. Each Self is "impenetrable to other Selves", resisting successfully, as an including entity, any other Self, even God. As man is of an identical type with God, Fichte mistakenly holds to a unity of existence of man and God. (1).

#### Section XXXIV.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 1770 - 1831.

Hegel holds that "the essence of the universe is a process of thought from the abstract to the concrete". (2). When "I think an object, I make it a thought, and take from it what is sensible". In this way I make it something which is in fact and directly my own". (3). Only in thought am I

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(1). See Seth; "Hegelianism and Personality", p. 226.

(2). Sidgwick; "History of Ethics", p. 279.

(3). Hegel; "Philosophie des Rechts", Einleitung, Sec. 4, "Werke", Band VIII, (1833), p. 35.

self-contained.

### Socialization.

The individual can identify himself with the mind of society, which is objective reality, and which is the ethical substance. To the extent that he effects this identification, does the performance of his duty express what he is, and the performance of duty is not a mere obligation: it is then that "the various social forces are not something foreign to the subject, but there is a witness of the spirit to them as to his own being. In them he feels he has a consciousness of his own self, and in them he lives as in his own element which is indistinguishable from himself - a relation which is more direct and intuitive than even faith and trust".(1). In identifying his will with the universal will as objectified in the state, the individual attains freedom and morality. "A consistent and logical theory of duties can be nothing else than the development of those relations, which, necessary through the idea of freedom, and therefore actual in their whole context, are found in the State". (2).

In the State, there is, theoretically, an inward unity between the interests of one and all, for the State is considered to be literally, one living mind. The constitution of the State is the expression of the mind of a nation - the embodiment of a mind immanent in nature and developing

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(1). Op.Cit., Sec. 147, p. 212.

(2). Op. Cit., Sec. 148, note.

in time as a "plan of Providence".

The practical issue of Hegel's ethics is that the individual should submit his will to the existing order of things; the positive morality of the society in which he lives is to be the guide of an individual's conduct. (1).

#### Ego-Alter.

In a person's immediate relation with his neighbour, Hegel says the maxim is: "Personality involves above everything the capacity to have rights --- the mandate of morality is therefore, Be a person and respect others as persons".

If the individual, qua free, sets up his own particular will against the Universal Will, that is, if he is anti-social, an exclusive egoist, asserting his own Self irrespective of others, he manifests evil in its pure form. Immorality is an irrational inconsistency.

The will is free to do this, for it is man's citadel. "Into this inner conviction of man no one can break; no force can reach it, and so is the moral will inaccessible".(2).

#### Integration.

Hegel touches on the subject of an integration of the personality around a purpose which is recognized by the moral will as its realization. "Each act, to be moral, must first of all agree with my purpose, since the right of the moral will is, that in the realization of the same, there is recog-

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(1). See Rogers; "Short History of Ethics", p. 228.

(2). Hegel; Op. Cit., Part II, Sec. 106, p.149.

nized only what is found within as a purpose".(1). He further says that right and duty coincide in the identity of the universal and particular wills. (2).

### Religion.

Man's individual Self is rooted in the larger Self of the absolute personality. Morality becomes the gradual unfolding of an eternal purpose whose whole is the perfection of humanity. Personality attains its complete self-realization through a growing consciousness of the world and of God. Hegel thus unites morality with religion.

### Criticism.

Hegel, in his emphasis of reason and will, mistakenly disregards affect as a constituent element of the moral individual.

In the second place, when he says that "whether the individual exists, makes no difference to the objective order, -----The moral order therefore has been represented to peoples as the eternal justice, as Gods existing in and for themselves, in comparison with whom the noble striving of individuals remains only an empty game" ( "ein anwogendes Spiel" ) (3), Hegel tends to annihilate the individual, or to lose individuality in God, or in the State which is the embodiment of the Immanent Mind in history.

### A Psychological Theory of the State.

We believe, rather, that the moral function of the State

(1). Op. Cit., Sec. 114, p. 156.

(2). Op. Cit., Sec. 155, p. 220.

(3). Op. Cit., Sec. 145, p. 211.



is not thus to engulf personalities and individualities, but to be the vehicle for the personal life of its citizens, guaranteeing to each person connected with it a permanent medium for making permanent the fruits of his personal labours, as these fruits are manifested in his own personality and property, also in those of his descendants. An organized State is psychologically necessary to personality, because, for the development of personality, it is necessary that the fruits of the labours of personality, which are a part of personality, should be safe-guarded. The State has a right to coerce an individual into acting in any certain way only because, and when, (existing as it does, for the interests of personality) it represents the citizens' own better Selves, assuring the protection of such interests as it has found, through long experience, to be the real best interests of its citizens. Rebellion thus becomes advantageous, and necessary, to a person, only when the external, organized manifestation of the State contradicts the inner ideal of the State.

#### Section XXXV.

Arthur Schopenhauer. 1788 - 1860.

Schopenhauer says the state of desire is painful, but is essential to life; pain is more intense than pleasure; and the labour of securing a merely imperfect degree of perfection is irksome. "The life of most is only a constant fight for existence itself, with the certainty of losing it

at last. --- But when existence is assured to men, they do not know what to do with it: then there follows the second thing that sets them in motion, the striving to be freed from the burden of existence, that is, to escape Ennui". (1). The result of this pessimistic evaluation of facts is the conclusion that self-conscious life itself is a curse, and the will to live is the chief moral blunder of man.

Schopenhauer makes loving-kindness the essential basis of all altruism and of all true morality. On the other hand, asceticism naturally results from the belief that the will to live is evil. "That is, it no longer suffices him to love others as himself and to do as much for them as for himself; but there arises within him a horror of the existence, the the expression of which is his own being, the will to live. --- He therefore disowns this existence which appears in him, and is already expressed through his body". (2). Here is a dilemma: on the one side, loving-kindness; and on the other, a horror of that nature of which one's very existence is an expression, the will to live.

#### Integration.

The renunciation of the will to live is the only escape from the blind, relentless drive involved in the will to live. Whatever integration is conceivable for such human

(1). Schopenhauer; "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung", Buch IV, Sec. 57, pp. 368 - 369, Deussen's Edition.

(2). Op.Cit., Buch IV, Sec. 68, p. 449.

personality as Schopenhauer conceives, is to be found in this renunciation of the will to live; and the consequent condition for the individual is a quiet freedom from all volition. This is pleasure: pleasure is nothing positive, but rather only the removal of pain and want. This ethical theory is an hedonistic pessimism.

#### Religion.

As a philosophical or religious basis for this pessimism, Schopenhauer posits an Irrational Will as the source of all reality. In man, will becomes self-conscious; and as man's ego is not conscious of the creation of nature by itself, therefore the Creative Ego can not always be conscious of its own actions - it is blind will. This blind will is irrational, showing signs of its unreasonableness, for example, in war between living things.

#### Criticism.

Schopenhauer is to be criticized for an inadequate treatment of personality. Man is more than the incarnation of a blind will. And it is not easy to ascribe even a negative pleasure to an incarnate blind will, as Schopenhauer does.

A further inconsistency in Schopenhauer's voluntaristic pessimism is, that renunciation of the will to live implies a rational choice; but blind will can not well make deliberate, rational choices.

Furthermore, Schopenhauer de-moralizes man by considering will to be blind. Blind, unreasoning will is not capa-

ble of morality.

Finally, Schopenhauer's blind will is not will at all, but only brute force. Will separated from intelligence is not will. Cognition, conation, and affection are what they are, and exist at all, only as an indivisible psychological trinity inhering within personality.

#### Section XXXVI.

Friedrich Eduard Beneke. 1798 - 1854.

Beneke holds that morality involves "the pursuit of the universal good, as measured quite impartially in accordance with a true assessment of values, and controlled by fundamental motives". (1).

#### Socialization.

In this pursuit of the good, the interests of individuals, when conflicting with those of groups of individuals, are subordinated to the latter: "for the interest of a larger body of men is nothing but a multiplication of the interest of the individual". (2). Thus the problem of the conflict between society and the individual is "solved" by making society's interests paramount to those of the individual.

#### Ego-Alter.

Beneke meets the question of the self-other relationship by saying that the welfare of each is to be considered

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(1). Beneke; "Grundlinien des Natürlichen Systems der Praktischen Philosophie", Translated by Benjamin Rand, Chap. III.

(2). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. III.



as on an equal footing with that of every other, for "in actuality, or according to its nature, it is on the same footing with ours". (1).

#### Innate.

Beneke seems to hold to the innateness of the basis of the capability of moral evaluations, although he rejects the idea of a moral instinct as such. "For the true estimate of values lying at the foundation of the moral demands, is given to us a natural product of the human soul. It must therefore somehow coincide with the deepest constitution of our being, or indeed, if not innate or preformed (which we have deemed inadmissible) be at least predetermined". (2).

This capability is supplemented, in the individual's experience as morality develops within him, by the experiencing of objective relations. "--- morality is by no means a thing foreign to human nature, entering into it only afterwards, or even as in opposition to it. On the contrary, the moral and natural coincide throughout, and the moral law is in fact none other than the pure and flawless development of the deepest fundamental relations of human experience". (3).

Beneke considers the realization of elementary faculties to be good things: "The unfulfilled elementary faculties strive for realization. --- Only the fulfilment, and

- (1). Op.Cit., Chap. III.  
 (2). Op. Cit. Chap. III.  
 (3). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. V.

the development conditioned by it, give to them the full reality of which they are capable, and these we must certainly regard as good things. --- The satisfaction of the stimulus or gratification is a good, so much the greater as the need was greater or more pressing". (1).

#### Criticism. *See "Evolution" "Necessity" (1).*

We hold that the fulfilment and development of man's elementary tendencies are not per se good. "Good" can not be predicated of all organic completions of instinctive urges. Instincts, in themselves, are neither good nor bad. Their functioning must be socialized and integrated before it is good. Tendencies are good or bad, not in and of themselves, but only in their relation to other tendencies; the satisfaction resulting from organic completion of instinctive urges, although probably an element in the good, is not the whole of the good.

Neither does Beneke resolve the apparent ego-alter antithesis. There is no solution for this problem in the contention that the interests of all are on an equal footing: this claim only states the problem. Unless the interests of A are such that they can not and therefore do not conflict with those of B, the self-other problem is unsolved.

Beneke is also to a degree guilty of Hegelian subor-

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(1). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. II.

dination of the individual to society. Individual and society are to be harmonized, not by the loss of either in the other, but through the realization that their interests, because of the psychological constitution of the individual, are identical. "There is a higher egoism which contains altruism within itself, and makes 'transition' unnecessary".(1).

of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness". (1).

Happiness is to be interpreted as including "for man, especially those pleasures which are qualitatively superior to the sensuous pleasures of a beast. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures --- We may give what explanation we please to this unwillingness --- but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity which all human beings possess in one form or another". (2).

Which pleasures are to be valued "higher", and which "lower", must be decided by "the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both". (3). Such alone can decide.

Furthermore, the "utilitarian standard is not the person's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of

(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 135.

## Chapter VII.

## MORE RECENT ENGLISH THEORIES.

## Section XXXVII.

John Stuart Mill. 1806 - 1873.

Mill says: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness". (1).

Happiness is to be interpreted as including for man, especially those pleasures which are qualitatively superior to the sensuous pleasures of a beast. "Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures --- We may give what explanation we please to this unwillingness --- but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity which all human beings possess in one form or another". (2).

Which pleasures are to be valued "higher", and which "lower", must be decided by "the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both". (3). Such alone can decide.

Furthermore, the "utilitarian standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of

(1). Mill; "Utilitarianism", Chap. II.

(2). Op. Cit., Chap. II.

(3). Op. Cit., Chap. II.



happiness altogether". (1). Nor is the happiness which is meant "a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing". (2).

Self-sacrifice is given a place in Mill's system, but not as an end in itself: "A sacrifice which does not increase the sum total of happiness, it (utilitarianism) considers as wasted". (3).

The best assurance of attaining happiness is the conscious ability to do without it, "for nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life". (4).

Mill holds that the golden rule is the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality: do as you would be done by.

Further, the system of Mill says that if God is both perfectly good and wise, it is also necessary to believe that the moral rules which he reveals to men will in some way coincide with the requirements of utility.

Innate.

Utilitarianism offers two moral sanctions: an external

(1). Op. Cit., Chap. II.

(2). Op. Cit., Chap. II.

(3). Op. Cit., Chap. II.

(4). Op. Cit., Chap. II.

and an internal. "Of the external sanctions: these are the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe.

"On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason the less natural. It is a natural outgrowth of our nature.

"There is a basis of powerful natural sentiment for this moral feeling, which is this: that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures ---". (1). Socialization.

All the strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in consulting the welfare of others. Each comes as though instinctively to be conscious of himself as a being that of course pays regards to others. Virtue, to be sure, is a thing to be desired, and that, too, for itself; but virtue is not originally an end: although through association it is capable of becoming so. "Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception is: there was an original desire of it, save its conduciveness to pleasure and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good.

(1). Op. Cit., Chap. III.

"Will is the child of desire and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit".(1).

#### Ego-Alter.

Mill discovers in man the presence of natural disinterested impulses, but he traces them to a purely self-regarding origin. "All the grand sources of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them entirely, conquerable by human care and effort --- yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small and inconspicuous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent to be without". (2).

Whatever amount of the feeling of regard for others a person has, "he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others.

"The deeply rooted conception that every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures". (3).

#### Criticism.

Mill is to be criticized first, on holding that a Stoic indifference to the pleasurable result of a morally good ac-

- (1). Op. Cit., Chap. IV.  
 (2). Op. Cit., Chap. II.  
 (3). Op. Cit., Chap. III.

tion is the best way to assure that Epicurean end. Mill says all men desire pleasure. But to desire pleasure involves a prospect of that pleasure. But this pleasant prospect is not a Stoic indifference. A Stoic indifference can not be considered as a means in accomplishing an Epicurean end.

A second criticism is, that if "the greatest good to the greatest number" is to be the standard, it is necessary that an "intuitive impartiality" shall be the fundamental principle of evaluating actions. But this is not the principle Mill invokes; rather, he again makes the pleasure principle the standard. If the motive of A's action is the attaining of his personal pleasure, then "the greatest good to the greatest number" as a standard of action is thereby excluded. The result is, that psychological hedonism can not be the basis for utilitarianism.

If Mill intends to prove, however, that the collective happiness is the object of the collective desire, rather than of the individual's desire, it is still to be said that Mill assumes that the greatest happiness of the greatest number has a greater value for the individual than his own happiness. This assumption, however, remains unproved.

Finally, Mill claims to recognize a qualitative as well as a merely quantitative difference between feelings - pleasures are higher or lower; the pleasures of mind are higher than those of the body. But quality is an extra-hedonistic criterion. The only hedonistic criterion is quantity; lower pleasures will be more intense and more desirable to



lower natures; and higher pleasures likewise to higher natures. The difference of quality will resolve itself into a difference of quantity.

### Section XXXVIII.

Herbert Spencer. 1820 - 1903.

Spencer, working toward psychology from the sociological point of view, holds the tenet, based upon the evolutionary hypothesis, that the ethical ideal is utilitarian.

The evolutionary principle of the survival of the fittest applies to the process of moral growth as well as of the organic: "A mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action, can not be successfully persisted in - must eventuate in death to self, or posterity, or both".(1). During evolution, mere activity becomes conduct by becoming purposeful toward the preservation of the various forms.

The natural objective end of the evolutionary process is life - life of the organism and of the race. Life means continuous adjustment of inner relations to environment. Conduct is this purposeful adaptive adjustment, and is good if it furthers life in the individual, in the offspring, or in fellow-men.

Ethical principles in the race have been inductively reached: "By early and rude experiences there were inductively reached vague but partially true notions respecting

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(1). Spencer; "Principles of Ethics", Part I, Vol. I, Chap. XV, p.280.

the effects of men's behaviour on themselves, on one another, and on society; to a certain extent serving for the guidance of conduct".(1).

When sentiency appears in the evolutionary process, only those living creatures survive who, on the whole, take pleasure in life-preserving acts. Pleasure is both biologically and ethically good. Good conduct produces a surplus of pleasure somewhere; bad, always inflicts somewhere a surplus of either positive or negative pain. (2). Absolutely right conduct would be that which produces pure pleasure, pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere. In conduct at large, however, it usually happens that whatever course is taken, entails some pain somewhere. Pain-producing or bad actions tend more and more to disappear, and there will be an ultimate coincidence of acts which are at the same time pleasure-giving, self-preserving, and race-preserving.

#### Socialization.

Nature aims at the preservation of the species rather than of the individual, so the "life of the social organism ranks above the lives of its units". The interests of society and of individuals conflict: "The multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill the earth --- are interferred with by one another".(3). The two ends, however, the end of

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(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. XV, p. 270.

(2). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. XV, p. 261.

(3). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 17.

nature, life, and the end of man, pleasure, must move toward harmony if the race is to survive.

### Ego-Alter.

Beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends - and "whatever facilitates the making of adjustments by each, increases the totality of the adjustments made, and serves to render the lives of all more complete". (1).

These last stages in evolution of conduct are those displayed by the highest type of being, when he is forced, by the presence of increased numbers, to live more and more in the presence of his fellows. (2).

"And conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities, becoming less and less militant, and more and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual injury or hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered by, cooperation and mutual aid". (3).

The source of the cooperative adjustments between individual and society is sympathy, which becomes thus the origin of disinterested benevolence. But egoism is prior, both biologically and ethically, to altruism. A parent must first have life for himself before he can give fuller life to the offspring.

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(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 19.

(2). Op. Cit. Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 20.

(3). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 20.

Altruism, however, is just as essential as egoism to the preservation of any species; and "is present from the spontaneous fission of the elementary forms to the higher types of self-sacrifice" which are manifested in man's actions. Since "unduly egoistic as well as unduly altruistic individuals alike tend to disappear from the race", only socialization and harmonization can assure preservation. Egoism and altruism are destined to be reconciled naturally by the process of evolution. As a basis for this reconciliation, this socialization, Spencer's theory is that a universal recognition of justice is advantageous to each individual. Justice is abstinence from mutual aggression. Thus Spencer's harmonization of the conflict between the interests of the individual and those of society is based upon utility. Altruism is made to have an immediate egoistic value, which arises from the joys of sympathy and kindly actions.

#### Criticism.

Spencer is to be criticized for thus making altruism only a duly qualified egoism. The happiness of the individual does indeed follow his seeking the happiness of others, because the other-regarding urge, as well as the self-regarding urge, is innate, and its exercise gives satisfaction; but this satisfaction is contingent to the real goal, the completion of the reaction. This completion entails the satisfaction, but does not aim directly at it. The problem of



self-other is to be satisfactorily solved by way of an integration of the elements of personality: harmony between self-interest and other-interest can be maintained or restored only by recognizing them to be mutually involved, each with the other.

Furthermore, Spencer, in making ultimate harmony to follow upon the objective, mechanical process of evolution, and natural selection - a pragmatic trial and error process on a large scale - rather than to depend upon an inner harmonization of innate tendencies, attained through an active self-organization of those tendencies, must admit that "throughout a considerable part of conduct, no guiding principle, no method of estimation enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right" (1): only the issues and consequences of an act can reveal its rightness or wrongness. In the case of an ad interim conflict between interests of self and of other, Spencer has no reply to the question, "Which shall I satisfy?". Ego and Alter are left unharmonized.

Again, natural selection is really only a physical, external, objective process. Nature does not actively, critically, volitionally, purposively select; she only passes by. A satisfactory ethics implies a self-conscious evaluation, judgment, and choice by man, between several possible alternatives to action. In this process of moral choice, man

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(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. XV, p. 268.

takes into account not only his material environment, but such elements as society, ideas, spirit. Such choice, taking account of such elements, "has no direct effect on man's continuance on earth as a physical organism". Mere biological life is not identical with a good life. Furthermore, Spencer does not prove that "actions biologically good and actions ethically good coincide in the limit of evolution". For men, it is the kind of life, not life itself, that counts. Spencer fails to see that pleasure can be properly evaluated only when character is taken into account.

#### Section XXXIX.

Henry Sidgwick. 1838 - 1900.

Sidgwick has been called a philosophical or rational intuitionist, an intuitional utilitarian, and a universalistic hedonist. He can be called an intuitionist because, although he criticizes the intuitions of the "common sense" philosophy, he still has left upon his hands a "residuum of intuitional thought which he finds it impossible to reject". This residuum is manifest in his three regulative principles of reason - prudence, benevolence, and justice - which are in turn reducible to the single imperative: "Act impartially or rationally". His rationalism consists in the fact that he appeals to reason for the organizing principle of the ethical life. He is hedonistic in affirming that pleasure, although not the actual object of choice, is the only reasonable ground of choice, the only ultimate Good.

Personal pleasure can not be made the continuous end of conduct, for its very acceptance "as the ultimate end of conduct involves the practical rule that it is not always to be made the conscious end". (1).

Socialization.

Rather, "Universal Happiness, desirable consciousness, or feeling for the innumerable multitude of sentient beings, present and to come, seems an end that satisfies our imagination by its vastness, and sustains our resolution by its comparative security". (2).

Ego-Alter.

Regarding the ego-alter conflict, Sidgwick says: "Disinterested benevolence is not only thus generally in harmony with rational self-love, but also in another sense, and independently, rational: that is, Reason shows me that if my happiness is desirable and good, the equal happiness of any other person must be equally desirable". "I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in arithmetic and geometry, that it is right and reasonable for me to treat others as I should think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to universal good or happiness. This is the clearest and most certain of our moral intuitions". (3).

(1). Sidgwick; "The Methods of Ethics", Book III, Chap. XIV.

(2). Op. Cit., Book III, Chap. XIV.

(3). Op. Cit., Book III, Chap. XIV.

### Religion.

Sidgwick assumes a moral order in the universe maintained by a moral governor, "a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction". One must believe that what is good for the individual and for the universe are ultimately identified.

### Criticism.

Sidgwick is to be criticized on his hedonistic stand. Hedonism is commendable in that it holds pleasure to be essential to the good, but is wrong in inferring that therefore the good and pleasure are identical.

Sidgwick is universalistic, his principle being "the greatest good to the greatest number". But there is present in all utilitarianism a failure to furnish any satisfactory quantitative measure for happiness. Pleasure is quantitatively incommensurable.

Furthermore, if the good and pleasure are identified, egoism and altruism, self-love and benevolence, are incompatible: for this identification leaves the good still self-contradictory - the pleasure of Self is not the pleasure of Alter. Interests of Self and interests of others are harmonized, we believe, only in Aristotle's "*εὐδαιμονία*" or Spinoza's "beatitudo": that is, in the well-being which inheres in the integration of personality, where the two interests are recognized as mutually involved, each with the other.

Finally, Sidgwick leaves personality unintegrated. He



dethrones Reason as the integrator of personality, considering it merely regulative, "the slave of passion": it only "discovers the path to the goal of sentient satisfaction and only plans the execution of an end which is already determined by sensibility". But he places no sovereign upon the vacated throne.

#### Section XL.

Francis H. Bradley. 1846 - 1924.

Bradley holds that the ethical end is self-realization: "What we do do, perfectly or imperfectly, is to realise ourselves, and we cannot possibly do anything else; all we can realise is (accident apart) our ends, or the objects we desire; and all we can desire is, in a word, self". (1). This individualism and the Hegelian ethics are to him, not inconsistent.

Bradley says "The self we try to realise is for us a whole, it is not a mere collection of states. The whole self is present in its states, and therefore the whole self is the object aimed at; this is what we mean by self-realisation. --- the question in morals is to find the true whole, realising which will practically realise the true self" (2).

#### Integration.

Speaking of the unity of the self, Bradley says: "What we mean to distinguish is the self as will in general, from

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(1). Bradley; "Ethical Studies", Essay II, "Why I Should Be Moral".

(2). Op. Cit.

this or that object of desire; and at the same time to identify the two --- Here are two factors in will: the unity subjective, and the something willed, the objective. That is, in order to will, we must will something. --- A third factor in will is the volition as a whole - this is the identity of both these factors, and the projection or the carrying of it out into external existence. This unity of the two factors we may call the individual whole, or again the concrete universal. This means self-realisation. Thus I possess my world only when I find my will in it; and I do not find that until what I have is a harmony or a whole in system".(1).

Furthermore, "realise yourself" means not merely "Be a whole", but "Be an infinite whole". "The mind is not finite, just because it knows it is finite. The self knows itself to be limited, to be finite. Well, if it does, it is infinite. For limitation comes from the outside by the outside, and to know itself to be limited thus, means it knows the outside - therefore, to feel finiteness, means to be infinite". "The finite is relative to something else; the infinite is self-related".

#### Religion.

Bradley's Hegelianism is manifest in his tenet that God is neither personal nor impersonal, but "super-personal". Bradley finds such a concept necessary because he says he

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(1). Op. Cit., Essay II.

can conceive of personality only as finite - an infinite personality is a contradiction: "A person is finite or is meaningless".

Nevertheless, he says, and seemingly inconsistently: "Realise yourself as an infinite whole", which means "Realise yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole by realising the whole in yourself".

#### Criticism.

Not only does Bradley seem inconsistent here, but he also confuses human individuality and personality. The former may be only finite, but the latter is essentially infinite. "Only the infinite is completely personal". (1). (2).

Bradley leaves personality unintegrated. He says: "Two great divergent forms of moral goodness exist. In order to realise the idea of a perfect self, a man may have to choose between two partially conflicting methods. Morality, in short, may dictate either self-sacrifice or self-assertion". (3). Now, if self-sacrifice and self-assertion are mutually exclusive, the moralization of a complete personality is impossible; but if integration involves self-sacrifice, then moralization is thereby effected. We hold that the "Idealization of a cause" manifests a personal loyalty which expresses a union of self-sacrifice and self-assertion. (4). (5).

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- (1). Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 451.
- (2). See Part II.
- (3). Bradley; "Appearance and Reality", p. 415.
- (4). See Part II.
- (5). See Royce; "The Philosophy of Loyalty", pp. 173,ff, 311.

## Section XLI.

Thomas Hill Green. 1836 - 1882.

Thomas Hill Green represents an attempted individualization of German rational idealism; he tries to emphasize more strongly than that idealism does the satisfaction of each individual. The rational idealists may be described as holding to the doctrine that the higher social customs and institutions are the "creations of the self-unfolding mind of society".

## Ego-Alter.

Green asserts that man's aims and activities are not explicable by natural laws, and that his good can not be found in the satisfaction of the desires of the animal organism. What this good is, can not as yet be exactly defined, for it is not yet realized in man; but within this good there can be no distinction between the good for the Self and the good for others.

Green gives as his reason for this impossibility of distinguishing these two goods, that all persons are the reproductions of the same Eternal Spirit, who is a Being in whom we exist, with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical, in the sense that He is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming. Only because men are such reproductions of the One, can each see that the good of others is objectively good, while it remains a good for himself as well. Green says: "--- with the constant characteristic of self-consciousness and self-object-



ification, the one divine mind gradually reproduces itself in the human soul. In virtue of this principle in him, man has definite capabilities, the realisation of which, since in it alone he can satisfy himself, forms his true good".(1).

This reproduction of the "One Divine Spirit", or of the "Spiritual Principle", or the "Eternally Complete Consciousness" in persons, is Reason.

#### Integration.

Reason makes it possible for one to hold before himself an ideal - a future Self who is better than the actual present Self. Will is the present Self, as a self-determining agent and a unity, in the process of realizing this ideal. When the ideal shall have been attained, Will and Reason will coincide.

The motive which determines will is always such an idealization of the future state of the Self, and the gradual realization of the ideal gives satisfaction to the person.

"--- the development of morality is founded on the action in man of an idea of true or absolute good, consisting in the full realisation of the capabilities of the human soul".(2).

Meanwhile, until the ideal shall be fully realized, man is able to conceive the truth of it but dimly, but this partial conception of it operates as a motive within man for

(1). Green; "Prolegomena to Ethics", Book III, Chap. II, Sec. A, p. 189.

(2). Op.Cit., p. 308.

for its complete realization.

### Socialization.

This moral good can be realized in beings who are self-conscious persons. But man becomes a self-conscious person only in society, and human society presupposes persons in capacity - subjects capable, each of conceiving himself and the bettering of his life, as an end to himself; only in the intercourse of men is this capacity for personality actualized. The ideal can be realized only in society. This ideal is "a society of persons, in which each has reached his own highest satisfaction, and each identifies another's good with his own". (1).

### Criticism.

Green, in his Hegelianism, is to be criticized in that, in holding to the idea of one self-conscious mind in society, it is with difficulty that he secures individuality. Man tends to become "only 'a fact' for an Eternal Consciousness and an Absolute Knower".

Furthermore, Green's Hegelianism makes the good of self and of other to be indistinguishable because all persons are reproductions of the One Eternal Spirit. Rather, we would maintain that the two goods are identical because they are psychologically only the reverse sides of the same bi-polarity or ambivalence. (2).

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(1). Rogers; "A Short History of Ethics".

(2). See Part II.

## Section XLII.

James Martineau. 1805 - 1900.

Martineau says that "the sentiments of right and wrong are characteristics of human nature", and therefore "the system of action which they call up receives the name of Mores or established ways". (1).

Man measures the goodness, and graduates his approval, of actions "by the purity of the source, not by the magnitude of the result". "What we judge is always the inner Spring of an action, as distinguished from its outward operation". (2).

In this graduation of approval, "every action is right which, in the presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is wrong which, in the presence of a higher, follows a lower". (3). To draw an absolute dividing line between good and bad is "mere casuistry".

## Innate.

Martineau quotes Heraclitus who said that "strife is the father of all things". When there is a simultaneous appearance of colliding forces which check and exclude each other, the "breach of the peace" which ensues results in an intuitive moral valuation of the conflicting forces. The conflict and resulting valuation is "the one great condition which raises the spontaneous into the self-conscious life".

(1). Martineau; "Types of Ethical Theory", Vol.II, Book I, Chap. I, p. 19.

(2). Op. Cit. p. 24.

(3). Op. Cit. p. 270.

Dealing with the intuitive, instinctive aspect of this process of evaluation, Martineau says: "Suppose the case of one lone man in an atheistic world; could there really exist any 'authority' of higher over lower within the enclosure of his detached personality? I cannot conceive it. --- The predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step beyond; for what am I? A person: 'higher' than whom no 'thing' assuredly - no mere phenomenon - can be; but only another Person, greater and higher and of deeper insight. In the absence of society or human companionship, we are thus still held in the presence of the One having moral affinity with us, yet solemn rights over us: by retiring into ourselves, we find that we are transported out of ourselves, and placed beneath the light of a diviner countenance. If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a living person can have higher authority, then is it certain that a 'subjective' conscience is impossible. The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself. Here we encounter an 'objective' authority, without quitting our own centre of consciousness. --- If this pathway is correctly traced, from the moral consciousness to religious apprehension, all possible excuse is taken away for treating the authority of Conscience as merely personal and subjective, or even as that of Reason 'impersonally conceived', for that which is real in the universal Arche-type of all mind cannot be either an abstraction or an acci-



dental phenomenon of human individuality". (1).

### Religion.

A man's very selfhood is dependent upon this One Other: "That he has a self at all, and knows it, is possible simply because the universe has an Absolute Self --- which communicates itself to the human being - the infinite to the finite spirit - and constitutes thereby the knowledge of moral law as the expression, under temporal conditions, of an eternal perfection". (2).

### Criticism.

In considering conscience as he does, Martineau is open to criticism. Communion between God and man may, we believe, be considered as a consummation of the process of individual moralization; and religion may properly be held to be the efficient power working toward a personal integration; but a God-given moral sense, or faculty, or a conscience, as such, innate to the individual at the beginning of the process of moralization, is a theory which needs restating. In Part II, we try to show that there is present in man only a unique something which makes morality possible; it is an undeveloped potentiality rather than a power or faculty. Along with a developing self-consciousness, it develops in society, and becomes socialized; the beginning of it is something more like an "Anlage" than like a definite instinct or faculty.

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(1). Op. Cit., Chap. IV, pp. 104 ff.

(2). Op. Cit., p. 106.

## Chapter VIII.

## THEORY OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR.

## I. Theories of Springs of Action.

## PART TWO.

## MORALITY AS THE SOCIALIZED BEHAVIOUR

## OF THE

## INTEGRATED PERSONALITY.

A living organism is said to be integrated when it acts with a degree of self-determination, toward an end, and does so as a unity or whole. Behaviour is said to be integrated when it is itself in itself in itself. The drive which is inherent in life is the ultimate mover to action. Dravert calls this original spring of spring of action "life impulse". In a great part of our experience, possibly in all, we experience ourselves as active. --- this activity which we experience, but which also determines experience, is the "life impulse" become conscious in us". (1).

## 2. Freudian "Wish".

Freud holds that the structures which are the springs of action are constituted of living cells which are the partakers of this life impulse. In this view, instincts are made up of these synthesized elementary "cell wishes". A cell wish includes a push toward activity, in virtue of the life which inheres in the cell. Each living unit of a living organism partakes of the general incentive to activity. Freud carries this theory to the point of making the thus synthesized

(1). Dravert: "Instinct in Man", p. 84.

## Chapter VIII.

## INNATE BASES OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR.

## I. Theories of Springs of Action.

## 1. Life Impulse.

A living organism is said to behave when it acts with a degree of self-determination, toward an end, and does so as a unity or whole. Behaviour is a criterion of animal life. Life itself is initiative: the drive or urge inherent in life is the ultimate mover to action. Drever calls this original energy or spring of action "life impulse": "In a great part of our experience, possibly in all, we experience ourselves as active. --- this activity which we experience, but which also determines experience, is the 'life impulse' become conscious in us". (1).

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(1). Drever; "Instinct in Man", p. 84.

"Unconscious" to be, in a mechanistic way, the ultimate spring of human conduct.

### 3. Ideo-motor Theory.

It is held by some that ideas are springs of action. This, the ideomotor theory, is tenable, we think, only if ideas are shown to embody life impulse. "An idea which is only an idea, a simple fact of knowledge, produces nothing and does nothing".(1). Ideas, however, themselves depend upon life, being the results of experiences - the residual deposits as it were of reactions. Reactions, activities, experiences, must precede ideas, for ideas are not innate. These experiences, in turn, presuppose life.

Simply because experience presupposes life, therefore an idea as mere cognition is only an abstraction, for life-experience, organic reaction, involves meaning, and affect, and often emotion. Ideas are movers to action only insofar as there inheres in them vital impulse, with the accompanying element of meaning, or affect, which is involved in reactions.

### 4. Intelligence.

Graham Wallas makes intelligence "as truly a part of our inherited nature, as independent a cause of human action, as any of the traditional instincts".(2). But intelligence, rather than being considered as an isolable element, a mover, is better regarded, we think, as a method of movement man-

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(1). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions", p. 19.

(2). Wallas; "The Great Society", p.48.



ifested by an organism which is otherwise moved to action. Intelligence is the ease and efficiency with which the organism's reactions are, from the inside, adjusted to the outer evokers of action, particularly when the outer conditions are new ones. It is a "mental trait", a "capacity for abstraction" rather than a spring of action. (1).

#### 5. Habit.

Dewey (2) and Woodworth (3) consider habit to be a spring of action. Dewey says: "All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity". "They form our effective desires and furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong, and which shall pass from light into obscurity". "They are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting". "Eye, arm, hand --- are means only when they enter into organization with things which independently accomplish definite results. These organizations are habits". Habits are "positive agencies", (4); they are energy "organized in certain channels" (5).

Habits, we think, are springs of action only in the sense that in their formation the vital impulse functions: they are formal sets, which probably have a physiological correlative concomitant: they are the resultants of reactions,

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- (1). Thurstone; "The Nature of Intelligence", p. 159.
- (2). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 25.
- (3). Woodworth; "Dynamic Psychology".
- (4). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 175.
- (5). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 76.

making easier the repetitions of those reactions, rather than the movers to those reactions. (1).

#### 6. Instinct-emotion Theory.

McDougall (2) makes instincts and their respective emotions to be the ultimate springs of human action. "The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action --- and are bases from which the character and will of individuals and nations are gradually developed under the guidance of intellectual faculties". Furthermore, "each of the principal instincts conditions some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it ". (3). Godfrey Thomson (4) agrees with McDougall that "instincts are the great sources of energy".

Instincts are, we believe, movers to activity only because they are the manifestations of "vital energy" or "life impulse". This self-starting vital energy, differentiated, works itself out into specific conscious activities which are commonly called "instincts". Each instinct is then evoked by its appropriate object, always in a definite, constant way.

Morton Prince (5) singles out emotion and considers this affective element to be the ultimate spring of action: he

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- (1). See Chap. XI.
  - (2). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 20.
  - (3). McDougall; Op.Cit., p. 49.
  - (4). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character", p. 156.
  - (5). Prince; "Can Emotion be Regarded as Energy?".

says that "emotion is energy", "emotion moves us".

We think, however, that the Instinct-affect ultimate, whatever it is called, moves to action because it is the vehicle or instrument of the fundamentum, the vital impulse, and that emotions "are to be regarded as accompaniments and not causes of instinctive reactions of all kinds".(1).

The consummation of any primary reaction or specific response through which the life impulse works itself out and becomes differentiated, causes organic satisfaction; and in this sense, "life with its changes and movements originally means pleasure".(2). That is, "primary reactions are directly conditioned by the constitution of man's nature; are not determined by pleasure-pain; and are themselves the sources of hedonic results".(3). The satisfaction resulting to the agent from the completion of these instinctive responses, shows that a goal has been attained. It seems to us, therefore, that McDougall is correct in claiming that purpose is present in "instincts": there is a "persistence until": instinct-reactions tend to persist until a satisfying completion is effected, or a goal is attained.

## II. Instincts and Reflexes.

Instincts are to be distinguished from reflexes. The latter lack (4) spontaneity, persistence, variability, purpose, preparation, and improvability. Furthermore, reflex

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(1). Pillsbury; "The Utility of Emotions".

(2). Buehler; "Displeasure and Pleasure in Relation to Activity".

(3). Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics", p. 171.

(4). See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", pp. 53,ff.

action is a response to a stimulus, while "instinctive action is in many cases a response to an object" (1), which action involves, in some sense, a perceptive process on the part of the reacting organism. A reflex involves no psychological process. Again, each instinct-reaction is the response of the whole organism or person, who acts through the respective organs involved; reflexes, on the other hand, are the movements of separate organs which can be elicited even when neural connection with the brain of the organism is severed. They are not the reactions of the total organism or person. Thus, for example, the knee might respond to a stimulation with a knee-jerk reflex, even if nerve connection with the brain were cut, but the person would not, in similar conditions, show acquisitiveness.

On any first reaction, habit begins to be formed. A predisposition to any response results from the repetition of that response. In the physiological aspect, these habits correlate with those latent modifications in the irritable tissue of the reacting organism which result from the repetition of the response. These modifications are analogous to the neurograms of Prince or the engrams of Semon.(2). They are "arrangements of neurones, conditioned in such a way that their subsequent activation produces a pattern of behaviour which resembles, but is not identical with, the

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 (1). McDougall, Op.Cit., p.75.

(2). Semon; "The Mneme", p.12.



previous resultant behaviour". (1).

### III. Innate Elements are Non-moral.

Gordon holds that these engrams, "representing primitive patterns of thought and feeling, acquired during the lifetime of various individuals, may be transmitted in their modified form to future generations".(2). This is doubtful, but whether it be true or not, definite character traits, character itself, are not transmissible. Character must be won by each personality for himself. Essentially, man's innate endowment is non-moral; the raw material of virtue and vice is the same; original desires are in themselves non-moral. Neither good nor bad inheres in instincts themselves.(3). (4).

Psycho-therapy agrees in considering these elements of man's innate endowment to be, per se, un-moral. "--- there are no vices in their own right; there are only perverted impulses, which, when wrested from their morbid attachments, may be turned into positive virtues". (5). To be sure, these native impulses are at first non-socialized, but in and of themselves they are not bad.

Neither are they good. "So far as any excellence is merely a natural or inherited tendency, it may be the basis

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(1). Gordon; "Personality", p. 180.

(2). Gordon, Op.Cit., p. 181.

(3). See Rashdall; "The Theory of Good and Evil", Vol.II,p.73.

(4). See Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion", p. 129.

(5). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals", p.117.

of virtue, but is not itself virtue".(1).

Although this innate dispositional endowment of man is neither good nor bad, it is the basis for "both moral and immoral tendencies in later years".(2).

Goodness and badness, morality, inheres in the conscious approval or disapproval by a self-conscious individual, of the actions upon which a weighed judgment has been pronounced by himself, as he is influenced by his socially-formed ideals. A child of two years, for example, would not be considered culpable if he appropriated a diamond ring whose brilliance attracted him. The "acquisitive instinct" would not, as a result of such action, be condemned as bad because this manifestation of its operation did not conform to social custom. The act was not the consciously approved act of a self-conscious, responsible individual. Instincts must be trained in and by society, and self-consciousness must first develop in the child, before the functioning of instincts takes on an ethical aspect.

#### IV. There is No Moral Instinct.

From the earliest times, some moralists have held that, as self-consciousness develops in the child, he can become morally responsible only as a result of his possessing an innate moral instinct.

Thus Kirkpatrick (3) says that "such an instinct prob-

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(1). Sorley; "The Moral Life", p. 15.

(2). Waddle; "An Introduction to Child Psychology", p.213.

(3). Kirkpatrick; "Fundamentals of Child Study", p. 61.

ably exists, in man at least, in the moral tendency to conform to law, and to act for the good of others as well as self, and in the religious tendency to regard a Higher Power". He continues: "Since every race and tribe has some form of morality and worship, there is good reason for saying that the tendencies to conform to law and to worship unknown sources of power is instinctive".

So also Clavier (1), says that a moral sentiment exists in the form of an innate tenderness.

Professor Paterson (2) holds that "Whatever may have been the precise factors and stages of his development as a moral being, man is now endowed with a moral instinct".

A German theory, that of Ebbinghaus-Duerr, is quoted by Froebes(3): "Normal men today possess an innate faculty which reacts to specialized stimuli just as fundamentally with praise or blame as the eye does to light-stimuli with colour sensations".

The various statements of the moral-instinct theory are to be variously criticized. Kirkpatrick speaks of a tendency to conform to law: but the fact seems to be that whatever conformity to law does exist in an unexperienced child, is either chance, or a result of external enforcement, or the mark of self-submission. If it is the result of chance, there is obviously no morality involved. If conformity is enforced,

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(1). Clavier; "L'Idee de Dieu chez l'Enfant", p. 89.

(2). Paterson; "The Nature of Religion", p. 99.

(3). Froebes; "Lehrbuch der Experimentellen Psychologie", Vol. II, p. 470.

it is not a voluntary obedience, so is not moral. If it is a mark of an attitude of self-submission, it is not a moral instinct, but rather only the instinct of self-submission that is operating.

Kirkpatrick further speaks of the tendency to act for the good of others. Now the roots of altruism are indeed, just as innate as those of egoism, but there is to morality more than a developed altruism; the two are not identical. Morality is bigger than any single moral trait; it includes more than a tendency to act for the good of others.

Kirkpatrick also mentions the tendency to regard a Higher Power. But this tendency is religious rather than ethical. Confusion in terms is here avoided only if man's personal regard for, and relation to, his accepted God or Gods, be considered the unique criterion of religion, rather than a characteristic of morality.

As to Kirkpatrick's statement, then, it can be said that obedience to law, altruistic regard for others, and reverence for God, are not the result of a moral instinct, neither is their sum identifiable with morality: all three result partially from a developing socialization; and some elements, such as duties to one's self, are omitted. Furthermore, religion is not to be wholly included within morality. (1).

Nor can it be said that a moral instinct exists because every race and tribe has some form of morality; for universal-

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(1). See Chap. XIV.



ity of practice does not alone make an instinct. Men may act alike just because they are physically of similar construction, and live in a similar environment; such conditions would account for tropisms and reflexes as well as for instincts. Rather, it can be said that the fact that every race and tribe has some form of morality is a social phenomenon, not that similarity of action is the mark of an instinct of morality.

Clavier's statement is acceptable, if innate tenderness is not construed to be the whole of the moral sentiment. Innate tenderness may be the basis for a worthy character-trait, but morality includes more than the one element of a developed tenderness.

Professor Paterson seems to hold definitely to a moral as well as religious instinct. But definition is needed here. It appears that Professor Paterson holds, after all, that what is innate is an "Anlage", a disposition, a potentiality for moralization, rather than anything so definite as a specific moral instinct. Such an Anlage or potentiality, we agree, is innate to man when he begins his development toward moralization, but this potentiality is nothing so specific as an instinct. L.L. Bernard (1) emphasizes the specificity for which we contend when he defines instinct as "a specific response to a specific stimulus or set of stimuli".

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(1). Bernard; "Instinct; A Study in Social Psychology".

Ward (1) agrees that what the child inherits is only a "tendency to develop certain ancestral characteristics, in a word, a particular Anlage". Waddle (2) calls this inheritance the inborn capacity to attain morality "in a social order permeated with social standards". Burt (3) speaks of "certain inborn dispositions" and "a heterogeneous collection of mental tendencies". Ribot (4) says the moral sentiment is instinctive, innate, "a set of tendencies".

As the vital impulse is the spring of action in "Instinct", so the differentiations of this impulse into the various instincts become, in turn, the conscious impulses or driving forces to the various human capacities; but as to the existence of a specific "moral instinct", it is to be concluded that, since there is revealed no consistent, specific response to stimulation which is the same for all individuals on all similar occasions, (5), a moral instinct as such can not well be considered as existing in man.

"A moral instinct does not teach a man what is right and what is wrong - for there is no such instinct"(6). There is lacking that specificity in an evoking object and in reaction which is an essential characteristic of instinct responses.

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- (1). Ward; "Psychological Principles", pp. 427 - 428.
- (2). Waddle; "An Introduction to Child Psychology", p. 210.
- (3). Burt; "Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility".
- (4). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions", p. 299.
- (5). See McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 26.
- (6). Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", Chap. XXIV.

Thus although morality and religion have instinctive bases, there are no instincts of morality and religion. (1).

Innate potentiality for morality develops into morality within society. Potential morality becomes actual morality only under social influences. It does not develop "independently of the moral control, training, and education which is supplied by the community". (2). McDougall thus emphasizes the social element in the moralizing process of the child: "The tendency to do what one believes to be right --- has an innate basis which may probably be called the social or moral disposition. --- The morality of a people objectively considered is the outcome of the interaction between their moral disposition on the one hand, and the moral environment on the other; and the latter consists of two parts: the traditional system of precepts, customs, laws, in short, the code; and the traditional system of sanctions by which the code is enforced." (3).

#### V. Moralization is Unique to Man.

Our position is, that, although there is in man, as a basis for morality, nothing so specific as a moral instinct, still, there are instinctive bases for morality; there is an innate Anlage, tendency, capacity, or potentiality for morality, which, in a social environment, and as self-con-

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(1). See Tracy; "The Psychology of Childhood", p. 181.

(2). Sully; "The Human Mind", Vol. II, p. 163.

(3). McDougall; "The Group Mind", p. 263.

sciousness thus develops in the child, develops into morality. Furthermore, if this Anlage be resolvable into simpler constituents such as self-submission, curiosity and the like, there still is, in the total organization, something unique to man. This moral tendency may extend radically to non-human forms, but even if it does, there is manifested in this moral potentiality of man, to use Morgan's term, a distinctly human "emergent".

### 1. Neural Intricacy and Plasticity.

On the physiological side, this emergent is marked by a greater intricacy in nervous organization. Man's neural organization attains to a greater complexity than that of any non-human individual. With the increased complexity of the nervous system there goes an increased ability to "think" on any subject, non-moral or moral. An increase in psychic intricacy parallels the increase in intricacy of nervous organization. Moreover, the neural patterns with which non-human individuals are endowed, are not only less complex than those with which a human being begins life, but those of the former are less amenable to development - less plastic than those of man. Horton (1) says along this line: "As we come nearer to human goals in the problems of comparative psychology, we experience a paradoxical slowing up in the yield of information from animal experiments. --- Knowledge derived from chimpanzees can rise no higher than chimpanzees. The

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(1). Horton; "Prince's Neurogram Concept", in "Problems of Personality", p. 409.



proper unit of investigation of humanity is man. --- When the experiments with chimpanzees are as finished as a squeezed orange, there will still be left out of account the especially human potentialities of nerve impulses in combination". The highest non-human individual can hardly be said to possess the ability of CONCEPTUAL THINKING, EVALUATING AND COMPARISON OF CONCEPTS, and FREELY CHOOSING one of several possible modes of action which may appear, at first glance, to be of equal desirability.

## 2. Conceptualization.

It is just this conceptualization, however, the highest kind of thinking, which is necessary if any individual is to form comparative, qualitative, moral evaluations of actions and motives; if he is to make judgments upon actions and ideals of others, and upon his own; and if he is to have, as a necessary basis for these processes of evaluation and judging, concepts of the things judged.

## 3. Self-consciousness.

Another element in man's moral uniqueness is his self-consciousness. Man can know himself, and can also know himself as the knower. As a person, he is not only a subject, but can make himself his own object as well. Hegel speaks to this point in the words: "The self-existing or abstract will is the person. The highest goal of man is to be a person --- as every living thing is above all a subject. The person is thus the subject for which this subjectivity ex-

ists, for in the person am I self-contained". (1).

Mead writes as follows; " --- the self that is central to all so-called mental experience has appeared only in the social conduct of human vertebrates. It is just because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the others who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object for himself. --- the self can exist for the individual only if he assumes the roles of the others. --- This is what we imply in 'self-consciousness'. We appear as selves in our conduct insofar as we ourselves take the attitude that others take toward us, in their correlative activities. --- We take the role of what may be called the 'generalized other'. --- It is this generalized other in his experience which provides him with a self". (2).

Seth speaks of man's uniqueness in these words: "In his critical and judicial 'view' of the impulsive and sentient life, consists that 'conscience' which distinguishes man from the animal creation, and opens to him the gates of the moral life which are forever closed to it".(3).

McDougall says that "The child has to pass gradually in the course of its development from the lowest to the highest stage of behaviour. --- The passage is effected by the development of self-consciousness, of the sentiments, and of character. Human behaviour on a low level, attended

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(1). Hegel; "Philosophie des Rechts", Part I, Sec. 35, Addition.

(2). Mead; "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", in "International Journal of Ethics", Vol. XXXV, pp.251 ff., 1924 - 1925.

(3). Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 193.

by a meagre amount of conceptualization, but rather evoked by primary instinctive impulses, approaches the non-moral".(1).

We may conclude:

1. The human nervous equipment is more intricate and more highly organized and organizable than that of any other animal, and his psychic capacity is at least proportionately greater.

2. In society, man becomes uniquely self-conscious.

3. Because of his resulting conceptual, critical, and judicial ability, his conduct "is distinguished from the behaviour of animals by the presence of moral ideas". (2).

L.A. Reid well says: "It is the existence of value self-consciously realized which constitutes the novelty of the moral life; reference to instincts is insufficient". (3).

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- (1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 185.
  - (2). Sorley; "The Moral Life and Moral Worth", p. 1.
  - (3). Reid; in "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. XIV.

## Chapter IX.

MORAL BEHAVIOUR AND THE ORGANIZATION  
OF MAN'S AFFECTIVE ENDOWMENT.I. Moralization Involves More than Socialization of  
Innate Elements.

Man's character is based upon his inherited powers and tendencies. The roots of character tap pre-natal life, but character itself is developed by the individual's experiences, under which are included both the systematic training which is called education, and the countless influences which the mature as well as the growing mind receives from the physical, social, and mental surroundings. "Heredity provides the basis of character. The environment gives the external conditions in which it must live and grow by the assimilation of experience and adaptation to the circumstances of life" (1).

So important, however, is the social element, and so great is the influence and pressure which society exerts upon the growing child, that some have claimed that the socialization of man's innate endowment is the whole of morality. Trotter (2) seems to consider the "herd instinct" to be the total basis for morality: but the term "herd instinct" is used "too indiscriminately as a mere descriptive term to blanket over behaviour otherwise unexplained" (3). Such

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- (1). Sorley; "The Moral Life and Moral Worth", p. 11.  
 (2). Trotter; "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War".  
 (3). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 154.



a term is reminiscent of the abandoned faculty psychology.

McDougall says that the only reason for not considering socialization to be identical with moralization is the resulting confusion in terms. We do not wholly agree with his statement that "there would be no serious objection to the use of the two expressions (moral conduct and social conduct) as synonymous" (1), unless there is included in the term "social conduct" the idea of integrated conduct. (2). Even then, it would be more exact to include socialization in integration than integration in socialization.

The mere tendency of individuals to associate together with others of their own kind does not prompt them to a behaviour which can be called either altruistic, or moral in any other sense. The gregarious instinct only "creates the situation in which the profoundly important general tendencies sympathy, imitation, and suggestibility can become effective in the development of the human being" (3). It is true that the complete satisfaction of their impulses is "impossible until each animal is surrounded by others of the same species in a similar state of excitement" (4), but gregarious instinct simply draws men together in society; it furnishes no incentive to proper social behaviour.

It is with ALL forms of individual experience, and not only with the instinctive associating together on the part

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(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 179.

(2). See Chap. XIII.

(3). Drever; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education". p. 83.

(4). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 175.

of members of the same species, that morality is concerned. (1). Our problem is the VALUE of associations; the KIND of behaviour manifested by individuals in groups.

We conclude that society is the necessary field for the moralization of an individual, furnishing him with socially approved and socially enforced customs as a partial curb and guide to his innate tendencies. However, real "progress of morality involves its gradual emancipation from the external rule of custom, and, at the same time, an increase and deepening of the reflective factor" (2) in the individual. The possibility of the development of morality resides primarily not in the gregarious instinct, but rather in the affective endowment of man. Morality involves both the socialization of the human innate tendencies, and also the development and integration of the inner elemental factors, including especially the affective ones.

## II. Affective Endowment is Basic to Man's Moralization.

### 1. "Instinct-interest" and Emotions.

The most fundamental element in man's affective endowment is the "instinct-interest" of Drever's theory. It is here that emotion is related to instinct. Instinct-interest is the affective element in the instinct experience; if this affective ultimate be disturbed in its normal functioning, there results conscious emotion: if temporarily thwarted, the intensity of

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(1). See Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 222.

(2). Sorley; "The Moral Life and Moral Worth", p. 8.

the desire for the end grows until at some undefined point in the process it becomes conscious - emotional - negative, or a "sadness" emotion; if temporarily and unexpectedly facilitated, it gives rise to a positive or "joy" emotion. Thus, "any particular instinct may take on either of two opposite characters or polarities, according as the instinct finds or is denied satisfaction".

We accept this theory as against Dewey who says that "emotion is a perturbation from the clash or failure of habit" (1). Clash and failure of a tendency to action would arouse the unpleasant or negative emotions, but the pleasant or positive ones, which arise from any unexpected facilitation to response, are left, in Dewey's theory, unexplained.

A group of psychologists define and explain emotion wholly in physiological terms. Pieron says it consists "essentially in an abnormal discharge of nervous energy, an amount too great to result in normal reactions" (2): this "reserve nervous energy" is discharged throughout the body, and the resulting "widespread reaction is the emotion". Weiss considers feeling and emotion as "categories of behaviour resulting from the interaction between physical stimulating conditions and the sensori-motor system" --- "To regard feelings and emotions as non-physical forces which modify behaviour leads to a type of experimentation the result of which can not

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(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 76.

(2). Pieron; "The Nature of Emotion in Animal and Man".



be incorporated into the rapidly developing system of biological and social laws". (1). Cannon considers emotions to be "under the control of the lower centres of the nervous system, to a considerable extent of the spinal cord", and have their "sources outside the field of consciousness". (2). Dunlap says that in his vocabulary, "emotion means visceral occurrences", and "in normal life are the general back-ground against which external objects appear". (3). Bechterew says that the nature of emotions is best expressed in the "external mimetic movements and the somatic or bodily changes", and hence emotions may best be considered as "somato-mimetic reflexes". (4).

Such theories, we think, are satisfactory as far as they go, but they mistakenly make the mechanical element the whole of the affect experience. Organic activities, somatic and overt, do accompany emotion; but to make these bodily manifestations of emotion the total experience is to exclude from that experience those qualitative elements which are observable only to introspection, but which are just as real as those which are quantitatively, behaviouristically, commensurable. It seems to us that such exclusive theories mistakenly identify emotions with the observable expressions of emotions, the

- inferior to Dreyer's, we think.
- (1). Weiss; "Feeling and Emotions as Forms of Behaviour".
  - (2). Cannon; "Neural Organization for Emotional Expression".
  - (3). Dunlap; "Emotion as a Dynamic Back-ground".
  - (4). Bechterew; "Concerning Emotions as Somato-mimetic Reflexes".

(1). Dreyer; "Historical Development of the Theory of Emotion".  
 (2). McDougall; "The Distinction Between Feelings and Emotions".



"concomitants of the life process" (1) with the self-starting urge inherent in the life process itself.

McDougall has most recently stated his emotion theory as follows: "There are good reasons to believe that the human organism is innately endowed with a number of distinct conative tendencies, each subserving some great biological end. --- The best general name for them is, I suggest, 'primary tendency'. --- Each primary tendency, when brought into action, manifests itself in a felt impulse or desire; and each such primary impulse is accompanied by and, as a mode of experience, is qualified by, a specific quality which reflects in consciousness the general setting of the organism. When any primary impulse is excited in great strength, the corresponding specific quality is easily recognized as one of the primary emotion-qualities. The conjoint operation of two or more primary impulses is accompanied by a complex quality in which, in many cases, we can detect affinity with the corresponding primary emotion-qualities; such complex may be called the secondary or blended emotion-qualities. The complex feelings (otherwise known as the 'derived emotions') have no such one-to-one relation to the primary tendencies. Their relation to them is, rather, highly general". (2).

McDougall's theory is inferior to Drever's, we think, because, as McDougall himself seems to admit, the simple, specific, one-to-one relation of emotions to instincts is an

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- (1). Brett; "Historical Development of the Theory of Emotions".  
 (2). McDougall; "The Distinction Between Feelings and Emotions".

over-simplification of the facts. The derived emotions are left without respective corresponding instincts. Furthermore, McDougall's theory, just as does the theory of Prince, that is, the "emotion-energy" theory, leaves emotion an un-analyzed ultimate. We think it is analyzable, and not ultimate.

Instinct-interest is, we think, the affective ultimate; and here is located the primary seat of man's moral potentiality. Instinct-interest is basic to meaning, evaluation, and judging, that is, to morality. Emotion is the affective development of this basic instinct-interest, and is the most powerful single factor influencing human conduct. Even on the perceptual level of mental activity, the interest of the situation, that is, its meaning, is, for elementary experience, the most important element. (1). If this be true, it is evident that, in the case of morality, which involves the higher mental activities of conceptual thinking and pronouncing judgments, the innate affective element can not easily be overemphasized.

The relation of the affective element, instinct-interest and its development, emotion, to meaning makes it important for morality. "Primary reactions give significance to persons, things, and events. When this significance is recognized, a peculiar reaction of feeling takes place which is called emotion". (2). It is precisely in the recognized

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(1). See Drever; "Instinct in Man", p. 133.

(2). Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics", p. 171.

significance of persons, things, and events, that the moral attitude inheres. Westermarck makes moral concepts to have their origin in emotion. (1). Brown says that "moral consciousness is coterminous with emotional and volitional consciousness". (2). McDougall says that the "emotional qualities are the cognitive basis of self-knowledge and self-control". (3). And Pillsbury, although emphasizing the controllable rather than the controlling aspect of emotions, emphasizes by this very attitude the centrality of emotions for morality, when he says: "A large part of self-control is really control of the emotions". (4). Thus, we agree with Hinkle in her contention that there is a demand for a displacement of the psychological point of gravity from the will and intellect to the realm of emotions and feelings. (5).

We conclude that man's emotions are inextricably, vitally, and fundamentally involved in his morality; their importance is established by their constancy in functioning while other mental elements vary; by their fundamental character in self-knowledge; by their urgency; and by their resulting tendency to mis-development into abnormality of personal conduct.

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- (1). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", Vol. I, Chap. I.
- (2). Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 223.
- (3). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 326.
- (4). Pillsbury; "Essentials of Psychology", p. 317.
- (5). Hinkle; Translation of Jung's "The Psychology of the Unconscious", Introduction, p. 40.

11. Dyer; "Instinct in Man", p. 305.  
 12. Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character", p. 184.  
 13. Edgell; "Mental Life", p. 317.  
 14. Shaw; "Foundations of Character", p. 62.



## 2. Emotions Become Organized into Sentiments.

Instinct-interest, we have held, is the innate, irreducible affective root of emotion, developing into emotion when it is temporarily disturbed in its operation. Emotions, in turn, on the ideational level, become organized into sentiments. "Any instinct may in ideational consciousness pass into a sentiment". (1).

A sentiment is an object or idea with its affective accompaniment. Shand has given to psychology the concept of sentiment which is now generally accepted. It is taken to be a kind of emotional structure around some object or idea. Thomson describes it as an organization, a prejudice, more than a mere grouping of emotions; it is rather "a permanent set or attitude which assures that the emotions of a given sort will arise in situations involving the object of the sentiment". (2). A sentiment is a unit of character; in its simplest form, it is a single emotional tendency connected to an idea. It is a structure of the mind, while emotion is an event of mental life. (3). In his fifth law, Shand further describes sentiment: "every sentiment tends to include in its system all those emotions that are of service to its ends, and to exclude all those which are useless or antagonistic". He further says that a sentiment is a self or microcosm of the entire mind. (4).

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- (1). Drever; "Instinct in Man", p. 209.
  - (2). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character", p. 154.
  - (3). Edgell; "Mental Life", p. 217.
  - (4). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 62.



### 3. Mood.

If an affective element, instead of becoming organized into a sentiment, remains in a condition of sub-excitation, we have a mood. Mood is an emotion in a state of sub-excitation: it is an affective set, of a duration somewhat longer than the duration of a conscious emotion. Pillsbury describes mood in this sense as being an emotion of long duration and slight intensity; it becomes in turn, a predisposition to an emotion or group of emotions. (1).

### 4. Temperament.

The nature of man as a whole, considered from the point of view of its emotional colouring, that is, from its affective-conative point of view, is called by the descriptive term temperament. Temperament is the general affective tone of a man's nature. The physiological side of temperament may be considered as in large measure "the balance or resultant of all the many bodily constitutional contributory chemical influences". (2).

### 5. Disposition.

The sum total of all man's original tendencies - his innate dispositions or instincts, may be called by the descriptive term disposition.

### 6. Character.

Character is another descriptive term. It covers sentiments

- (1). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology", p. 346.  
 (2). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 121.

and habits, the innate plus the acquired. It is the "sum of the acquired tendencies, built upon the native basis of disposition and temperament: it includes our sentiments and habits in the widest sense". (1).

### 7. Personality.

The term personality emphasizes the integrative aspect of the relationship existing between the elements constituting man's psychic being. Personality is made up of what Hall calls elemental "psyches" (2), which are sometimes very loosely, and sometimes compactly constellated; some of them may be persistently repressed, and others forced and over-stimulated. A personality is a universe of psyches or sentiments or selves in a state of more or less perfect order and integration.

### III. Emotional Normality and Abnormality.

#### 1. Emotional Conflicts are possible within the Personality.

A condition of emotional conflict may readily develop within a personality; for "Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own". (3). Various sentiments tend to develop independently, and thus may become unharmonious rivals for the ascendance and governance within and over the other elements of the personality. If the respective innate tendencies, which are inherently self-assertive, are left to

(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 123.

(2). Hall; "Educational Problems", Vol. I, p. 200.

(3). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 123.

themselves, to develop, each in its own way, without any organization or integration into an harmoniously working, although complex whole, then certain emotional conflicts are inevitable.

Instincts may oppose each other. There may be, for example, a conflict between the appreciation of Self and the contempt of Self, (1), between self-assertion and self-submission.

## 2. The Complex.

The "complex" is a repressed tendency, usually contrary to the moral code accepted by the individual; it therefore involves a conflict, upon one side of which is to be found the self-sentiment. It is best to distinguish "complex" from "sentiment": the former is the latter well on the way toward a pathological condition. Bernard Hart and A.G. Tansley (2) do not make this distinction, but use the term "complex" to mean any emotionally toned system of ideas. The breadth of this definition causes confusion in meanings. It is better, we think, to reserve the term "complex" to express a repressed tendency in conflict with the self-sentiment. A complex becomes a fixation of the mind; the individual rejects the unpleasant incident in question, as involving an unacceptable sentiment, and he tends to repress it; but although thus rejecting it, he is tied down to it. The complex prevents the normal functioning of the mind in any situation

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 (1). See Stratton; "Psychology of Religious Experience", Part I.  
 (2). Tansley; "The New Psychology", pp. 57 ff, p. 73

which arouses the emotion associated with the original unpleasant experience. "When the complex is struck on --- the whole mind reacts just explosively and exclusively to that complex". (1).

### 3. Affective Normality is Relative.

Even in normal men and women there can be detected the beginnings of conflict and dissociation, and the condition of abnormality is merely one of degree: in "normal" individuals, dissociation has not reached such proportions as to be called dual or multiple personality. Most persons have within themselves unreconciled contradictions which are possibilities of abnormality and which become abnormalities if allowed to develop in that direction. "Unity of personality is merely ideal". (2). "The normal typical mind is a scientific fiction never fully realized". (3). Just as cases "of hysteria show all degrees of mental disaggregation, from mere alternation of mood and conflict of motive compatible with mental health, to extreme cases where two souls seem to share the tenancy of one body" (4), so also do the various degrees of mental integration present unbroken series of conditions, ranging from the closely knit type of personality which is dominated by one consuming purpose down through increasingly abnormal cases which present conditions of extreme multiple personality. There is no difference in kind between the

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- (1). Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 75.
  - (2). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions", p. 385.
  - (3). Sully; "The Human Mind", Vol. II, p. 311.
  - (4). Brown; Op.Cit., p. 195.



normal and abnormal, but rather only a difference in degree. No personality is perfectly integrated, with a completely ordered hierarchy of sentiments nicely graded, with a supreme dominating purpose at the top; and there is no definite place in the series where it can be said that normality ends and abnormality begins. "He who remains healthy has to struggle with the same complexes that cause the neurotic to fall ill".(1).

The reason the neurotic falls ill is, that he has not faced the conflict of motives by recognizing and openly acknowledging them, and thus resolving the conflict. "Danger of disorder comes when the contending motives work obscurely, unrecognized, or disguised by rationalizations, reasons which we invent to explain or excuse our yielding to the promptings we do not acknowledge; and especially is there danger of disorder when one of the unrecognized motives is of a nature such that we will not, dare not, recognize it, but rather repress it". (2).

The reason the healthy minded person does not fall ill, on the other hand, is, that "his character has been formed from a well-balanced disposition under the influence of unquestioned ideals and of a definite supreme goal or master purpose". (3). Normality and morality rest upon the integration of sentiments under a single master sentiment.

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- (1). Hinkle; translation of Jung's "The Psychology of the Unconscious", introduction, p. X.
  - (2). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology", p. 217.
  - (3). McDougall; Op.Cit., p. 216.

#### IV. Strength of Character Involves Organization of Sentiment Systems.

One essential condition of a strong character is the organization of the sentiments into some harmonious system or hierarchy; "happiness arises from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organized and unified personality --- towards closely allied and harmonious ends". (1). Although integration as a principle operates also on the purely perceptual level, it is on the higher, the ideational and conceptual levels, that it has special importance for us in this essay.

We may summarize an analysis of sentiment, and see its development under the influence of the principle of integration. An instinct is an interest-disposition. The instinct-disposition is perceptual, involving only perceptual consciousness. The sentiment-disposition is ideational, and is a sentiment because it is ideational. Interest dispositions are either native or acquired, but a sentiment is more than a mere acquired interest-disposition on the ideational level; a sentiment involves, in its activity, an emotional excitement, whereas the activity of an interest-disposition involves merely worthwhileness, or interest-experience. In the human being, although the acquired sentiments play an analogous part on the ideational level to the part played by the instincts on the perceptual level, they also involve a synthesis

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(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 161.

or an integration of a higher order.

This synthesis may be seen when the normal instinct-interest is obstructed in its passage into satisfyingness. Normally, the interest experience, determined by an acquired interest, passes into satisfyingness without any emotional excitement; but if there is a disturbance, due to some intervening obstacle, the necessary energy to overcome it is drawn from the appropriate sentiment. This fact implies that under normal conditions, there is a connected dispositional whole, constituted of interest-dispositions and sentiments, presenting in its arrangement a kind of hierarchy.

#### V. Idealization Effects Integration.

"Ideal formation" represents a level of psychic integration still higher than the "sentiment formation", just as the latter represents a higher level than the instinct. The formulation and acceptance of an "ideal", as we shall see (1), involves on the part of the person, a reflecting and a judging for his own Self. All such sentiments of value, that is, "ideals", thus become integral parts of the "Self". Here the self-sentiment enters as a support for any other element to which value has been adjudged by the Self. Morality rests upon these value-judgments pronounced upon concepts: that is, rests upon idealization. As value is value for a Self, and judgment is judgment by a Self, therefore morality is obviously essentially and vitally connected with the sentiment of Self.

(1). See Chap. X.



The goal of personality is character, effected by way of the integration of sentiments through the personal acceptance of an ideal. Roback, although making character to be too negative a thing by his emphasis of inhibition, rightly emphasizes this integration and coordination by way of an accepted "regulative principle" (1) or abstract "ideal". He defines character as "an enduring psycho-physical disposition to inhibit instinctive impulses in accordance with a regulative principle". This integration marks completeness of life, and "complete human life is the supreme good". (2). Allport, speaking from a behaviouristic standpoint, expresses the same idea in these words: "Integration of drives and subservience of the minor ones to the major ones are essential for human efficiency and happiness. --- In some individuals we find a self-inculcation of excellent habits in the interest of the major drive, leading to a hierarchy of harmonious drives in a total integration of personality". (3). Guyau says tersely: "Morality is the unity of the being". (4). And Sorley says that "in his own life, as far as it is a moral life, each individual seeks system or unity". (5). That is, personality has integration as its goal. "Man is of necessity a moral being, for the moral impulse is simply the effort to

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- (1). Roback; "The Psychology of Character", p. 450.
  - (2). Hall; "Educational Problems", Vol. I, p. 204.
  - (3). Allport; "Social Psychology", p. 111.
  - (4). Guyau; "Education and Heredity", p. 79.
  - (5). Sorley; "Recent Tendencies in Ethics", p. 134.



systematize all particular tendencies by reference to an end which possesses intrinsic worth".(1). A moralized individual possesses an "all-inclusive end for the organism as a whole, and this end has a necessary reference to the essential nature of the organism". It is "in the due subordination amongst themselves of the conflicting systems of instincts and in their control by our higher mental functions" that the moral value(of instincts) lies". (2). On the other hand, inadequacies in the associations of innate emotional elements with the mental powers of man are the cause of all important errors of conduct and of all the burdens of men or of societies. (3).

But man is not yet so harmoniously integrated within his emotional and sentimental constitution, that he is a real "in-dividuality", that is, wholly "un-dissociated".(4). "Man is still only on the way towards self-harmony and individuality". The goal of "complete and permanent control, in full self-consciousness, of his whole psychic inheritance from higher animals, as also of these new elements that result from his own mental activity as man", has not been attained. If such a goal were attained, man would experience complete, harmonious, moral life, for right conduct means harmony within the personality, and as we shall see (5), a resulting wider harmony between the person and society. The contribu-

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- (1). Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics", p. 172.
- (2). Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion", p. 129.
- (3). Hinkle; Jung's "The Psychology of the Unconscious", Intro.
- (4). Simpson; "Man and the Attainment of Immortality", p. 251.
- (5). See Chap. XIII.

tion of the ideal to conduct is "peace in action". (1).

The personality in which the number of harmonious sentiments is large, is superior to one in which the number of harmoniously functioning sentiments is small; for each sentiment results from personal experience, and breadth of experience is therefore implied in a multiplicity of sentiments. Furthermore, as the number of sentiments increases, intricacy of organization and of affect-pattern is increased. So, if, in such a more highly complex pattern, harmony exists, it is indeed the harmony of a superior type of personality. And if a personality, inclusive of many and intense emotional units, is harmoniously organized under the sovereignty of a worthy master sentiment, that personality is a high type of individual. "---the richer and better organized is our character, the greater is our good ---". (2).

But even if the master sentiment is not of the highest kind, it may still be an effector of integration of personality. Strength of character depends upon the extent and degree to which the sentiments are interconnected with one another, and are governed by fixed principles, not upon the quality of the master sentiment. A personality harmonized under a bad master sentiment is still a strong character if the integration is comparatively complete. "Character stands for the

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(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 264.

(2). Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 225.

hierarchy of motives, as it has become established for any individual" (1), but the FINEST type is, of course, complex, strongly and harmoniously organized, and directed toward the realization of a HIGHER goal and ideal.

The governing sentiment for one person may be a quite insignificant one in the judgment of another person: for example, one man may be completely engrossed in a detailed study of the Greek particle  $\delta\eta$ , and in enthusiastically pursuing his study of that word in all its uses in the whole range of Greek literature, he may manifest a trait akin to genius; but such a pursuit would be considered by another man as quite unworthy of the emotional enthusiasm which his friend shows toward it. Strength and stability of character may be shown by an intense, persistent, emotionally tinged interest in the Greek particle  $\delta\eta$ , just as certainly as by an interest, say, in world politics. In either case, stability of character would be shown, not so much by the kind of object which furnishes the nucleus of the dominating sentiment, as by the completeness and strength of its dominance over the other elements within the personality.

Instability of character, on the other hand, is marked by a variability in master sentiments. If the governor is changed frequently, the actions of the individual manifest the frequent changes.

(1). Edgell; "Mental Life", p. 245.



## VI. Integration of Personality and the Unconscious.

### 1. "The Unconscious".

Personality may fail of attaining its goal of an efficient integration of sentiments, because of conditions existing in "The Unconscious". Let us first see what The Unconscious is, and then consider some of the possible conditions existing therein which might cause a failure in integration and thus prevent moralization of the personality.

However the unconscious is characterized, it is to be considered a real and integral part of the personality. "Subconscious resources are OUR resources". (1). There may be conflicts within a personality which amount to dissociation, but the dissociated element still belongs to a somebody. If a dissociated element becomes the dominating power in the activity of A, and he acts in ways of which he is wholly unaware in the succeeding normal state, as for example in a fugue, it is still A who is said to perform the acts. Either Dr. Jekyll or Mr. Hyde may be the governor of the individual's behaviour, but in either case, it is the Jekyll-Hyde individual who owns both tendencies, and acts, now under the dominance of the Jekyll tendency, and again under that of the Hyde tendency. In cases of less pronounced abnormality, or in "normal" cases, this ownership of alternating tendencies is more plainly evident: thus it is obviously the individual

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(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p. 538.

(1). Brewer; Essays, January 21, 1927.



who owns his alternating moods which influence him to act now this way, now that.

The subconscious resources, whether they seldom, or never, emerge into consciousness, are nevertheless continuously active. Only a small part of the content of the unconscious may ever emerge into consciousness, but what remains below does not, because of its submersion, remain inactive and uninfluential upon conduct. The "group of prejudices and sentiments" which structurally constitutes the unconscious, functions "in endo-psychic processes". (1).

Freud holds that all psychic phenomena are manifestations of the unconscious, and the phenomena of conscious experience are superficial, the former producing and explaining the latter. His mechanical theory erroneously extends the meaning of "The Unconscious" until the conscious is relegated to a place of minor importance in psychic life. On the physiological side, Freud holds the unconscious to be constituted of active neural mechanisms, the energy of which shows itself in "wishes". This wish-energy of the unconscious becomes manifest in such phenomena as wit, phantasy, hysteria, dreams, slips of the tongue and pen, and forgetting.

The psyche, the mental life, is divided by Freud into three levels: the conscious, the foreconscious, and the unconscious. The conscious is the sphere of normal mental personal awareness. The foreconscious is composed of elements

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(1). Drever; Lecture, January 21, 1927.

which are capable of becoming conscious, but are not so: they are available for conscious use, and can be recalled from the foreconscious ante-chamber into the audience-chamber of consciousness. The unconscious is the sphere of repressed wishes: that is, repression has dissociated them from the conscious personality. These repressed wishes are not eliminated nor annihilated, but are only overlaid. So in the unconscious the primitive psychic life remains intact. Freud emphasizes this unconscious to such a degree that everything conscious is made to have a preliminary step in it: the unconscious is considered the basis of psychic life. Repressions are effected from the earliest months of life, and each new repression is an addition to the sum of submerged tendencies which sum constitutes the unconscious. Repressions are effected usually because the tendencies repressed are rebellious against the dictates of moral and social ideals and customs. These tendencies are practically all regarded by Freud as specializations of, or deviations from, the sex instinct. Libido is the energy with which they strive to gain expression in the sex instinct. Thus there is involved in repressed tendencies, in complexes, a conflict, and the powerful resulting affect is unpleasant. The censor, an ill-defined term of Freud's, is a repressing force or forces, a barrier protecting the conscious against painful invasions from the unconscious. To evade the censor, and thus to succeed in entering the conscious, the repressed wishes must be reclothed, assuming a symbolic character. This sym-

bolization is commonly effected in dreams, phantasies, and so forth. Thus for Freud, a study of dreams is all important as a key to an explanation of all psychic phenomena.

Not only is Freud to be criticized for his mechanistic view-point, but there is, we think, no warrant for extending the meaning of the unconscious to such a confusing degree as to force it to displace the conscious elements as the sovereign psychic phenomena. And in the third place, he gives undue inclusive prominence to the sex instinct. In order to include within that concept everything which he does include, Freud is forced so to expand its meaning that this meaning becomes unique among all psychological theories. The expansion only effects confusion in terms. On the whole, Freudianism is an oversimplification of facts, resulting in making out of the unconscious "a mere fermenting dung-heap, made up of odds and ends of nasty and forbidden desires". (1).

C.G. Jung repudiates the pan-sexuality of his earlier master, Freud. He includes within the term "unconscious", not only the individual's repressed tendencies or complexes, but also all the instinctive foundations of his mental life, and a somewhat vaguely defined "collective unconscious". This latter includes racial elements - unconscious psychic patterns which have never been experienced by the subject, and which "are encephalographically determined, entirely at the level of un-

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(1). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology".



conscious activity". (1). These are Jung's "archetypes", innate tendencies belonging to the individual to explain his world in terms which figure largely in mythology and folk-lore. Jung thus classifies the

#### Constitution of the Personality.

1. The personal conscious elements constituting the conscious personality, the "moi conscient", (das Ich).
2. The personal unconscious elements constituting the individuality (das Selbst), or the "moi inconscient" or "sub-conscious".
3. The conscious and unconscious elements of personal nature constituting the person. (2).

Thus for Jung, there is, besides the "conscious I", (2) a personal unconscious consisting, first, of complexes which were once conscious, and secondly, of sense perceptions; and (3) also a collective unconscious which is a depository for racial elements. In Jung's theory, the unconscious becomes "the source of all our more imaginative life, our inspirations, our intuitive insights and prophetic glimpses". (3).

Jung is to be criticized for his indefiniteness along certain lines. What, for example, is the relation between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious? The theory seems to place upon the inheritability of character-

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(1). Gordon; "Personality", p. 178.

(2). Jung; "La Structure de l'Inconscient", in "Archives de Psychologie", Vol. XVI, p. 177. 1916 - 1917.

(3). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology", p. 22.



istics a burden heavier than it can scientifically bear.

Pierre Janet holds that the mental life is a flow of sensations which, in the normal man, cohere, or are synthesized in a complex stream. In the abnormal or neurotic, the stream falls apart or fails to attain unity because of a deficiency in the energy necessary to secure the synthesis and coherence. Such poverty of energy Janet calls "*la misère psychologique*", and he holds that, for such a condition, "Most methods of psychological treatment are methods of economy which in one way or another try to conserve and augment the psychological forces of the patient". (1). He claims that most acts of misconduct are only manifestations of the deficiency of this energy: "*Il me semble possible de démontrer que la plupart de ces troubles de la conduite ne sont que des degrés de la même dépression plus ou moins profonde*". (2). The dissociated individual becomes the seat of two or more streams, generally one major stream and one or more minor collateral streams.

Janet's theory resembles what Oliver L. Reiser calls "*spiritual behaviourism*". Reiser says: "The fundamental reality of the universe is energy". (3). "Where the integrative action is insufficient, ( "*la Misère Psychologique*"? ) the central unity breaks down into the separate selves or psychic isotypes, and multiple personality results". Such

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- (1). Janet; "*La Tension Psychologique, ses Degrés, ses Oscillations*", in "*British Journal of Psychology*", Medical Section, 1920 - 1921, p. 5.
  - (2). Janet; *Op.Cit.*, p. 213.
  - (3). Reiser; "*Spiritual Behaviourism*", "*The Monist*. April, 1927.

a theory as Janet's is, we believe, justly criticized by McDougall as being "a mere mechanical dynamism" (1), with the purposive nature of mental activity too exclusively ignored. This tendency toward "mere mechanical dynamism" is revealed by Janet in such words as the following: "if we knew the tendencies which are operative, we should be able to predict exactly the reactions and at the same time the conduct seemingly unforeseen. Without speaking here of the role played by the inventions and progress, the great difficulty of foreseeing depends on the fact too little recognized, that man changes incessantly, that is, that at two different moments he does not present the same mechanism or the same tendencies". (2).

Rivers holds that experience becomes unconscious by the process of unwitting suppression, which he considers to be a form of forgetting. This is a protective mechanism for consciousness. An emotional or affective experience, or an intellectual experience with a strong affective tone, is especially liable to be suppressed. The danger instincts, with their unpleasant emotion of fear, are emphasized by Rivers. Experience shut off from consciousness by suppression of the unpleasant is inaccessible to consciousness directly, but can be recalled under certain special conditions such as

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 (1). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology", p. 11.

(2). Janet; Op.Cit., p. 223.

sleep, hypnotism, free association, and certain pathological states (psycho-neuroses). (1). Rivers contends that "the main function of psycho-neuroses is the solution of a conflict between opposite and incompatible principles of mental activity. Instinctive processes and experience associated therewith pass into the unconscious whenever the incompatibility passes certain limits". (2). For Rivers, as for Jung, the significance of the dream lies in a present conflict rather than in a past conflict, as Freud holds.


Morton Prince (3) says that psychic phenomena may be classified into three groups: those of personal consciousness, of co-consciousness, and of unconsciousness. The co-conscious and the unconscious constitute the sub-conscious. Dissociated states are psychic phenomena belonging to the co-conscious. Prince characterizes the unconscious, from a neurological standpoint, as "the great storehouse of neurograms which are the physiological residua of our mental lives". (4). This neurographic theory of Prince's is analogous to the neurological aspect of the "mnemic phenomena" of Bertrand Russell and Semon, or of Broad's "mnemic persistents". For Prince's theory, all inner psychic life belongs to experience and is subject to the same laws of conservation as any other part of experience. Elemental ideas

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- (1). Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 17.
  - (2). Rivers, Op.Cit., p. 6.
  - (3). Prince; "A Biological Theory of the Unconscious".
  - (4). Prince; "The Unconscious", p. 149.



which make up the experience of any given moment tend to become organized, that is, synthesized, and conserved. "Such a system, conserved, may be called an unconscious complex or neurogram or system of neurograms. It is a complex or synthesis of dormant ideas, a neural disposition. Every system of ideas, therefore, implies conservation through an organized unconscious complex".

Drever has characterized the unconscious as "sub-personal consciousness", "consciousness mainly at or below the perceptual level, and therefore consciousness in which appetite and instinct will have the fullest play: but to identify the unconscious with instinct is impossible. The unconscious is wider than instinct, though undoubtedly instinct plays in the realm of subpersonal consciousness a part that is certainly more prominent, if not more important, than in the realm of personal consciousness". He represents the "strata" of consciousness schematically as follows:



(continuous lines show normal relationship, broken lines possible distribution).

The unconscious or subpersonal consciousness is considered as



underlying at all times the conscious or personal consciousness, "just as the instinctive propensities underlie the ends and purposes of our rational activities, and it is unconscious because it represents either a stage of psychical evolution beyond which we have passed by normal development, or a mass of experience upon which we have, as it were, tried to turn our backs by some more or less abnormal process of dissociation, repression, or substitution, but instinct has precisely the same psychological position and function in subpersonal as in personal consciousness". (1).

In summarizing, the unconscious may be considered as the depository of the records made by affectively-toned experiences. The unconscious thus becomes a group of prejudices and sentiments which, though submerged, remain an integral part of personality, and active, and at times powerfully influential upon conduct. These elements of the unconscious may include among their number some submerged sentiments which have been relegated to the "subpersonal consciousness" because of an unpleasant affective tone, being possibly in conflict with an individual's accepted code of conduct and with social custom. In its physiological aspect, the unconscious is the sum total of mnemonic persistents, or neurographic residua of affective experience.

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(1). Drever; "Instinct and the Unconscious", in "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. X. 1919 - 1920.

VII. Innate Tendencies, Submerged into "The Unconscious", are a Source of Disintegration of Personality.

Conditions may easily exist in this complex depository of sentiments which cause, or amount to, dis-integration of the personality. Instinct tendencies which come to be considered by an individual as unharmonious with his accepted code, may be submerged into the unconscious, in an attempt to eliminate them. But it is dangerous to mental health thus to suppress innate tendencies; they are to be trained and controlled, but they can not be safely submerged: suppression of these forces, because they are the raw material of the complete, integrated, moralized personality, is both unsuccessful and immoral. In case of loss of, or lack of, a mental equilibrium between these instinct-tendencies and their controlling forces, (a condition which causes the psycho-neuroses), various ways of re-establishing the equilibrium are tried by different subjects. These attempts are unsuccessful.

1. Unsuccessful Attempts at Dealing with Conflicts within the Unconscious.

According to Rivers (1), neither an instinctive suppression, which is usually a defensive, unwitting process, nor a conscious process of repression is a successful solution of

Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious", pp. 122, ff.

conflict. Repression, according to Rivers, belongs to the order of intelligence; it is epicritic, rather than belonging to the order of instinct which is protopathic. The subject of an epicritic process (an anxiety- or repression-neurosis) may consciously and voluntarily "thrust out of his consciousness the painful experience, together with the affects and conative tendencies connected therewith" - but such an attempt at solution is as a rule unsuccessful.

A third unsuccessful way of dealing with inner conflict, is the attempt on the part of the organism to escape from the conflict by substituting another form of instinctive reaction for that which naturally tends to be brought into activity. The subject may regain a temporary and superficial comfort by the occurrence of symptoms which enable him to escape the conflict rather than face it. Such symptoms, for example, are those of hysteria, which shows such characteristic manifestations as paralyses, anaesthesias, and a condition of heightened suggestibility. This condition of hysteria is "due to the substitution, in an imperfect form, of an ancient instinctive reaction in place of other forms of reaction to danger".(1). For example, a wild animal, on being frightened, will often stand perfectly still, paralyzed. If this ancient instinctive reaction is substituted by man for more intelligent forms of danger reactions, there is manifested, in the substituted reaction, an hysteria

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(1). Rivers; Op.Cit., p. 135.

characteristic. of which illustrates the condition of

Again, phobias may exist in the unconscious, as a result of a previous suppression of a painful experience of fear, and lie there, maintaining a potentiality for activity whenever conditions are suitable for evoking the fear involved.

In the fifth place, the subject with an unresolved conflict between instincts and controlling forces may be seemingly "compelled", by pressure of the conflict, to perform meaningless actions, the performance of which apparently gives him comparative relief from his neurosis, provided of course, that the meaningless acts do not themselves arouse social attention or opposition. This substitutional solution of a conflict, because the subject's reaction is not to the actual situation, is inadequate. "Compulsion neurosis" does not satisfactorily meet the issue.

A method of attempted solution of conflict, involving flight from reality, a method common too, among "normal" individuals, is rationalization. This is a process of self-deception by the false fabrication of excuses for the subject's own condition and actions. Obviously, such failure to deal with actual conditions is inefficient.

Paranoia, as a defence mechanism for the organism, resulting from feelings of inferiority, and tending toward compensatory delusions of grandeur, is, of course, no adequate solution to conflict.

Neither is day-dreaming an adequate solution; nor is its exaggerated form of hallucinatory and delusional states,



aggravated forms of which illustrate the condition of dementia praecox. No reaction by an organism is efficient and normal which shows a flight from actual, existing conditions to which the organism is, after all, subject.

Finally, conflict within the elements constituting a personality, may result in the dissociation of a rebellious element from the main personality, and a successful temporary assumption by it of authority within the personality over the other elements. The result is duality of personality. In extreme cases, in manic states, dissociation may advance to such a point that it seems that the whole controlling organization breaks down completely, and the various unorganized, unrestrained instinctive tendencies run riot.

#### VIII. Moralization Involves Organization of Rather than Annihilation of Instinct-tendencies.

A general conclusion from these brief summaries of some unsuccessful attempts at solutions of conflict (1) is, that attempts at annihilation of innate tendencies is not a healthy disposal of them, for instinctive tendencies are so powerful that they can neither be annihilated nor safely disregarded, nor successfully suppressed. They may break through the attempted repression, or they may slip through in secret ways which the subject will not recognize, or "the dam is a success, and the valley below it is dry and sterile". (2).

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(1). See Rivers; Op.Cit., pp. 122, ff.

(2). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character", p. 159.

The fact is, the instinctive tendencies can not be eliminated, and even if their elimination were possible, it would be neither desirable nor moral to eliminate them, containing as they do, not only the potentiality for bad, but just as powerful potentiality for positive good. Eliminate them and you eliminate the basis for morality as well as for immorality. Not annihilation, but control and organization of instinctive tendencies is the basis of ethical conduct. Morality is the socialized behaviour of the integrated personality. The elimination of instinctive tendencies would be the elimination of the raw material of which personality itself is constructed.

#### 1. Integration Involves Identification

Integration is a principle which is fundamental to the complexity of mental and emotional life. It is the process by which the individual identifies himself with the various elements of his personality, and thus achieves a unified and coherent whole. This process is essential for the development of a mature and responsible personality.

## Chapter X.

## INTEGRATION AND IDEALS.

Moral failures are the result either of a faulty, incomplete socialization of hereditary endowment, or of a failure at integrating the instinctive elements within that endowment. A failure in integration is marked by the absence of a singleness of life-purpose, a lack of a master sentiment which dominates within a whole well-ordered hierarchy of sentiments within the personality. Or moral failure may result from lop-sidedness; that is, what integration there is, is of a restricted portion of the personality, so that the result is that after all the personality as a whole is not integrated, and some necessary activities are sacrificed by the subject. Such an exclusiveness of interest is morally perilous, for it tends to omit many duties which call for exercise; and because of this disregard for duties which are socially considered urgent, the subject may easily become an active law-breaker, by running amuck of customs which he considers unimportant, but which society regards as the final moral code. Or such an individual may develop either an active hypocrisy or a real dissociation.

## I. Integration Involves Idealization.

Integration is a principle applicable to all degrees of complexity of neural and affective organization. The nervous system of the individual inherits a certain degree of organization among the neurones which are its constituent vital

elements. The main units of man's inherited organization are the instinctive dispositions, each tending to function independently of the others. This independent functioning of these elements develops sentiments, within each of which several instinctive dispositions may be integrated into an harmonious system. In order to achieve integration within a personality, these various systems of sentiments must be nicely ordered into an hierarchy of character, of which the dominant system must be powerful enough to exercise an authoritative influence over all other sentiment-systems, subordinating them to its own master-purpose. Thus a character is formed. Dissociation results if several sentiment systems continue in an unresolved competition for mastery, perhaps alternating with each other in their mastery. The problem of integration of personality, and of the moralization of an individual, becomes the problem of finding such an undisputed master sentiment, of finding an "ideal" which is the resultant of the conceptualization of experiential elements, and the evaluating of, and the choosing between, these various conceptualized clamants for choice.

#### 1. Alfred Adler's "will to power" as the Integrating Factor.

Alfred Adler asserts that the desire for power is the most powerful and fundamental element of man's nature - the one ideal able to be the integrative force of the personality. This desire for power is conceived of as the so-called "masculine protest" manifested by the individual as a compensation



for some inferiority of function. Every one desires to be "a complete man", and hence, a deficiency or weakness in one direction tends to evoke an excess of compensatory reaction in another. "Every bodily or mental attitude indicates clearly its origin in a striving for power, and carries within itself the ideal of a kind of perfection and infallibility". Thus Napoleon, ridiculed for his small stature, protested against this inferiority by a compensatory desire for power. "--- the psyche has as its objective the goal of superiority". Although this goal is a fiction, "it has become the principal conditioning factor of our life". (1). According to this theory, it would seem that ambition and pride, which are natural developments of a self-assertion which is compensatory for a feeling of inferiority along some particular line, would tend to become the goals of every individual.

But Adler's is only a partial view: it is only the positive aspect of the possibilities latent within a condition of inferiority. Another aspect, a negative one, is, that an uncompensated feeling of inferiority may manifest itself in an exaggerated habitual attitude of self-submission. When self-submission has developed to an exaggerated degree, it becomes the inferiority complex.

## II. The Sentiment of Self-regard as the Integrating Factor.

The healthy minded individual is marked by an integration and

(1). Adler; "The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology", p. 7, and p. 9.

balance between these two tendencies. Self-assertion and self-submission, harmonized, each functioning in a normal way and to a normal degree, constitute self-respect. A self-respecting individual corresponds closely to the Aristotelian "high-minded" man. comment, as he discovers, is not absolute. For

Self-respect, the sentiment of self-regard, develops, just as does self-consciousness, only in society. Let us see how this important sentiment develops in the child. At birth, the child has only the potentiality for self-consciousness. His reactions are only a series of wild physical movements, undirected to any definite goal, and not referred to any "Self", which is as yet only a latent possibility within him. But he soon discovers a difference between an object which he experiences as being a part of his own body, and an object which is beyond that body. Then he soon learns that some of the objects beyond his body are more actively responsive to his reactions than are some other objects, that is, he learns by experience the difference between persons and things. At this point he has, vaguely at first of course, discovered his physical me, and distinguishes also, from it, his social environment. Now this social environment has a name for him, which he soon learns to consider as his own possession, and this name becomes a hook upon which he can hang references to "himself". His Self is expanding, assimilating all his experiences: what he sees becomes his; what he hears becomes his; he develops rapidly as he learns that he can receive into himself all his numerous experiences. His "Self-in-its-

social-setting" continues to develop rapidly as he learns that, besides only passively receiving from his social environment experiential contributions to his Self, he can also actively influence that social environment. But his control of this environment, as he discovers, is not absolute. Punishment, and social approval as well as social disapproval, forces itself upon his attention, and it is not long before he learns to prevent the unpleasant punishment and to court the pleasant approval of others, by foreseeing these social attitudes toward his various possible lines of action, and governing his actions accordingly. He is learning, more and more, to refer social standards to "himself". He does so by learning to recognize the social expressions of emotions which accompany and precede the social judgments of his actions, and he discovers that he also has certain feelings toward the actions of others. In other words, he learns to interpret the emotions which he feels, in the light of the expressions of emotions which he experiences as accompanying the actions of others. And he learns that certain emotions which he expresses meet with social approval, and that he, in turn, prefers the social expression of certain emotions to the manifestations of other emotions. So it is by experience, that his emotional life broadens, that he passes judgments, and thus that he begins, always under social influence and pressure, to form systems of moral attitudes, evaluating certain actions as "good", and others as "bad" - desirable and undesirable. The final stage is, on the one hand, the abstracting from all the



desirable actions the common element, and likewise from the undesirable; and on the other hand, the distinguishing differences: in this process of abstraction, of conceptualization, and of differentiation, language is indispensable. Thus, with other persons constituting a "social" field, the sentiment of self-regard develops. The child refers to himself the possibility of a prized social esteem; it is for himself that he fears social disgrace; for himself is dishonour before society an unpleasant contemplation: in short, the "Self-in-its-social-setting" has become the object of the developed sentiment of self-regard. This sentiment is not merely a sentiment among other sentiments, but is, as we have shown in the account of its growth, "the synthesis of all the sentiments". (1). The development of this self-sentiment is the one indispensable condition to a nicely ordered, hierarchical integration. It may be described as a psychological structure representing the original innate structures as modified by experience, and involving on the ideational level, where we saw its organization had been effected, the all-important "integrating factor --- the Idea of the Self". (2).

We have discovered in the self-sentiment or the sentiment of self-regard or self-respect the "only sentiment which can adequately fulfil the function of dominating and harmonizing

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 (1). Drever; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education",  
 p. 77.

(2). Drever; Op.Cit., p. 112.



all other sentiments". It is the Self which "comes to rule over conduct", and the result is serenity. (1). "It is in self-respect which does not permit of selfishness that the best character appears to find its strength".(2). Shand's statement in this respect is: "In all normal individuals there is a love of something to give some order and unity to their lives; and the system which is found generally preeminent is the great principle of self-love or the self-regarding sentiment". (3). That is, the sentiment of self-regard is the only sentiment able to rule among all the sentiments.

III. The Nucleus of the Self-sentiment is the Empirical Ego, the Self.

The nucleus of this important sentiment of self-regard is the "self", the empirical ego, which is a psychological structure, resting upon past experiences which have become ordered into a system of dispositions. It extends to include everything which is apprehended by the "me"; everything, as we noted above, which is apprehended, becomes a part of "me".

For psychology, the Self does not mean the "Pure Ego"; although psychologists may hold, philosophically, that the Ego owns the states which constitute the Self. Neither for experimental psychology does this complex whole, which is supposedly composed of Ego and the states it is supposed to

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(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 269.

(2). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character", p.242.

(3). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 57.

own, constitute the Self; for empirical psychology, the question of a pure or transcendental Ego is not vital; rather, The Self, whether or not an Ego exists, is the whole, as composed of the states in their inter-relations, laying aside, as a problem for philosophy, the question of a Pure Ego which owns these states.

#### 1. James on "the Self".

James (1) explains the concept "Self" somewhat as follows: A man's "me" is the sum total of all that he can call his. Of this me there are three classes: the material me, the social me, and the spiritual me. The material me includes such objects as my clothes, body, family, home, property. The social me is the recognition which I get from my mates; that is, we are not only gregarious, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favourably, by our kind. The spiritual me is not merely one of my passing states of consciousness, but is rather the entire collection of my states of consciousness, my psychic faculties taken concretely. This collection, says James, may at any moment become the object of my thought and awaken emotions like those awakened by any other portions of the me. When we think of ourselves as thinkers, all the other ingredients of our me seem relatively external possessions. The very core and nucleus of our self, as we know it, the very sanctuary of our life, is the sense

(1). James; "Psychology; A Briefer Course", pp. 176 - 181.

of activity which certain inner states possess. (1).

The enthroned Self of the self-regarding sentiment, effecting an organized stability within the personality, can maintain its supremacy only if it recognizes the existence of the other constituent elements of the personality, and also only if it recognizes the relationships existing among these various "selves", including its own Self: that is, each sentiment or "self", each element of the personality, must enter the whole organization as a recognized element of the whole, in its own right. In addition, "the emotional discharge should be at no time so violent as to materially impair, through dissociation, the normal control" (2) of the self-sentiment. This condition of stability is possible only if "the Self is stably organized on a sufficiently broad basis". Such organization is the essence of "Self"-control, which is the "control proceeding from the Self as a whole, and determining the Self as a whole. The degree in which it exists depends upon the degree in which this or that special tendency - "self"- can be brought into relation with the concept of the Self and the system of conative tendencies which it includes". (3). In this "self"-control, or control of "selves", inheres self-respect. So long as there remains within a man any vestige of self-respect, any degree of control

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- (1). See also McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", pp. 369, ff.
- (2). Drever; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education", pp. 114, ff.
- (3). Stout; "A Manual of Psychology", p. 626.

of his "selves", his case is not hopeless; but to break the last element of pride, or self-respect, means ruin. The respect of other people may be lost, but if the citadel of character, self-respect, has not fallen, the total disintegration of character has not been effected. If any self-regard remains, character is not totally destroyed.

#### IV. Character is Based upon Idealization.

##### 1. Character as a consistency of "selves".

Character may thus be considered as essentially a consistency of "selves". The healthy life, a life which manifests a healthy character, is "above all things a well-balanced life".(1). This consistency results from the supremacy of the one sentiment able to exercise supremacy - the sentiment of self-regard. Sutherland points out (2) that morality assumes a more noble aspect when, to sympathy and cheerful compliance with duty which is external, there is added a complete surrender to that sense of self-respect which is only duty with an internal sanction.

This sentiment of self-regard takes the form of a "self-conscious devotion to an ideal of character": that is, the stabilization of personality, the formation of a strong character, involves the formulation of ideals which afford the elements of personality an acceptable unifying centre of power.

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(1). Fite; "An Introductory Study of Ethics", p. 337.

(2). Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", Chap. XVI.



Furthermore, that man has a stronger character, psychologically speaking, whether it be good or bad, who shows a greater singleness of aim, and for whom that aim is the more powerfully regulative, the broader, and the more coherent. (1).

To our present point Stout writes: "The process of ideal construction through which the concept of Self grows, is gradual, and reaches different degrees of perfection in different persons. The more highly systematized and organized it becomes, the more effective it is. Self control is greatest in the man whose life is dominated by ideals and general principles of conduct".(2). That is, "the more completely the various inner forces of an individual are focussed upon the attainment of a certain end, or pursuing of a certain line of action, the more power will be manifested in that direction". (3).

As we have noted, the sentiments are organized on the ideational level. But such ideals and principles of conduct as are effected on the rational level in the mental life, may, as a result of the individual's reflecting upon them, and consciously identifying one of those ideals with his Self, and making it his own, supersede those sentiments of the ideational level. Shand notes this process as a second stage in the development of sentiments, a stage "in which we become conscious of their ( that is, the sentiments' ) qualities

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(1). See also Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 468.

(2). Stout; "Manual of Psychology", p. 628.

(3). Dreyer; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 131.

and reflect on them, and strive after them with effort; --- from this cause arise the Ideals of a sentiment". (1).

## 2. The process of Idealization.

The formulation of these ideals which are the essence of character is a process of synthesization of those desirable elements which are extracted from the individual's concrete experiences. "The ideal is a projected synthesis of conative tendencies".(2). Every ideal is preceded by actualities. "We find our clues to direction in the projected recollection of definite experienced goods". (3). Moral ideals are generalizations from the goods that are found in experience, and that are isolated from any accompanying bad elements. Thus, a child experiences an act of kindness, a concrete person performs a concrete act of kindness for the child. After several repetitions of such concrete acts of kindness, the child gains an abstract concept of kindness, by extracting from each experience the common element. Because the concept of kindness is constituted of the common element of concrete experiences which the child found to be desirable in concrete persons, he idealizes the concept by ascribing it to a person, either an actual friend whom he has not yet found to be unkind, or else to a mere ideational fiction and construct. The same process occurs in the case of other desirable characteristics which

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(1). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 112.

(2). Macdonald; "The Education of Ethical Consciousness".

(3). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 282.

the child concretely experiences. Personal experiences give the child the raw material for his ideals. These ideals, because they are constructed only out of desirable characteristics, contain no undesirable elements. A hero, or ideal person, is thought of as perfect until, by experiencing in him an unexpected flaw, the child's idol is broken; but when the ideal is a fictional construct, no flaw enters into its structure. So a child who worships his hero, naturally ascribes to him only those character traits which he himself considers good, and he does so whether or not the hero really possesses those traits. (1).

When the child has thus constructed his hero out of traits he has judged desirable or good, and probably with a core furnished by some actual person, the child is then confronted by two antithetical thoughts of personality: that of his Self as it stands, with its well-known tendencies to occasional undesirable action, and over against this, "the sense of the ideal Self, the being perhaps temporarily embodied in father, priest, or whoever else, - the better Self, from whose actions the copy is to come for the further reduction of the selfishly or generously capricious Self to order and goodness. I feel I ought to be like the better Self". (2).

Even if these ideals be only "ideational fictions and constructs whose unreality is admitted", they are at least

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(1). See Part IV.

(2). Baldwin; "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development", p. 306.



psychological facts, and are indispensable to the development of the morality of the child. The experience of goods precedes the idea of the good; and the idea of the good, generalized from experiences, is either fictionally objectified in an unreal individual, or is attached to the child's hero. Just as mathematics postulates an imaginary perfect circle, though no such thing exists in nature in reality, so the imaginary in ethics, the absolute ideal, is justifiable in spite of its possibly not being an objective actuality. (1). Furthermore, the presence in the child of the ability to conceptualize evaluated goods, ensures the functioning of that ability: he must form ideals because he can. His ideal has been formed of elements from his experience, just as the idea of the perfect circle has been formed by numerous experiences of partially perfect circles, from each of which the idea of perfect circularity has been abstracted. That is, perfect circularity as an ideal, and perfect morality as an ideal, are both consistent with our experiences of partially imperfect, or partially perfect, objects. This consistency with the whole of experience is necessary if the ideal is to be a rational one. Furthermore, "in order that a manysided self of infinitely various and often conflicting impulses may be realized", it must have an end or system of ends which are mutually consistent; that is, the various contributing elements of the ideal must be consistent with each other.

(1). See Vaihinger; -----  
 "The Philosophy of 'as if' ", p. 44.



### 3. Conscience.

When this ideal has been self-consciously formed and willingly accepted by the personality, when "I", my Self, the unity of my organized selves, desire to realize in action this ideal, I have gained "self-possession through self-surrender" (1) to that ideal; I may defy society, for I have abstracted from society as I have experienced it, all that which I have evaluated as desirable, and have concentrated it into a single ideal, fictional or real, and that ideal becomes now the only judge for whose decision I care, and the only spectator whose approval I desire and from whose disapproval I shrink. My ideal has become all the good of society, as I know it, concentrated, and that ideal is my supreme court. The push of the vital impulse has become one with the pull of the ideal. When possible alternatives of action are referred to this court of approval, conscience functions. This court is my conscience.

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 (1). Royce; "The Philosophy of Loyalty", p. 152.

## Chapter XI.

## WILL.

## I. The Nature of Will.

## 1. Will as habit.

Dewey identifies will with habit. He considers the essence of habit to be an "acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts, except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will". (1). "All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will". (2). "Habit is that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematisation of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality; ready for overt manifestation; which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity". (3). Dewey explains that the tendency to act, which is involved, the potential energy, needing only the opportunity to become kinetic and overt, is "disposition". Habit is thus energy organized for

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(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 42.

(2). Dewey; Op.Cit., pp. 25, 40, 44

(3). Dewey; Op.Cit., pp. 40, 44, passim.

use in certain channels. He further states that when habit is frustrated, its force is embodied in an ideal. (1). "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action".

In a sense, there is involved in will a predispositional element, inasmuch as it is ideally the whole organization of all the personality-elements in action. Will does involve an integration, in varying degrees, of the constituent sentiments of a personality, an ordering of "minor elements of action"; for the individual does in this way carry his past along with him in a unique manner. But habit is to be considered dynamic, we think, not so much as habit, but rather because there has functioned, as the active mover in the various reactions which formed the habit, the original vital impulse. Mere bare habit is only a skeletal set: it is the "formal" resultant of these repeated reactions: it awaits a re-filling with content, a revitalization. Habit is a containing form rather than a dynamic content.

Furthermore, Dewey's hands are so tied with behaviourism, that he fails, we think, to discover any solution for the problem of the place of intelligence in voluntary conduct.

The factor, choice, remains as it was, that is, the name rather than the solution of the problem of the will.

(1). Dewey; Op.Cit., pp. 53, 210.

## 2. Will as personality in action.

Ideally, will is the whole personality in action. Ideal conditions, however, never exist within a personality: that is, perfect personal integration or complete unification of Self, or complete harmonization of selves, effected by a single worthy ideal, is never fully realized. It follows that every action of a person does not reveal the whole person. The energy of all of his various selves or sentiment-systems do not always, if ever, rally to the support of the energy of the temporarily dominant system. Therefore any act observable as an individual's overt behaviour is not, strictly speaking, the expression of the whole personality. Although for the moment, the whole organism appears to react as an instrument of the harmonized sentiment-systems, still there actually are an indefinite number of temporarily subdued systems, to the exercise of any one of which the Self might, the next moment, lend the organism. Only under ideal conditions is the will the whole personality in action.

## II. Function of Will.

1. Will, functioning, involves Self-conscious Conceptualization.

Let us see how will functions. In deciding between conflicting ideals, that is, in "making up my mind", I have before me several possible lines of action, and in imagination I develop the various conceptions of myself as I shall be, if I carry out into action each of the possibilities. My "self-



consciousness is an essential factor" (1) in the conceptualization involved, as I imagine myself making the various suggested lines of action parts of my actual life history, that is, as I follow out the respective representations of these hypothetical Selves.

My self-consciousness is further manifested when I consider each line of action and its results, not in isolation, but, evaluating each, consider it in its relation to the other possible lines, and also to the whole Self, that is, to the "ideally constructed whole for which the word 'I' stands". "I" compare the various concepts of my various possible Selves: I deliberate.

After my attention has oscillated between the several alternatives, one of these alternatives, with the motives for it, "gets a decided and persistent predominance in consciousness, so that my mind no longer tends to revert to the others".(2). I follow out the representation of one hypothetical Self until the other possibilities are excluded. By excluding these other lines from my focal consciousness, I "make up my mind". The result is formulated in a judgment. Action naturally follows.

## 2. Will is based upon Attention.

It is evident that will is based upon attention. If one of the alternatives is held at the focus of consciousness,

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(1). Stout; "Groundwork of Psychology", p. 233.

(2). Stout; Op.Cit.

it will ultimately move to action. "The mere concentration of attention on an idea is sufficient to produce movements". (1). "Effort of attention is -- the essential form of all volition --- the holding of an idea at the focus of consciousness by an effort of attention covers every instance of volition". (2). It follows that the voluntary moral life involves a "turning of the attention in another than its natural direction, an effort, --- to change its focus from one restricted area to another". (3).

We are not here discussing that attention which is merely an involuntary or non-voluntary awareness of an object which, instead of being selected, really forces itself upon us just because it is spectacular; in this sense, even beasts "select" objects to which they attend. We mean rather, the voluntary attention which is distinguished from the non-voluntary and involuntary by the element of deliberation. Considering attention in this sense, it is close to the facts to say that virtue is attention to a worthy object or idea; it is "the steady entertaining of a certain conception of life or of its several activities". (4). James says, "To sustain a representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral act".

The problem, however, still faces us; "How can attention be focussed upon an object which does not arrest us specu-

(1). Stout; "Analytic Psychology", Vol. I, p. 126.

(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 249.

(3). Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 51.

(4). Seth; Op.Cit., p. 59.

(5). Dewey; "Social Development", p. 148.

(6). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology", p. 331.

larly, nor force itself upon our consciousness?". It seems that voluntary attention itself involves the functioning of will. The answer, we think, involves the use of the word will in a narrower sense. In the broad sense, will is character in action; in the narrower sense, it is what James calls the "fiat". This narrow sense needs explanation.

### III. Will, in a Limited Sense, Involves Creativity.

Although we agree with Hobhouse when he says that "the will is not so much a new impulse as the entire mass of impulses and feelings excited by the object, organised as a whole" (1); and with Pillsbury when he says that will is a "term used to designate the entire original disposition of the individual, together with its modification by experience, when applied to action" (2); in addition, we think that in choosing between alternative goals of apparently equal value, that is, in deliberative willing, the Self becomes consciously, volitionally purposive in a narrower sense. The functioning will in this limited sense marks the conclusion of the period of deliberation in which are rehearsed the several possible alternatives. Will in this sense is the manifestation of "a certain creative power of original determination" following upon the precedent conceptualization, comparison, and evaluation of alternatives. Stout hints at the inner creativity for which we contend when he says: "We attend insofar as our psychical activity directly produces, or maintains

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(1). Hobhouse; "Social Development", p. 142.

(2). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology", p. 351.



and develops such contents of consciousness as have a more or less determinate objective reference"(1).

The various sentiments or selves may be considered as mental sets, each one ready to manifest its presence by being evoked into a correlative behaviour, when the conditions are suitable. Thus Hobhouse speaks of "mass of impulses and feelings excited by the object"; and Shand (2) speaks of "tendencies of emotions and sentiments". By whatever name these organized potentialities for action be called, each is a possible ground for its respective action. Any persisting conflict between them may be prevented, or resolved, by the intrusion of a voluntary focussing of attention upon one of them. The resulting release of the successful, surviving one of these mental sets, constitutes willing in the narrower sense. This seems to be Claparède's idea when he says; "The will always marks a division of the self"; --- "Every voluntary act results from conflict of tendencies, and the function of will is precisely to resolve this conflict"; --- "It is the part of will to stop this division of the self and restore unity". (3). He holds that the will is the name given to that process which leads to the reenforcement of a group of tendencies, and consequently to action.

An implication involved here is that each of these dispositional sets, each sentiment or emotional system, has its degree of what might be called will-strength. Strength of will

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(1). Stout; "Analytic Psychology", Vol. I, p. 180.

(2). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 64.

(3). Claparède; "Does the Will Express the Entire Personality?", pp. 39, 40, 41.



varies with the strength of the sentiment system to which it belongs. "Strength or weakness of will, other things equal, varies with the strength or weakness of the emotion or sentiment to which it belongs; and hence it is that we find the same man strong in some directions and weak in others". (1).

### 1. Three Stages of Deliberative Willing.

As we have seen, concluding the period of deliberation during which attention is focussed successively upon the various possibilities of action which are dramatically rehearsed in imagination, is the definite fiat or act of will in the restricted sense. The whole process of deliberative willing involves, thus, three stages: first, a stage in which the alternatives are inhibited, an interval or pause in which there is no activity; second, a stage in which deliberation proper takes place, when, in the light of memory, the future course of consequences of each possible alternative is rehearsed, and there thus takes place in imagination a reflection on the issues of the various alternatives; and third, the act of willing itself, willing in the limited sense, the definite identification of the choice with the Self, in which act of identification the Self becomes consciously, volitionally, self-consciously, purposive. Will may be considered as the process of self-conscious identification of a conceptualized, evaluated ideal with the Self; such process of evaluation involving a comparison of concepts. There are involved cog-

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(1). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 65.

nitive conceptualization, affective evaluation, and the conative fiat.

2. Willing in the Limited Sense, reveals the Original Vital Impulse.

If the problem of the will can be solved at all, it is to be done, we think, by way of the organization effected among the sentiments. The problem of willing is the problem of self-organization. McDougall holds that the third stage of the willing process, the act of willing in our restricted sense, will show, when analyzed, that the effort represents a store of energy furnished by the self-regarding sentiment.

This store of energy, we think, is the conative element, which, as one of the indissoluble trinity of elements of each reaction, of which trinity the other two elements are the cognitive and affective, is "the driving force which carries us on to achieve these ends", that is, leads us to pursue ideals. (1). This conative energy is really the self-assertive instinct; it is uniquely embodied in the sentiment of self-regard. That is, the core of the sentiment of self-regard is the instinct of self-assertion. The instinct of self-assertion embodies and thus reveals the conative energy, which thus becomes the ultimate driving force toward the realization of ideals.

Furthermore, this core of self-regard, the instinct of self-assertion, is a differentiation of the self-assertiveness

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(1). See Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 81.

of Instinct: that is, the vital impulse which becomes specialized through the various respective instincts, is uniquely specialized in the self-assertive instinct. The original vital impulse, which always and characteristically shows a tendency to reveal itself, becomes in the self-assertive instinct of the self-regarding sentiment of a self-conscious human being, the energy of a tendency to reveal A Self. In a Bergsonian vein, we might say that instincts manifest the self-unmaking on the part of the *élan vital*.

Brown goes part of the way toward our conclusion when he says: " --- volition is the whole character in action, with the sentiment of self-respect in command, within which the self-assertive instinct bulks large" (1). The "efficiency of volition, according to this description, turns partly upon the degree of harmonious development of the self, and partly upon the strength of the self-assertive instinct". Supplementary to Brown, we would hold that the self-assertive instinct is a peculiar working-out of the self-assertiveness of all Instinct. It is from this view-point that we can say that the "normal human mechanism, physical and psychological, is a mechanism of revelation"(2): it reveals the Primal Energy, the vital impulse.

To resume. Life itself, vital impulse, as manifested in

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(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 82.

(2). Brown, Op. Cit., p. 133.

the instincts, is creatively initiative; and the self-assertiveness of this urge to activity is, in the case of man, uniquely revealed in the self-assertive instinct. The self-assertive instinct becomes the core of the self-regarding sentiment. The self-regarding sentiment becomes, in the case of the integrated, moralized personality, the sovereign among the sentiments constituting the personality. Thus, although will in the broad sense is character in action, in the restricted sense it is the distinct, definite, direct revelation of the original Primal Energy.

James speaks of this energy in a discussion of the "spiritual me": "The very core and nucleus of our self, as we know it, the very sanctuary of our life, is the sense of activity which certain inner states possess. This sense of activity is often held to be a direct revelation of the living substance of the Soul. Whether this be so or not is an ulterior question. I wish now only to lay down the peculiar internality of whatever states possess this quality of seeming to be active. It is as if they WENT OUT TO MEET all the other elements of our experience". (1). This internal, initiating energy, we identify with the embodied *élan vital*, which becomes differentiated into the energies of the various instincts, and uniquely so in the instinct of self-assertion.

(1). Quotation in Robinson and Robinson: "Readings in General Psychology", p. 530.



#### IV. Freedom of Will.

Is this energy free? Does will, in the narrower sense of being the distinct, definite, direct revelation of the vital energy, show freedom?

##### 1. Kant and Freedom.

For Kant, freedom is an empty and unreal abstraction. In his treatment of it, it is withdrawn from the practical sphere of nature and mechanism, of feeling and impulse. He constitutes for it a purely rational sphere of its own.

##### 2. Hegelian Freedom.

Hegelian transcendentalism resolves freedom into a "higher necessity", the "necessity of God, losing as it does, the personality of man in the personality of God". To depersonalize man as Hegel, Fichte, and Green appear to do, is to demoralize him. "This pantheistic absorption of man in God is too rapid an explanation; the unity thus reached can not be the true unity, since it negates instead of explaining the facts in question". (1).

On the other hand, freedom for man must mean more than his mere subjection to natural laws. Such a freedom is not freedom, for it is based upon and debased into the necessity of nature. Only if I am a person, "an Ego on my own account" am I free; "if I am not such a person or ego, I am not free".

##### 3. Freedom as Self-determinism.

Herman Ebbinghaus may be taken as representative of a

(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles"; p. 401.

group who explain freedom in terms of self-determinism. Those actions are taken as free which result "essentially from factors within the mind, not from external factors which happen to impress the mind at the moment". Their freedom does not mean that they have no causation, that they are free of causes, but they are free of the compulsion exerted by the external stimuli of the moment. They are free actions as opposed to instinctive actions, which are not free of these stimuli of the moment, but on the contrary, completely determined by them". (1).

We agree to this theory, but think that more needs to be said. For such factors within the mind which cause "free" action, have themselves a source: if they are hereditary dispositions or some kind of inherited elements, they are thorough determinants insofar as they have not been made the chosen motives of the Self; and if they have been thus consciously accepted by the personality, the question remains as to the entity which has done the conscious accepting. The problem is only pushed back.

#### 4. Dewey on Freedom.

Dewey says, regarding the problem of freedom, that it is not a question of "what are the antecedents of deliberation and choice, but what are their consequences? --- What do they

- (1). Ebbinghaus; "Psychology, an Elementary Text Book", pp. 176 - 182; translated by Max Meyer; quoted in Robinson and Robinson; "Readings in General Psychology", p. 520.

(deliberation and choice) do that is distinctive? The answer is, that they give us all the control of future possibilities which is open to us. And this control is the crux of our freedom. Without it, we are pushed from behind. With it, we walk in the light. --- When we use the law to foresee consequences and to consider how they may be averted or secured, the freedom begins. --- We use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activity. In this use of desire, deliberation and choice, freedom is actualized". (1).

This view is acceptable as far as it goes, but we think that in addition, account needs to be taken of an immediate apprehension of the good - the direct intuition of what the Self judges to be preferable. After all, "no system of ethics can be entirely free from intuitionism" (2), for ethical values, as ultimates, must be directly, intuitively apprehended: "our 'heart' tells us they are right". (3).

So Dewey, we feel, allows no place for a morally valuating attitude. He speaks only of such conditions as "equilibration of activities" (4), and "a stable condition free from conflict and disturbance" (5). In short, Dewey appears to be too exclusively mechanistic, and as a result leaves freedom of

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(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", pp. 311 - 313.

(2). Brown; "Mind and Personality".

(3). Shand; "Foundations of Character", p. 114.

(4). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 252.

(5). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 285.

will unexplained.

#### V. Freedom is Basic to Morality.

However we try to discuss freedom, its nature and reality, it must be held to be the very basis of morality. If the personality is to be capable of moralization, it must be considered to be, in a measure at least, independent of external conditions. Personality is self-determining: "no change within is entirely determined from without" (1): "the flame of consciousness has prepared and arranged its own fuel". (2).

1. A certain Determinism is basic to Scientific Generalization.

Although holding to freedom of will, we also maintain that there is a certain determinism involved in human action, for that which functions absolutely indeterminately, in a perfectly unpredictable way, can not be the subject of scientific generalizations at all. If a determinism did not hold good for mind and personality, we could not foresee what people would do, and we could trust no one, not even ourselves. It is just because of the reliability within its own nature, that mind can gain self-mastery; when a man has no fixed character, he will act and think according to numerous, ill-regulated motives, that is, chaotically, disintegratedly. The kind of determinism which constitutes human freedom is that which inheres in the integrated personality.

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(1). Stout; "Analytic Psychology", Vol. I, p. 156.

(2). Stout; Op.Cit., p. 155.



The more cautious psychologists today hold to such a self-determinism rather than to a bald determinism: they "take as their system, not the antecedent processes of the mind only, but the entire mind, right up to the present moment. --- This is a doctrine of self-determinism rather than determinism, because it is determinism within a self which is growing, and which acts as a whole. --- So far as conduct is the outcome of the whole mind working in its unity, so far it is self-determined and free in the only sense in which we can understand freedom". (1). The only determinism which allows for freedom, the only acceptable determinism, is self-determinism.

Self-determinism does not exclude a consistency or relevance between successive mental events, but rather implies it: what "precedes" or over-laps forward into, and what "follows" or over-laps backward into, that mental event which is developing in the span of time called the "specious present", are both obviously related to that present: "when anything occurs in the mind, there is sufficient reason why it should occur rather than not occur", but this "principle of relevancy" is not mechanical determinism.

A mechanical determinism is not acceptable, because the primal energy, which becomes differentiated into the self-assertive instinct, the core of the all-important self-regard-

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(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality", p. 278.

ing sentiment, is spontaneous. It is even unpredictable in its functioning except to the degree of organized integration which maintains among the various sentiment systems of the personality through which it is functioning. In this self-conscious guidance by the personality of the functioning of the free primal energy, there inheres a "consciousness of efficiency" (1), a consciousness of an ability to do things, to cause differences, to create.

Mind, as revealing the operating of the free vital impulse, is creative. This free creativity is basic to morality. "The belief in a certain creative power of original determination is a necessity of our moral nature". "The mind, in its highest flights, creates new things, thinks in ways that have never been thought before". (2). It seems to us that both mechanism and a thorough-going teleology err in assuming that "all is given": "both alike ignore the fact of continuous creation". (3). It is in this self-conscious creativity of the organized personality that the moral potentiality which is unique to man, inheres. Man alone of all creatures is able, self-consciously, to identify an evaluated ideal with his Self.

## VI. Freedom and Integration.

### 1. Freedom is Proportional to Integration.

Freedom is proportional to integration. If several ideals

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- (1). Quotation from Principal T. Hywel Hughes.
  - (2). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 448.
  - (3). Brown; Op.Cit., p. 238.

or ends are competing for acceptance by the Self, and as long as they remain thus unharmonized, the individual's store of energy is dissipated, he is not free to react with all his energy concentrated upon a single line of action. He is bound to a degree of slavery which is proportional to the degree of dissociation. Freedom of will is proportional to integration of personality; when there is conflict between any elements of personality, there can be no true freedom, for freedom means freedom to act, freedom to function, but inner conflict hinders total functioning. "The completely harmonized self is the completely free self". (1). "A person is free and is acting freely when he is most himself in carrying out an action". (2).

## 2. Integration is based upon Idealization.

Now an organization of personality around an ideal assures action that is consistent with that ideal. Constancy of action resulting from the acceptance of an ideal marks an integrated personality. Since an integrated personality is the only free personality, it follows that free activity is really predictable. So Webb found a character element in intelligence which corresponds to a "persistency of motives". (3). The moralized or integrated individual shows this persistency of motives, a steadfastness in pursuing an accepted end: he manifests a consistent behaviour, which is predictable in proportion as the ideal, in identification with the Self, dominates the person-

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(1). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals", p. 81.

(2). Brown; Op.Cit., p. 278.

(3). Webb; "Character and Intelligence".

ality, that is, in proportion to the degree of integration. "Organization assures adequate direction of mental energy". This adequate direction of energy, this persistence, is noted by Roback, when he describes what he calls "the consistency urge". (1). He postulates this consistency urge as the basis of all conduct typifying a person of character - one who "employs one standard of action both for himself and others", which standard is to be applied "from the angle of an impartial spectator".

If one acts counter to the organization of his personality, against his accepted ideal, he thereby surrenders his freedom, he becomes inconsistent, self-contradictory, he feels "conscience pricking him", he is "kicking against the goads" of his innate tendency to completeness, he is not submitting to his own accepted supreme court; and the dissociation is unpleasant.

Integration of personality results in free, consistent, predictable behaviour. "True freedom manifests itself in constancy and stability of character". (2).

### 3. Integration is basic to Moral Responsibility.

In the integration of personality, also, is to be found the basis for personal responsibility. A normal person is responsible: for an integrated personality, responsibility is a self-evident fact; moral responsibility rests upon the

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(1). Roback; "The Psychology of Character", p. 486.

(2). Temple; "Mens Creatrix", p. 172.



unification, harmonization, integration, of the selves of a personality. A disturbance of this unity results in irresponsibility. Blame for "immoral" conduct, therefore, should in some conceivable instances, be shifted from the shoulders of the erring individual to those persons who caused, or permitted the conditions which caused, the dissociation.

Reason can not be considered an isolable ability, a divine gift miraculously conferred upon man, a "faculty". Reasoning, as a process of self-conscious reflective thought, is, we think, an emergent upon the human plane (1); but to call Reason a human faculty is only to re-christen the phenomenon, and to leave it as it was before - unexplained. Neither is reason to be thought of as a "creative energy", a force which impels to action, or effects the identification of a source of action with the Self. Neither can reasoning be satisfactorily explained by holding, in a behaviouristic fashion, that in common with all thought, it is only an implicit language habit. (2).

The whole person functions when reason functions, just as the whole person functions when will functions: "The whole of the rational self enters into its thinking and doing". (3). It can be said that it is the personality which functions through "will-reason" (4), if at the same time it is reman-

(1). See Gordon: "Personality", p. 29.

(2). See Watson: "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist", pp. 315, 32.

(3). Jones: "A Faith that Enquires", p. 66.

(4). S.S. Laurie: "Ethics", p. 314.

## Chapter XII.

## REASON AND SELF-REALIZATION.

## I. Reason is Not a Faculty.

In our account of moral freedom, reason was not directly considered. It needs further treatment.

Reason can not be considered an isolable ability, a divine gift miraculously conferred upon man, a "faculty". Reasoning, as a process of self-conscious reflective thought, is, we think, an emergent upon the human plane (1); but to call Reason a human faculty is only to re-christen the phenomenon, and to leave it as it was before - unexplained. Neither is reason to be thought of as a "conative energy", a force which impels to action, or effects the identification of a course of action with the Self. Neither can reasoning be satisfactorily explained by holding, in a behaviouristic fashion, that in common with all thought, it is only an implicit language habit. (2).

The whole person functions when reason functions, just as the whole person functions when will functions: "The whole of the rational self enters into its thinking and doing". (3). It can be said that it is the personality which functions through "will-reason" (4), if at the same time it is remem-

(1). See Gordon; "Personality", p. 99.

(2). See Watson; "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist", pp. 316, ff.

(3). Jones; "A Faith that Enquires", p. 65.

(4). S.S. Laurie; "Ethica", p. 316.

bered that to every conscious reaction there exists not only cognitive and conative aspects, but an affective aspect as well, and that none of the three aspects exists independent of the others.

## II. All Thought Involves Affect.

Thought, being a conscious reaction, involves affect. (1). Rignano makes affect fundamental to reasoning. He says: "Thus the faculty of paying attention to what we are thinking about, and so of maintaining coherence of thought and exercising the power of criticism; the faculty of imagining new combinations by means of old mnemonic elements; the faculty of classifying and introducing a certain order into the chaotic mass of facts presented to our senses; the faculty of creating concepts more and more general and abstract; and so forth; all these faculties of attention, coherence, criticism, imagination, classification, and abstraction, which gradually raise the reasoning from its primordial intuitive forms to the highest deductions of science, are all shown by our analysis to have an affective substratum". (2). Without maintaining that affect is the whole of the process of reasoning, we would hold that all conscious reactions, including reasoning, involve in addition to, and indissolubly united with, cognitive and conative elements, an affective element.

## III. Reasoning as Imaginative Trial and Error.

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- (1). See Gordon; "Personality", p. 100.  
 (2). Rignano; "The Psychology of Reasoning", p. 388.

Reasoning in a specific sense may, as a term, be applied to the second, the deliberative stage of the attention-will process, that is, the stage in which the various alternatives to action, with their respective issues, are imaginatively rehearsed in the mind. This process involves, first, "holding possibilities of action, or objects for valuation, or ends for choice, in consciousness, and measuring them one against the other in a simultaneous field - or in a field of alternating objects, any of which can be continually recalled. Second, the process yields a universe of valued objects as distinguished from a subjective consciousness of desires and feelings. Third, the process may be described also as one of 'universalising' the judging consciousness. Fourth, the process is thus a reciprocal process of valuing objects and of constructing and reconstructing a self. The object as first imagined or anticipated undergoes enlargement and change as it is put into relations to other objects as the consequences of adoption or rejection are tried in anticipation. The self by reflecting and by enlarging its scope is similarly enlarged. It is the resulting self which is the valuer". (1).

Reasoning is the trial and error process operative on the highest mental level, involving the imaginative, rather than the actual, trying out of various conceptualized ideals, and involving also a resulting evaluation and comparison of

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 (1). Tufts; "The Moral Life", in "Creative Intelligence", by Dewey et al, pp. 363 - 371.



these conceptualizations, and finally a decision based upon the evaluations. Instead of its being a faculty which gives moral judgments, it is "nothing else than a series of operations that we imagined performed --- and limited to thought only in order to economize time and energy". (1).

#### IV. The Thread of Reason is Affective.

The process of reasoning is self-conscious and involves the continuing operation of identification of the various alternatives with the thus developing Self. The question arises as to the character of the continuum of this process: what is the nature of the "thread of reason"? How is the effectiveness of the process prolonged so as to cover the temporal existence of a series of terms?

Explanatory of this perseveration is the theory that consciousness and ideas are based upon motor excitation. This motor excitation can become associated with an "activity attitude", or in other words with a "static movement system" connected with the arousal of an instinctive urge. If such association is effected between the motor excitation upon which an idea is based, and a bodily attitude which involves an instinctive urge, the persistence of the series is said to be explained. (2). (3). In making motor excitation the basis of ideas, this theory apparently subscribes to psycho-

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(1). Rignano; Op.Cit., pp. 81 - 83.

(2). M.F. Washburn; "Movement and Mental Imagery", pp. 159 ff.

(3). M.F. Washburn; "Emotion and Thought; a Motor Theory of Their Relation".

physical parallelism.

Woodworth explains the persistence in a similarly physical way. The mechanism for a consummatory reaction, having been set into activity by a suitable stimulus, acts as a drive operating other mechanisms which give the preparatory reactions. The drive is a mechanism already aroused, but which outlasts the activity of the external stimulus. It can thus persist because a neural centre does not always, after arousal, relapse into immediate quiescence. The continuing residual neural quiver in one centre may act as a drive to another centre. Thus by means of a communication of conserved nervous energy, Woodworth explains neurologically the perseveration which is our present problem. He deals only with the neurology of the question. (1).

Hollingworth emphasizes, in the reasoning process, the existence of at least two cooperating "cues": one or more "instigating details" or stimuli; and one "specifying detail" or "motive". Motives are physical, bodily sets, "at least originally organic states". They constitute the perseverating element in the process: they are relatively permanent, "persisting as an enduring influence within the sphere of which many instigating clues in turn function and lapse". A motive involves a state of organic unrest which constitutes a "problem". Problem solving consists in "the satisfaction of a mo-

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(1). Woodworth; "Dynamic Psychology", pp. 39 - 42.

tive, the gratification of an impulse", the "neutralization of a persistent stimulus". Reasoning thus becomes little more than the quieting of organic unrest by means of a release of the physical tension involved in an unsatisfied bodily set. This bodily set is the continuum which accounts for the prolongation of the effectiveness of the reasoning process. (1).

Although there are probably physical correlates to all mental processes including reasoning, the psycho-physical problem involved in physical explanations of reasoning is not our problem. Neither do we accept a purely organic or neurological explanation of the phenomenon. Rather, we would only emphasize the affective element involved.

We believe that within the deliberative stage of the reasoning process, the series of identifications between the imagined alternatives to reaction and the developing Self, manifests an affective continuum. The trials of the trial and error process are threaded together by the perseverating interest in the goal of the process. Interest, an affect, is the core of purpose; reasoning is a purposive thinking; the thread of reason is therefore affective. Rignano calls this affective continuum "the affectivity for the end". (2).

#### V. Reasoning is a Human Emergent.

Reasoning, reflective thinking, on the highest level,

- (1). Hollingworth; "The Psychology of Thought", pp. 250 ff. 266.  
 (2). Rignano; Op.Cit., p. 93.

involves, as we have seen, conceptualization: in the deliberative stage of the attention-will process, imagination constructs new combinations; the conclusion of the process is a new fact. Reason is creative. Only man among animals can thus create. Reasoning is a human emergent.

#### VI. Doubt and Belief.

An issue of the fact that only man is mentally creative, is, that only man can believe and doubt. For "belief and doubt essentially involve integration on the level of reflective thought." (1). Doubt precedes belief. Doubt is an unpleasant affective experience resulting from the failure of one or the other of several alternative intellectual propositions to become, or together to issue into, a new integrating ideal or accepted proposition for the personality. The unpleasant tension, a kind of anxiety, is resolved when one of the possibilities is judged preferable, and is accepted by the evaluating Self; or when a new proposition issues from the preceding ones and is accepted by the personality. There then ensues belief in the new proposition, or idea, or ideal. Belief is thus "an organization of pleasurable affective patterns on the plane of reflective thought. --- The more perfect the coordination, the freer from unpleasurable tensions will the affective pattern be, and therefore the 'stronger' the belief". (2).

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(1). Gordon; "Personality", p. 107.

(2). Gordon; Op.Cit., p. 107.



Doubt may be converted into belief by reasoning: that is, the suspense of judgment in the attention-will process is ended when attention is finally focussed upon one member of the series to the exclusion of the others and reaction follows. Reasoning involves the formulation of a new belief by way of a judgment based upon beliefs already held. Doubt, however, continues as doubt as long as judgment is suspended. Doubt is an affect of anxiety and fluctuating uncertainty on the intellectual plane: it is the unpleasant affect persisting as long as the attention-will series is not judicially concluded. The accepted proposition resulting from the process of reasoning becomes "a belief". Viewed from this angle, we may say: "The most desirable personality is presumably he in whom there is a well organized system of beliefs, constituting a satisfactory philosophy of life". (1).

#### VII. Integration and Self-realization.

The harmony and integration of personality, effected by the will, that is, by the identification of such an accepted ideal or philosophy of life with the Self, can be termed self-realization. The attainment of a strong character, an organization of the individual life into an ordered hierarchy with a master sentiment supreme, this is, literally, "Self"-realization, for it is the unifying of the developing innate raw materials of personality. It is "to become what one is

(1). Gordon; Op. Cit., p. 116.

capable of becoming". (1). It is "to constitute out of your natural individuality, your true, ideal, or personal self".(2). It means being a person. This realization by the individual of his distinctive capacities is man's supreme end. (3). The goal of each individual is the realization of his possible Self; it is the identification of the ideal with the Self; and it is the continuous progress toward an increasing degree of integration. Here, in this pursuit of this common goal, the deeper interests even of enemies are identical.

#### VIII. Integration is Effected by Conversion.

This integration, this self-realization through the acceptance of an ideal, is effected by conversion, whether conversion be an apparently sudden event or a progressive development. A condition of practical integration, that is, a moral life, is not always attained solely by a continuous progress toward the goal of identification of Self and ideal; nor is it solely to be attained always by a sudden cataclysm within the personality. Although all of life seems destined to be a continuous struggle against partial dissociation and toward a more complete integration, still, there may be experienced by a disintegrated, that is, unmoral, personality, an upheaval among the elements constituting that personality - a psychologically spectacular integration which suddenly, and in a

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(1). Hocking; Lectures on "The Philosophy of the State", 1921.

(2). Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 199.

(3). See Irons; "The Psychology of Ethics", p. 159.

cataclysmic way, changes the individual's whole outlook on life, and completely reverses the habitual reactions of former days. This is "sudden conversion", but it is psychologically little different, except in its apparent suddenness, from the gradual process; both are examples of progress toward the goal of personal harmony and sentiment-integration, that is, toward morality in conduct; but the one type accomplishes, to the observer at least, a comparatively large part of the journey at a single bound, while the other type attains the goal by apparently more gradual stages in development. Conversion is the whole process involved in making a moral Self, Self being "a group of powers united in the service of a harmonious system of purposes". (1). Conversion is this unification of a divided Self.

#### 1. Conversion may be religious.

For psychology, conversion is not identical with a religious experience. Conversion may be furthered within a personality by any means sufficiently powerful in its influence, to impress, and, to varying degrees, change and order the disorganized state of the elements within that personality. These means may be "line upon line, precept upon precept", each influence entering the individual's unconscious, there to "celebrate unconsciously or to incubate" (2), until some shock

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(1). See Pratt; "The Religious Consciousness", p. 123.

(2). James; "Varieties of Religious Experience", pp. 206 - 210. Also footnote, p. 236.

causes them to burst into consciousness from the subliminal and effect what may be a most radical change in conduct, and which is, to observers, a sudden change. But, on the other hand, although psychologically all conversions are not religious, still, the shock which causes the explosion may be some powerful, strongly emotional religious experience. It may be-

come the organ of a "Spiritual Whole", which uses the personality as a vehicle for its, or his, activity. This theory is reminiscent of the State doctrine that, in proportion as divinity inheres within a person, to that degree does that person become a citizen within the city of god. The modern theory is that, insofar as the Spiritual Whole or the "one self-conscious mind in society" is operative within a personality, there can be no dissociation, for that one mind must be self-consistent, and continuously so.

### 1. The Hegelian State.

One form of this theory is Hegel's concept that there is a Universal Will operative, which is objectively presented in the State, and functions through the individuals comprising the State. Thus Hegel says: "---- particularity is the outer visible way in which the social principle exists" (1); that is, the Universal Will manifests itself in particular individuals.

### 2. Schopenhauer's "Blind Will".

Another concept comparable in essence to the theory of

(1). Hegel: "Philosophy of Right", Part III, Sec. 134.



## Chapter XIII.

## INTEGRATION OF INNATE SOCIAL ELEMENTS. SELF AND OTHER.

## I. A "Spiritual Whole" as Integrator of Personality.

One line of approach to the solution of the problem of personal integration is, that each human personality may become the organ of a "Spiritual Whole", which uses the personality as a vehicle for its, or his, activity. This theory is reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine that, in proportion as divinity inheres within a person, to that degree does that person become a citizen within the city of god. The modern theory is that, insofar as the Spiritual Whole or the "one self-conscious mind in society" is operative within a personality, there can be no dissociation, for that one mind must be self-consistent, and continuously so.

## 1. The Hegelian State.

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## 2. Schopenhauer's "Blind Will".

Another concept comparable in essence to the theory of

(1). Hegel; "Philosophy of Right", Part III, Sec. 154.

one "Spiritual Whole" in society, is Schopenhauer's concept of a blind will which functions through individual ego's. (1).

### 3. Rousseau's "General Will". *See can a will be created*

Rousseau conceives of a general will which assures personal inner harmony in virtue of its being the recipient of the submission of the individual wills which are under it, and which yet constitute it. The general will is not thought of as being an entity preexistent to the individual wills which submit themselves to it, but is itself created by the acts of submission of these constituent individual wills. "Each giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all we lose, and more power to preserve what we have. --- Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole. This act of association produces a moral and collective body, which is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives from this act, its unity, its common self, its life, and its will". (2).

All such theories as Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, and Rousseau's, manifest an unsatisfactory lack of psychological analysis of the individual personality. Furthermore, such con-

(1). See Part I, p. 104, ff.

(2). Rousseau; "The Social Contract"; Book I, Chap. VI. "Oeuvres", Vol. VI, pp. 20 - 21.

ceptions as disembodied wills and spiritual wholes are psychologically fantastic: wills are not isolable entities; they are personalities in a dynamic aspect. Nor can a will be created by the acts of submission of various individual wills, as Rousseau's words intimate is done. And Hegelianism does injustice to the individual, tending to lose him within the universal.

It seems to us, therefore, that any theory pretending to secure a solution of the Self-Other problem must in a satisfactory, analytic way account for the individual personalities involved, neither calling them mere disembodied functions such as wills, nor submerging them into a unified and unifying whole.

#### 4. Bradley's Self-realization.

Bradley seeks to evade this annihilation of individuality while still holding to a whole which functions through it. He says: "But I am one among others, therefore can not be infinite. The answer is --- I am both infinite and finite. I know myself as a member of a moral organism, the members of which are related in no mere external way. I know myself as a member; I am aware of my function; but I am also aware of the whole as specifying itself in me. The will of the whole knowingly wills itself in me; the will of the whole is the will of the members, and so, in willing my own function, I do know that the others will themselves in me. --- 'Realise yourself as an infinite whole' means 'Realise yourself as the

self-conscious member of an infinite whole by realising the whole in yourself". (1).

Bradley tries to save the individual from Hegelian annihilation, but his treatment of it is hesitating and qualified. He seems to confuse individuality with personality; the confusion becomes especially evident in his denial of the personality of absolute. (2). In this denial, he leaves ill-defined his substituted concept of "the super-personal". To us, personality is the highest human concept.

## II. Dewey's Solution of the Ego-Alter Problem.

Dewey solves the conflict between Self and Socius by saying that "Right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy of their insistencies". (3). This solution emphasizes the element of social pressure upon the individual to the apparent exclusion of individual creativity. He identifies morality with social custom.

We would maintain that neither theory is correct; neither one like Hegel's which submerges individuality; nor Dewey's which seems to disregard the free creativity of the individual in the making of moral decisions. Rather, we think that moral-

(1). Bradley; "Ethical Studies", Essay II.

(2). See Part I, p. 124.

(3). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 326.



ity is based upon the integration of elements which are innate in the individual, some of which are social, and that morality is therefore a social phenomenon; but it is not social to the exclusion of the free core of a self-conscious individuality.

### III. Innate Social Elements to be Integrated.

Among man's innate tendencies, the integration of which constitutes moralization, there are certain social elements, which are, as Shaftesbury and those following him pointed out afresh, just as innate as self-love, or any other commonly accepted natural tendencies. Even Alfred Adler (1) admits that there is at least the beginning of sociality in the very limitation of the conditions of community of life into which man is born.

Such non-voluntary limitation of the individual's will to power, by the mere presence of other people with similar wills, might tend to permit the development of some of the innate bases for socialization, but obviously, such necessity can not be the direct root of any integration of social elements.

There is, however, a higher necessity which might be so considered: not the necessity founded upon the social limitation of a will to power by the mere presence of other similar wills to power, but rather the necessity founded upon the recognition that each psychical organism, each person, is but a part of a wider whole, and is not wholly independent and

(1). Adler; "The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology", p. 9.

self-contained. That is to say, "we grow up with instincts and desires determined by conditions of our life and that of our ancestors. This life is social, but imperfectly social. Hence love, affection, generosity, candour, honesty, truthfulness, modesty, courage, are as much a matter of 'natural' instinct, reacting on early surroundings; as the desires for personal gain or esteem". (1). Thus it can be said that "The moral law is an expression of the fact that man is an organic part of an organic whole". (2).

#### 1. Primitive Passive Sympathy.

Of these fundamental innate social elements, whose organization goes toward constituting moralization, primitive passive sympathy is one. This capacity is manifested in the case of beasts, for example, when one of a flock of wild birds is moved to action by some strange object in the environment and the bird takes to flight, possibly with a sharp cry which can be easily distinguished as peculiar to that kind of sudden action: we seem safe in interpreting the action of the bird as it flies and cries, as being manifestations of fear. Immediately the whole flock follow the first bird in flight and outcry, each individual uttering the cry which is distinctive of such sudden action, and this, too, apparently, without their being directly aware of the cause of the whole proceeding, except that they have noted the reactions of the

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 (1). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution", Vol. II, p. 247.  
 (2). Irons; "The Psychology of Ethics", p. 172.

leader. Instinctive behaviour has been induced in the members of the group by means of the manifestations of signs of primitive emotion in one of the group.

McDougall defines this primitive passive sympathy as "the liability or capacity to be stirred to that kind of instinctive behaviour whose signs are displayed by other members of the species". (1).

In the case of the child the same phenomenon may be seen. Although in the case of the human being, primitive reactions are with greater difficulty isolated from other elements such as habit and imitation, than is the case with the simpler animal reactions, we can still safely maintain that the "child responds to the emotions of those around him --- in virtue of --- the sympathetic induction of emotions, or primitive sympathy---". (2). There is in the child, a general instinctive tendency to experience a feeling with another, when its manifestations are observed in that other; this tendency is the fundamental social element of human personality called primitive passive sympathy. By virtue of this tendency, the child can interpret "directly the expressive signs of an emotion, whether it is an emotion he has already himself experienced or one which he has never before experienced". (3). Nor are the child's responses mere simulations of purely instinctive

(1). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 156.

(2). Burt; "The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility", pp. 22 - 23.

(3). Drever; "Instinct in Man ", p. 238.

responses, but "all the emotional attitudes of the persons with whom the child comes frequently in contact may become characteristic also of him".

It can probably be held that the degree and range of this sympathy depend upon the clearness and extent of the representation of the signs of the emotion shown in that other member of the group. Furthermore, the emotion thus aroused as a result of the existence in the individuals of the group of the tendency of primitive passive sympathy, and aroused through the sympathetic induction of that emotion, may be any emotion whatsoever. Primitive passive sympathy involves the subjective sharing of any of the various emotional excitements which the individuals of any particular species may manifest.

In the case of the development of morality, it is to a large extent by this sympathetic contagion of emotions that the child's moral sentiments are shaped. A person who is admired by a child effects in the child an attitude of wonder and receptive submission toward him, and as a result, the hero's emotional responses, and his attitudes, and the emotions themselves, including as a result the moral sentiments, are sympathetically induced in the child. We know the emotions of others intuitively, by way of sympathy. The child thus learns to know himself and others, and his developing emotions take on the nature of those of the people about



him. (1).

This primitive passive sympathy is the essential basis of the higher forms of sympathy. Active sympathy, with its developments and differentiations, develops in man, within a social environment, from passive sympathy. As these higher, active forms of sympathy develop in the individual, his moral world is more and more widened to include within it the realization, not only of his own capacities, but the capacities of his fellows: he becomes mentally objectified. (2). So in the higher form, sympathy becomes the propensity to "feel with others", as they struggle on to self-realization - to treat them as we would be treated in our struggling toward the same goal.

It is with some reason, therefore, that Sutherland can say that, when we have traced the capacity of sympathy to a reasonable degree of cogency, we have witnessed the growth of a natural form of morality, in the latter stage of which "where sympathy is called love, it is the basis of morality - indeed, is the morality of the religions of Jesus and Buddha".(3).

Sully, too, although elsewhere seeming to explain contagion of feeling through imitation rather than through an instinctive tendency to experience emotion directly, gives a

(1). See Drever; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education", pp. 85 - 86.

(2). See Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p.135.

(3). Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", Chap. XIV.

satisfactory summary: "Sympathy means feeling excited by the manifestation of a like state in another --- In its higher and more complete form, sympathy is 'fellow-feeling', that is, feeling with and for another, which involves an imaginative 'intuition' or realization of his affective states". (1).

Sully further notes the developed active form of this fellow-feeling when he says that "the benevolent man, who is ready to sacrifice personal comfort for others, is a man in whom the sympathetic or 'altruistic' feelings are so strong and dominant that he finds his happiness in beneficent action, and would be miserable if cut off from this". (2).

## 2. Imitation is Instinctive, but not an Instinct.

A second innate social tendency which is fundamental to moralization is imitation. Although there seems to be an innate basis for the similarities observed in the behaviour of different individuals, we would not consider imitation to be anything so specific as an instinct. Indeed, mere similarity of organic structure and similarity of stimulating environment would assure similarity of response. Again, some of those actions which are sometimes termed the result of an instinct of imitation, are explicable merely as the result of the "imitator's" attending to the action of the imitated, and as previously explained, the vital impulse produces the reaction

(1). Sully; "The Human Mind", Vol. II, p. 106.

(2). Sully; Op.Cit., p. 243.

appropriate to the action attended to.

In the case of the learning of spoken language, the child's so-called imitation is, we think, more basically explicable as follows. The suitable movement of the child's vocal apparatus produces sound, and he simultaneously hears his own voice and feels the muscular movements involved. He thus associates the two. Then, when he hears a similar sound coming from another source, he easily associates that noise with his own vocal sound, and with his own vocal movements. Thus the sound of another's voice comes to elicit the child's vocal response, just as the hearing of his own voice had tended to do. That is, in virtue of the preformed association, he will tend to utter the sound which he hears. But this is originally only a conditioning of reflexes rather than the working of an instinct of imitation. Later on in the development, conscious imitation does operate, but whatever innate element is the basis of such a later function, has, by that time, been overlaid quite thoroughly by habit, and the function can not be termed an instinct.

At one extreme of the series of those who discuss imitation, are to be found the psychologists who, accepting the existence of no instincts at all, explain imitation behaviouristically in some such way as Floyd H. Allport, who says instinct is a mere descriptive term covering observed uniformities of behaviour. (1). J.B. Watson accepts no instincts,

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(1). Allport; "Social Psychology", p. 242.

holding that the fundamentum of behaviour is purposeless, physiological, mechanical reflex, and that all later development of conduct is explicable as a compounding of these elements, by way of a conditioning of them, through association. (1). Janet offers as an explanation of so-called imitation, that it is an organic predisposition to the performance of all acts capable of performance by others of the species. This organic predisposition to a similarity of actions, that is, imitation, conserves the budget of energy of the organism. Because it is thus a conservator of energy, it is the origin of moral-religious conduct, for whatever conserves that budget is good. (2). Janet thus takes a position which has a biological basis, just as Allport and Watson do.

At the other extreme of the series, are such instinctivists as G. Tarde, E.A. Ross, and J.M. Baldwin, who give to imitation, as an instinct, a fundamental position in their explanation of society. Thus Baldwin, including sympathy and suggestion under imitation, makes the latter the liaison between the individual and society.

M<sub>c</sub>Dougall holds that imitation has an innate instinctive basis, but is not a primary instinct, lacking specificity of the evoking object, definiteness of response, and manifesta-

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- (1). See Watson; "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist".
  - (2). See Horton; "The Origin and Psychological Function of Religion according to Janet", in "American Journal of Philosophy", Vol. XXXV.



tion in sub-human individuals. He says it is better explained either on the ground that perceived actions are followed simply because the gregarious instinct so prompts; or that the reactions in question are based upon primitive sympathy. (1). (2).

We agree substantially with McDougall and Drever, considering imitation to be the general instinctive tendency to copy directly, either deliberately or unconsciously, the behaviour of another. (3). Imitation is so closely related, indeed, to the other two general innate tendencies of sympathy and suggestion, that, "from the objective side, it may be quite impossible to say whether any behaviour is due to imitation, to sympathy, or to suggestibility". The functioning of imitation is facilitated in the imitator by the apprehension of superiority in the imitated, and the assumption of an attitude of self-negation toward the superior, on the part of the imitator, that is, of course, if the difference between himself and the superior is not imagined to be so great that it inhibits imitation completely.

Thus, as involving an enhanced suggestibility toward an imagined superior on the part of the child, imitation, even when not consciously and deliberately functioning, enters vitally into the development of morality; and this too, even though imitation is not to be considered a primary instinct,

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(1). See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 173.

(2). See McDougall; "Social Psychology", pp. 107, ff.

(3). See Drever; "Instinct in Man", pp. 230, ff.

(4). See Drever; "Instinct in Man".

and not a sole basis for morality.

### 3. Suggestibility.

A third general instinctive tendency which functions in the development of a moralized personality is suggestibility. It is non-rational - a "tendency under certain circumstances, to accept or act upon the opinions and beliefs another person would have us accept and act upon, without ourselves having logical grounds for accepting them". (1). This process may be conscious or unconscious. A person may consciously accept a suggestion just because he has no good reason for refusing it; and a hypnotized person will unconsciously accept a suggestion for the same reason.

Suggestion is plainly an important element in the socialization and moralization of the child, being a condition which is, in the individual, conducive to the reception of the interests and sentiments and moral code of the community in which he lives. Suggestibility tends to make the immature human being receptive to social standards.

### IV. Integration of Personality Involves Harmonization of "Self" and "Other".

An integration of man's innate social elements involves the harmonization of "Self" and "Other", of "Ego" and "Alter". Integration involves socialization; that is, self-interest and other-interest must be included in the integration of personality, if that integration is to be considered in any measure

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(1). See Drever; "Instinct in Man".

complete.

But so distinctive and so powerful seems the emphasis which the Self puts upon his own welfare; and so strongly appears self-love and self-preservation to influence action; and so exclusive and driving to the individual appears the appeal of his own happiness; that it is not strange that some writers hold that "the attempt to establish an absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness, is, in ethics, what the attempt to square the circle is, or to discover perpetual motion". (1).

#### 1. Altruism is as Fundamental as Egoism.

It must first of all be maintained that the struggle for the life of others is, evolutionarily, practically as old as the struggle for the life of one's self: the roots of love are as ancient and fundamental as the roots of selfishness. The roots of love began to grow "with the first cell of life which budded on this earth"(2); an unselfish reproduction or a giving up of Self for others yet to be, is as fundamental as nutrition, or as a careful attention to the welfare of the individual Self. These two elements of self-giving and nutrition, of self-preservation and propagation, appear and develop and persist side by side. "From the dawn of life altruism has been no less essential than egoism" (3), each evolving

(1). Stephen; "The Science of Ethics", p. 430.

(2). Drummond; "The Ascent of Man", p. 276.

(3). Spencer; "Data of Ethics", Sec. 75, p. 201.

simultaneously.

But these two tendencies, merely by virtue of the simultaneousness of their evolution, do not necessarily function harmoniously within the individual personality. Just as any several innate tendencies may lack harmonious development and integration among themselves, so may these two be unharmonized. And further, just as it is within the personality that all integration takes place, so it is also within the personality that the harmony between the interests of others and of Self is to be effected: the only field where any integration can take place is the personality. Integration, including integration of "Self" and "Other" is an inner phenomenon; its field is the personality.

This inner process of harmonizing Self and other, moreover, does not involve, on the part of the individual, a sacrificing of his individuality, but, as both elements belong inherently to himself, the harmonization of them is INVOLVED in the development of his complete individuality. Other elements are just as innate and just as legitimately the individual's own, as are the self-love elements of his personality: the innate other-regarding element must be recognized, and must be included in any integrated whole, just as surely as the more "private" interests of the individual.

The idea of Self and that of Socius are born together, and develop together, in society; they are never separable. Indeed, individuality itself is a social phenomenon, for the social environment sharpens the outline and makes for the in-



dividualizing of the Self. (1). And if this feeling of self-hood, self-consciousness, can appear only in society and under social influences, the selves of a personality can not be harmonized so long as we contemplate the mere individual in isolation from society. "Mutual dependence more or less intimate, is indeed, universal, and to the extent of this dependence, Ego always has interest in Alter". (2).

True happiness, or well-being, or "*εὐδαιμονία*", rests on the successful integrating of the two elements of Self and other within a personality, as well as on the integration of any other elements. If these develop, each independent of the other, a dissociation results which is just as real as if the elements involved were any other pair of interests. But even man's egoistic desires which instinctively crave their own gratification, "can only be fulfilled by adapting them to the real world and to the social group". (3). Westermarck claims that because "acts beneficial to the individual are at the same time beneficial to his companions", "the distinction between ego and alter loses much of its importance". (4). Interest in Self and interest in others are both innate, and, being innate, must be harmonized if the personality is to be integrated, socialized, and moralized.

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- (1). See Coe; "The Psychology of Religion", Chap. XV.
  - (2). Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 393.
  - (3). Jung; "The Psychology of the Unconscious", p. 41.
  - (4). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas", Vol. II, pp. 195 - 197.

## 2. Interests of Self and of Other are really Identical.

The integration of Self and socius, we think, can be effected because they are not several independent, impenetrable monads existing and developing side by side in the personality, but they are so interpenetrated each with the other, that their interests are practically identical. It is not the abstracted Self that is involved in the process of moralization, but the "Self in relation to others", and the basis of this relationship of interests lies deep within the personality. It is only in proportion to the unselfishness of a life that it can be enlarged and enriched itself. (1). "The lover widens his experience as the non-lover can not. He adds to the mass of his idea-world, and acquires thereby enhanced power to appreciate all things. --- The altruist alone can accumulate that treasure of idea through which all things must be enjoyed that are enjoyed." (2). Even self-feeling can not develop without an objective reference, that is, unless that self-feeling is also altruistic or other-feeling, ego-altruistic, or semi-social: "truly to serve humanity is to realize ourselves, and at the same time to aid others in the same task of self-realization". (3). The interests of Self and of other are identical.

This is true because socius is latent within Self: in-

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(1). See Seth; "Ethical Principles", p. 271.

(2). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p. 136.

(3). Seth; Op.Cit., p. 276.

terests of others inhere in interests of Self, or interests of Self inhere in interests of others; they interpenetrate.

"The elements of social service steep themselves in self-feeling" (1): "It is in going beyond ourselves that we really find ourselves" (2). Jung states this condition in characteristic fashion when he says that libido is bi-polar, dynamic self-wards and dynamic other-wards. F.C. Sharp says that "benevolence" is a force, the desire for the realization or attainment of a good; and this force manifests itself in two different directions, egoism and altruism. (3).

Thus the real contrast is not between egoism and altruism. "The true contrast is between the partial or exclusive on the one hand, and the comprehensive and rational on the other. --- The collective achievement appeals to the individual as his own aim writ large". (4). Harmonization of Self and other within a personality consists in the realization by that personality that his interests are one with the interests of others.

#### V. The Parental Instinct as the Basis of Harmonization of Self and Other.

The parental instinct, being innate, and constituted of the two elements of self-regard and other-regard, is a basis for the harmonization of self-interests with the interests of

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- (1). Hobhouse; "Social Development", p. 150.
  - (2). Mark; "Factors in Conduct", p. 110.
  - (3). Sharp; "Some Problems in the Psychology of Egoism and Altruism", in "Journal of Philosophy", Vol. XX, p. 85. 1923.
  - (4). Hobhouse; Op.Cit., pp. 161, 171.

others. The parental instinct is "the mother of morality --- the only truly altruistic element in nature" (1); and it can be analyzed into the two elements of pure altruism and the extended self-regarding sentiment; in its completest form it arises "from a fusion of the purely altruistic with the extended self-regarding sentiment". (2). Shand agrees with this analysis when he says that the parental instinct "is a system and not merely a group, because all these instincts are inter-organized for the preservation of the offspring. And therefore the disinterested character of this system is not merely acquired, but it is also an innate characteristic". (3). We thus inherit "an innate disposition --- to love" which is "quite naturally disinterested". Ribot also agrees that the "tender emotion is simple and primary, being the source of all altruistic, social, and moral manifestations", and "the maternal sentiment is the gate by which the feeling of benevolence made its entrance into the world". (4).

This parental instinct, or Ribot's maternal sentiment, a fusion of self-regard and love, is not unique to either sex, although the female probably in most cases inherits it in a more intense form than does the male. Irrespective of sex, man inherits, in the parental instinct, a fusion of self-regard

(1). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 131.

(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 172.

(3). Shand; "The Foundations of Character", pp. 40, 43, 45.

(4). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions", pp. 236, 281.



and other-regard: here is manifested an affective bi-polarity; socius is here latent within the Self; self-feeling and other-feeling are interpenetrated each with the other. It is an abnormal condition to be exclusively self-loving or exclusively other-loving; indeed, a complete exclusiveness of either is almost incomprehensible; there are probably only degrees of abnormality in this respect, as in the case of personality in general.

The theme of Hirst's book "Self and Neighbour" agrees with ours. He holds that moral good is common good. In the ethical sense, as far as mere impulses of his nature go, man is exclusively neither egoistic nor altruistic. Family life supplies the instinctive basis of morality because it effects a natural unity of interest among its members. Socius is here seen to be latent in ego. Common good is community. A synthesis of Self and other reveals itself in the parental sentiment. In this sentiment we find the psychological possibility of that ethical love which, in the experience of "community", effects the unification of Self and neighbour. This sentiment of love, Hirst notes, in the form of parental affection, is thus based upon instincts which are of biological importance to the race.

#### VI. Moralization Involves Self-sacrifice.

In the functioning of the parental instinct, there is frequently seen a self-sacrifice on the part of the individual. The question comes: "Which self is it which is sacrificed?". Integration implies an hierarchy of selves in which only one

system is supreme among the constituent systems : that is, in order that one system may be supreme, other systems must be subordinated: in order than one self may be dominant, some other self or selves must be sacrificed. The very essence of integration, moralization, self-realization is "self"-sacrifice. Thereby the individual, The Self, loses the self which he has evaluated to be the lower or less important self, in order to save the higher. In the case of the parental instinct, it frequently results that the parent loses his physical self to the extreme of giving his life for the offspring, in order that his other self, or the other element of his parent-self, namely the extended self-regarding sentiment as embodied in the offspring, might not be sacrificed. So it is "natural" for a parent to give up his life for his offspring, because that offspring is his own Self extended; but it is not so "natural" for the offspring to give his life for the parent, because the parent is not the embodied extended self-regarding sentiment in the way in which the offspring is of the parent who is the immediate source of the offspring's being.

We conclude that socialized self-realization means not only the capability of self-sacrifice, but rather, that self-realization involves self-sacrifice. "Self-sacrifice and self-realization are parts of the same act". (1). One self or more

(1). Jones; "A Faith that Enquires", p. 286.

must be sacrificed, that the dominant self may be in a position of integrating authority within the personality.

This principle of self-sacrifice is capable of expansion, to include within it the people by whom any personality is environed. Each person, or the idea of each person, of whom I gain experience, becomes the core of an incipient sentiment, which thus becomes one of the systems constituting my personality. Now in the process of the formation of an ordered hierarchy of sentiments or selves, it is conceivable that one of these sentiment systems, with a friend at the core of it, could become the dominant system of my personality. That is, I might love that person better than my physical life; the other-love sentiment being supreme over the self-love sentiment. Humanity could not well exist if the one, from among the group, could not sacrifice himself for the other. Inherent in the very idea of self-realization, or integration of personality, is the possibility that that sentiment system could be made the supreme goal of the personality, which has as its object of reference or core, another person.

The highest conceivable self-realization involves self-sacrifice. The self I sacrifice as being of less worth might be the sentiment of self centred around my physical body, and the sentiment system or self which I count the most worthwhile, that is, the dominant sentiment system of my personality, might be conceivably centred around the idea of my country; in which case, there arises the possibility that my highest self-realization might mean for me the sacrifice of my "physical-



self"-sentiment, in favour of my "fatherland-self"-sentiment, with the result, "I die for my country". But only in that way would I realize that self which I have evaluated most highly. Only by dying would I live.

#### 1. Self-sacrifice Consummates Self-realization.

So self-sacrifice, instead of implying the sacrifice of individual personality, really consummates the development of personality.

We have been speaking of what Shand calls "The most conspicuous of these greater systems, love", in which "there is an organization of the lesser systems of many emotions", (1); or of what Wallas calls "the disposition of Philanthropy", (2), or the love of one's fellows as such. If humanity in general, therefore, were to become within me the core of a dominant sentiment system, I would, as a result, show toward each concrete example of humanity "the disposition of Philanthropy", and this attitude would mark me as a perfectly moralized personality. Then I would love even my enemy, because he, as surely as does my friend, concretely represents humanity, the sentiment of which rules my personality.

#### VII. Socialization of Innate Tendencies is Fundamental to Moralization.

If it is remembered that there is an innate basis for the harmonization of Self and other, the influence of society

(1). Shand; "The Foundations of Character", p. 35.

(2). Wallas; "The Great Society", pp. 151, ff.



upon the process of moralizing the individual can not easily be overemphasized. We agree that "moral conduct is essentially social conduct" (1), but we think that external social pressure, exerted upon the un-moralized individual, is but an aid in the integration of the personality: it is not the sole factor either in that integration or in moralization. "The moral tradition which sums up the experiences of the race, though not so decisive as the instincts, is wisely regarded by those who seek happiness. --- But for society to make this code compulsory, is to deprive the individual of that free choice upon which his happiness depends. So it is embodied in public opinion". (2).

The influence of public opinion is powerful, and social pressure is on the whole necessary and beneficial to the individual; for the social code, which is based upon society's experiences which have been found to be beneficial, may be considered as a worthy guide and curb to the unrestrained play of the individual's innate impulses. Without this restraint, these impulses would tend to run riot; and the *élan vital*, which we consider to be the ultimate urge to action, would, as Dewey holds, "likely have the attributes of the devil in spite of its being ennobled with the name of God". (3).

A child, therefore, endowed as he is with various im-

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- (1). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 179.
  - (2). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals", p. 96.
  - (3). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 74.

pulses to untrained, chaotic action, finds himself in immediate conflict with society. "Childhood is one long conflict between individual instinctive tendencies and the social traditions and ideals". (1). The beginning of the child's moralization is the process of socialization of his impulses, and paralleling this socialization is a process of integration of those impulses.

Phylogenetically as well as genetically, the starting point for the development of human ethics is custom, arising and maintaining itself, not at first through any reflective thought as to what is best, but "by the play of human impulses within the limits of a life lived in social groups". (2).

The limits of a life lived in social groups are, we admit, tightly drawn. Social pressure is, to an almost overwhelming degree, formative of the individual's moral code. Bosanquet states even, in an Hegelian way, that the measure of morality "seems to be the actual identification of the private self with the universal self - the actual surrender of the will (of the individual) to the greater will of the system to which we belong". (3). Pillsbury, also, says plainly that "in general, the ideals of the individual are the ideals of his community". (4).

The explanation of this social authority over the in-

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- (1). Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 157.
  - (2). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution", Vol. II, p. 264.
  - (3). Bosanquet; "The Psychology of the Moral Self", p. 113.
  - (4). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology", p. 351.

dividual is not hard to find: the individual must live in society, and he can live in society only when obedient to the rules of society; he is social by nature, and the satisfying of that social demand within him all but necessitates his obedience to the social code. After his wide observations along this line, Westermarck concludes that the traditional notions as to what is good or bad are commonly accepted by the majority of people without further reflection. (1).

McDougall gives as a further explanation of this customary individual submission to social customs, the fact that group selection functions. He says: "The principal condition of the evolution of a moral nature was group selection among primitive societies constantly at war. --- a society with an inferior moral code, strictly conformed to by its members, would, in the long run, have better chance of survival than one with a higher code less strictly observed". (2).

Thus, from the standpoint both of the individual and of the group, the usual submission of the individual to the group code is readily explicable. So in the end, the moral sentiments of the group in which a child's life is mainly passed, "tend to mould his into conformity"; for the external power of social rewards and punishments, praise and blame, admiration and scorn, respect and ridicule, with which the child's group enforces upon him its traditional code, as he conforms to or re-

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(1). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas", Vol. I.

(2). McDougall; "The Group Mind", pp. 264 - 265.

bels against that standard, is usually too great to be long withstood.

# 1. Inner Sympathy aids in the process of Moralization.

But there is, in addition to this outer social pressure, and aiding in the socialization of the individual, an inner force, which, being innate and instinctive, is also powerful, as an ally, cooperating with the outer pressure of society. This inner ally is the innate sympathy-tendency, which exercises an impulse toward a harmony of feeling and emotion with one's fellows. Between the outer social enforcement, and the inner sympathetic-tendency toward social harmony, the socialization of the individual's impulses progresses more or less rapidly.

But the first advances toward socialization are made at the point of the bayonet. Innate impulses know, at first, no restraint: they only push toward an active functioning: their satisfaction is their consummation. The immediate first result in the child's experience is, therefore, conflict with society, probably in the person of one of the immediate family; and the child experiences at least a partial defeat in the unrestrained exercise of his impulse. That is, society partially succeeds, after a struggle, in enforcing its code upon the unwilling individual. The child's first sense of duty is obedience; (1); at the lower levels of morals, it is his sense of what is demanded of him by those about him. It is only at

(1). See Part IV.



the higher moral level that his sense of duty becomes what he demands of himself, in virtue of the ideal of character which he has formed and accepted. Progress toward this level of morality is made by way of the foreseen social approval and disapproval of his contemplated actions; and by way of his associating society's approval of his actions with his own approval of the same actions of others; and by way of the consequent formulation of ideals made up of those actions which have been discovered to be suitable, or good, both by society and by himself.

Westermarck goes so far as to identify the moral emotions with the emotions of disapproval and approval, which are related, respectively, to anger and revenge on one side, and gratitude and other forms of kindly emotion on the other. He makes all these states to fall under the general heading "retributive emotions". (1).

2. Socially developed Self-consciousness is Basic to man's Moralization.

But there is more to the process of moralization of the individual than the visiting of social retribution upon the child's non-conformist head. It is in society that there develops within the individual that self-consciousness which is a characteristic unique to man, and which is fundamental to a true moralization. Until self-consciousness has well developed, the child's innate impulses tend to drive toward sat-

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(1). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", Vol. I, Chap. II.

isfaction blindly. The individual is ego-centric. But after he has become conscious of his Self in relation to other Selves, and his own Self has become clearly recognizable to him as differentiated from other similar Selves, he begins to try to live in harmony with the code of those other Selves around him. It is only after he has thus become able to distinguish himself as an individual in society, that he is able to realize what is wrong when his impulses and the social code conflict, and only then can he begin to learn to evaluate the two, and to discover that it is often the better way to prevent an unequal contention between himself and society, and to act accordingly, that is, in a "socialized" way. Society thus becomes "the birthplace of moral consciousness". (1).

3. The Individual's Ejective Consciousness aids in the process of Moralization.

There is a further development of the relationship between the individual and society with its increasingly dominating influence over him. That is, instead of considering the actual positive punishment or disapproval which will result if he transgresses the social code, the individual gradually develops a concern for the favourable approval of his fellows, and forms in his mind a picture of himself as he thinks he will appear to them if he acts this way or that. He then acts in accordance with the imagined judgment of this "looking-glass-self". His "looking-glass-self" or his "ejective conscious-

(1). Westermarck; Op.Cit., Vol. II, p. 740.

ness" (1) is the awareness of thoughts and feelings as belonging to other minds than his own, the awareness of the contents of other people's minds. He becomes more and more subject to the idea of what he thinks others think of him. The effect of this ejective consciousness is, that "it substitutes mental for physical causes of social behaviour --- The self-exhibiting instinct is stimulated rather by what he imagines other people are thinking of him than by any external stimuli". The value of the ejective sense of the moral self is seen in "the great sensitiveness we have to these supposed opinions of others about our conduct. --- There is therefore a constant progress through the action and reaction of society upon the individual and of the individual upon society". (2).

This process is aided by the individual's becoming "accustomed to expect from others what he presently comes to find that they expect from him. So he comes to see himself as others see him, when he is praised or blamed for acts that he has long been ready to approve or disapprove in them. In a word, his self-consciousness becomes conscience". (3).

VIII. Socialization and Integration are Both Involved in Moralization.

We conclude, then, that morality has no significance apart from the relation of an individual to some other in-

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(1). See Washburn; "Social Consciousness".

(2). Baldwin; "Mental Development", pp. 329, ff.

(3). Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 395.

individual: morality is a social phenomenon. But the other side of the process as well must be kept in mind, namely, the integration of the sentiment systems or selves within the personality. Socialization and integration develop intertwinedly to form a moral human being.

the perceptive level accomplishes its working; the process proceeds according to this principle and conceptualization is a process of integration of imaged elements which are unified into a concept.

1. The ideal is not anti-social, but has its counterpart in reality.

Integration of personality, integration on the highest level, a unifying of the sentiment systems, is effected by the formulation of an "ideal". The "ideal" is a conceptualized sentiment which has been accepted by the Self as the supreme sentiment among all the sentiments. It is the ruling motive of the whole personality, the supreme law of conduct, the final court to which the person, irrespective of other laws, looks for approval. As this ideal has been formed out of character elements experienced in other individuals, living, normally, in society, it is not anti-social: because of the continuous precedent influence which social customs have had upon the formulation of the ideal, it is not wholly independent of society, nor is it totally contrary to existing customs. But because its constituent elements were not experienced in a single individual, that is, because of the selective combination of the ideal, made up as it is, of elements chosen from



## Chapter XIV.

## MORALITY AND RELIGION.

Integration is a principle operating at all levels within the individual mind. The nervous system manifests its operation; the perceptive level exemplifies its working; ideation proceeds according to this principle; and conceptualization is a process of integration of imaged elements which are unified into a concept.

I. The Ideal is not Anti-social, but Has No Counterpart in Society.

Integration of personality, integration on the highest level, a unifying of the sentiment systems, is effected by the formulation of an "ideal". The "ideal" is a conceptualized sentiment which has been accepted by the Self as the supreme sentiment among all the sentiments. It is the ruling motive of the whole personality, the supreme law of conduct, the final court to which the person, irrespective of other laws, looks for approval. As this ideal has been formed out of character elements experienced in other individuals, living, normally, in society, it is not anti-social: because of the continuous precedent influence which social customs have had upon the formulation of the ideal, it is not wholly independent of society, nor is it totally contrary to existing customs. But because its constituent elements were not experienced in a single individual, that is, because of the eclectic constitution of the ideal, made up as it is, of elements chosen from

many individuals in society who exhibited the respective respected character traits; and because in the process of thus abstracting these traits they have also been imaged as the more perfect; - therefore, the ideal has no human counterpart in society.

A person who holds such an ideal, has attained an integration which places him without the law: he may become a law unto himself. (1). He is ruled by a law which to him is above the law of society. But this law is not contrary to the highest social law, even if it is far in advance of the place to which the slowly developing existing law of society has yet come. Such an integrated personality becomes a moral trail-blazer for society, often persecuted by a society which fails to recognize its own best elements as constituting the ideal which the person in question holds, and failing to see that he is only an advance guard on the road to a higher social morality, which the rest of society is destined to travel very slowly and labouriously, until it too, sometime in the future, shall attain to the level whither he, the martyr of today, has already come. Thus society follows in the wake of her martyred prophets and seers. Roback calls attention to this fact when he says that "society has evolved to a great extent through the efforts of those who were unwilling to conform to the society of their day", and sometimes such "maladjusted souls --- de-

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(1). See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", pp. 439 - 443.

termine the normality of future generations". (1).

## II. Man Conceives a Developing Ideal, which Remains Unrealized.

By its very nature, the ideal is never fully attained. It is always a projection into the future. Because it can be gradually approached, and bit by bit realized, it continues to lure the individual onward; but because it is an eclectic conceptualization composed of fine traits of character theoretically abstracted and isolated from the various individuals who possess them; and because these traits have been, in imagination, perfected; and because the ideal develops and grows as the person's experiences multiply; - therefore, the ideal can not be fully attained.

This projected ideal develops for the individual by way of accruing experiential concepts. The human being experiences in a fellow, a trait which he evaluates as desirable; and in another of his fellows he sees another socially desirable characteristic. Thus the ideal for the individual begins to be formed, when he attributes to an imagined individual all these desirable traits which he experiences in various persons. As he thus forms his ideal, the traits which he attributes to that ideal personage undergo a process of purgative abstraction from all contaminating associated traits, and in addition to this purifying isolation of them, they are also imaged as

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(1). Roback; "The Psychology of Character", pp. 512, ff.

the more perfect. The result is a concept of a kind of super-personality. The actual objective existence of this ideal may indeed be doubted or denied, but it is, as a concept, just as real psychologically as any other element of the mind: for psychologically, even a wrong concept is as truly a concept as is a right one. For morality, there are no more important psychological facts than these conceptualized ideals or values, determining as they do, conduct and character. (1).

### III. An Ideal for Humanity.

The accruing elements of this ideal are as limitless in scope as the experiences of the mind of man. Each individual human mind can so formulate ideals, and, indeed, is so constituted as an evaluating subject, as to make the process of ideal-formulation necessary. But in these individual formulations of ideals, there is not only much in common as a result of the common humanity inhering in each individual, but there results also an Ideal for Humanity, constituted from the elements of all the individual ideals. The identification of the Ideal for Humanity with any individual Self would make the words of Leibnitz true: "l'individualité enveloppe l'infini".

#### 1. The Ideal is conceived as Personal.

Man tends to make this Ideal personal. All the personal characteristics which the child experiences as desirable, can

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(1). Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 469.



not, it is felt, exist in a condition of isolation and separateness from a personality, for it was in a person that he first experienced them. So the child makes ejective, an ideal person, considering that person an actual being, separate from himself and others, a distinct personality. "There must be, somewhere, feels the child, a self which answers to all the elements of the law: to the charity, the love, the beauty of the ideal, whose presence in my thought makes my own self morally so incomplete. --- The great spirit becomes the way of speaking of this being - that is, it is the race-child's way. --- So there is always a direct objectifying of the religious sentiment in the world. Men are theists in some form". (1).

The point we wish to make is, that there is fabricated by the normal human mind a personal projection to which the various desirable traits, as they are experienced, may be ascribed, a person as the accepted objective embodiment of those ideal characteristics. This projection becomes a gallery for whose approval alone the individual cares: it may be one's particular idealized hero; "it may be his dead mother or his best friend; it may be what he believes to be the group consisting of the best men of all ages; it may be the Christian saints; or it may be God". (2). The ideal Self is projected out of and beyond the individual: it is "embodied in the

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 (1). Baldwin; "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development", pp. 339, 447.

(2). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", p. 441.

moral sanctions of society and finally in God". (1).

#### IV. Humanity's Personalized Ideal is its God.

The place to which we have come is this: man apotheosizes desirable character traits and ascribes them to an objective person as his ideal. As the child experiences in all his acquaintances imperfections which prevent his permanently considering any one of them a satisfactory ideal, he gradually constructs for himself an imagined ideal who possesses only desirable traits, and no undesirable ones, and these desirable traits in a perfect degree. Man is forced by his very nature to fabricate a God, a Deity, a Person beyond himself who is wholly good, and who is infinite, as including at least all goodness conceivable by man. (2).

#### V. The Ideal as a Mere Fiction.

The idea of God is a mental creation (3), standing as a convenient generalization for those things which for us are the greatest values in human social experience, the totality of human purposes and values. (4). Man desires physical and psychic power, therefore this projected idea becomes part of the Ideal of God; the question "whence?" arises, so the creator idea is projected. What all men prize most and desire most they project into the idea of God. So religion comes to be man's

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- (1). Baldwin; "Mental Development in the Child and in the Race", p. 328.  
 (2). See also Tansley; "The New Psychology", p. 161.  
 (3). See Leuba; "Psychology of Religion".  
 (4). See Ames; "The Psychology of Religious Experience", p. 313.

whole bearing to what seems to him best or highest. (1).

It may be argued that such an ideal is a mere fictional fabrication, and that the relationship felt by man to exist between himself and this ideal, to which he ascribes also objectivity, is a sign of abnormality. Thus Mill says that "mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without". (2). We think that Mill here describes, however, not a healthy normal mysticism, but an abnormal introversion. Such abnormality, however, is not unique to the mystical experience, nor is mysticism identifiable with abnormality. A mystic may manifest abnormality, and give us such a picture as Hobhouse paints: " --- a picture of the emaciated hermit dreaming, in a trance of semi-starvation, of himself as one with the centre of things, a God self-created by his own afflicted brain" (3): but of such a condition, we would emphasize the abnormality.

1. Man's formulated Ideal is psychologically real.

In the case of man's fabrication of an ideal God, man must still act "as if" he believed in the actual reality of the existence of the ideal. (4). For ideals are necessary to

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- (1). Stratton; "The Psychology of the Religious Life", pp. 327, 328, 332, 338.
  - (2). Mill; "Logic", Vol. II, Book V, Chap. III, Sec. 4.
  - (3). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution", Vol. II, p. 105.
  - (4). See Vaihinger; "The Philosophy of 'as if' ", p. 323.

self-conscious man whose nature it is to form conceptions, to evaluate things and ideas, and to desire what he judges to be best.

Man's projected ideal must be something either real and actual, or fictional; if only fictional, it is at least a psychological reality, influencing action as powerfully as any objective actuality.

#### VI. Idealization Is the Source of Man's Ideas of Evil Spirits.

Thus far we have taken it for granted that the formulation of an ideal results in the idea of a good God. But it is just as possible that a man may take as his ideal an imagined individual who is constituted of the magnified character traits which are socially undesirable, and get as a result of the process, a devil for his god. Such a man may appear to be internally just as free as the man who fashions for himself a good God, for "a man is free internally whenever the ends he pursues have his whole-hearted approval, whether he says with Milton's Satan, 'Evil, be thou my good', or with Jesus, 'Thy will be done' ". (1). But such an individual is not moralized, nor is he likely to be allowed to go free in society: the socialization process has been omitted. Integration of a personality around and by an anti-social sentiment system may issue in an apparent inner harmony, but the person thus inwardly "harmonized" is out of harmony with society, and

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(1). Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 405.



society's highest ends, so he is not moral. Indeed, his inner integration is, after all, only apparent, for integration must include the harmonization of the other-regarding elements which are just as innate as the self-regarding elements.

The process of projection accounts for the ideas of all "spirits", good and bad alike. "When man feels moral conflict strongly, he tends to objectify the two sides of it, and he objectifies the forces on the side of moral goodness as God". (1). Coe also maintains that both gods and spirits are projections of what men have felt in themselves when emotionally excited; the self-projection of emotional situations into objects thus personalizes them, and makes them friendly or unfriendly, gods or devils. (2).

The ideal which a man entertains - the concept which he evaluates, in its constituent elements, as being good - declares what that man is. The God he fabricates for himself reveals his character. "His personality will not be shown merely in what a man is, but what he is striving to be". (3). The moral progress of an individual consists in his development toward a likeness to his ideal, his God. As this ideal improves, the individual makes moral progress. Moral development consists in the "improvement of the 'gallery' before which we display ourselves". (4).

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- (1). Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion", p. 46.
  - (2). See Coe; "The Psychology of Religion", Chap. VI.
  - (3). Ward; "Psychological Principles", p. 464.
  - (4). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 263.

This gallery, or god, or ideal, is the "form which we feel our conceptions would take if we were able to realise them in a satisfying degree of unity, harmony, significance, and universality". (1).

## VII. The Ideal Has Objective Reality.

### 1. Introspective reports of Normal Men agree on their Experience of an Objective Correlate to their Ideal.

We agree with Leuba, Ames, Coe, and Stratton, that the idea of God may be considered as a product of the human mind, but claim in addition, that the introspective reports of normal individuals as to their direct experience of an objective God, an actual correlate to their fabrication or projected ideal a real Being, must be accepted by empirical psychology just as unhesitatingly as the consistent introspections of normal subjects on any other experience. Normal mystics do report an experienced "impinging" upon their consciousness; and behind the impinging there must exist an Impinger. (2). It seems to us that the data of this normal human experience make necessary the belief in an actual, existing, objective correlate to the unrealized value which constitutes the goal of man's striving - his ideal. Man's fabricated god demands as its archetype and correlate, an actual God, who is the Impinger.

These data of normal human experience are what Otto calls the "numinous feeling". Man has immediate consciousness of

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(1). Baldwin; "A Handbook of Psychology", Vol. II, p. 201.  
(2). See James; "Varieties of Religious Experience".

God just as he has immediate consciousness of himself: the one experience is as invincible against disproof as the other. The testimonies of many subjects who can not be classed as abnormal or neurotic in their reactions, are to the effect that the immediate experience of God is real to them. These introspective accounts of experience, given by dependable subjects whose actions in other directions are unhesitatingly accepted as normal, must be accepted as being as dependable as the introspective accounts of any other class of experiences of subjects who agree in their reports. If these normal concurring religious introspections of numerous individuals are rejected, all normal introspections must suffer the same fate.

If, on the other hand, these normal conscious experiences are admitted to be legitimate, as we think they must be, there must be for them an object of reference, for "the fundamental characteristic of a conscious experience is its reference to an object, whether or no it is itself the object of a further act of reflection". (1). James speaks of this consciousness as a consciousness of " 'something there', more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed". (2). It is a "sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence".

Hocking describes this experience as "an experience of

(1). Laird; "Problems of the Self", p. 33.

(2). James; "Varieties of Religious Experience", p. 58.

not being alone in knowing the world". This immediate appreciation of the presence of this other Knower rests, not upon a specific religious instinct, but it does imply that man's mind is furnished with a potentiality to receive an idea of that Other Mind. "We are able to read our signs as we do, because we already expect them to mean something". But we have no organ differentiated for knowing other minds directly any more than we have for knowing our own minds directly. There is no perceptual inlet for man's knowing himself, and yet self-knowledge is an admitted phenomenon; likewise, the phenomenon of knowing Other Mind must be admitted. "If the subject-object relation were the true ideal and explanation of knowledge, we could not know ourselves any more than others. For we have no physical knowledge of our own mind". (1). Spiritual things are spiritually discerned: there is necessary in the sphere of morals and religion - the sphere of values - this, an ultimate element of intuition.

Conscious normal human experience presupposes the actual existence of the object experienced. "In finding God to be a necessary object of experience, have we not, in a way sufficient and decisive, proved his existence?" There can be no normal, continuous, consciousness of a non-entity.

S.S. Laurie speaks as follows regarding man's direct apprehension of God: "I both feel and know absolute-infinite, universal-Being, prius, ground, and potentiality of all that

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 (1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", pp. 236, 250, 252.



exists, more closely and intimately than I know that leaf outside there. The 'thing in itself' is nothing save this very Being determined-so through the dialectic of Being in its movement of finite determination. --- the true Infinite is Being as non-finite ground of the finite - the not as yet finitised, the determining not-determined, the conditioning not-conditioned, the potential not-yet". (1).

#### VIII. Religion is Not Pathological.

1. Emotional reaction of man to the totality of existence is normal, and necessary.

We have been calling this numinous feeling normal, that is, saying that introspections reporting it are the introspections of persons who can not, from their other reactions, be called abnormal or neurotic. We would now further maintain that the emotional reaction to totality is as normal, and as necessary, for the living, self-conscious organism, as any other reaction, and this emotional reaction is not, in fact, isolable from the intellectual and conative. Given a normal, live human being, and, as a total environment for him, life as a whole, or the totality of existence, or the living universe, then that human being, by his very nature as a normal self-conscious being, is necessitated to react to it in some way or other: in a broad sense, this reaction, including its inherent emotional element, is the religious attitude.

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(1). Laurie; "Metaphysica", pp. 160, 162.

This response to totality, with the involved affective aspect, can not be considered to be the response only of a diseased mind, or a sign of infantile regression. This religious experience is normal, not neurotic: it arises, not from abnormal mental conditions, but so far as the individual is facing the totality and the innermost mystery of existence. This attitude, not merely to personal and social ends, but to human life as a whole and its final meaning gives completeness to human character. (1).

2. The result of a Religious Attitude upon a neurotic individual is curative.

Agreeing with Streeter and Brown, we would further claim normality for this religious attitude because the result upon a neurotic individual, of his accepting his highest moral conceptualization, his highest conceivable ideal, as the centre of his life, is curative rather than the reverse. That is, conversion is, for psychology, integration of previously unharmonious elements in the personality - a return to health rather than a sign of disease. And the religious ideal, by way of its integrative function, acts as such a means of conversion for the distracted mind. It is a real cure, and not a fantastic hallucinatory experience which only satisfies the individual but does not cure him. Brown, after his wide experience in psychotherapy, and after submitting to a psycho-

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(1). Sorley; "The Moral Life", p. 24.

analysis himself, writes: "I have become more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and that it is essential to mental health". (1).

He further points out that the mystical experience, being "an experience of apparently direct union with the Divine", is, as a communion, "in general, a healthy form of experience". It is isolation from environment, and not communion, that is abnormal.

### 3. The Religious Attitude and Neurosis are not Identifiable.

Finally, the idea of God can not be considered as a creation of a neurotic mind, for the religious attitude and neurosis are not identifiable. Some geniuses, not intensely religious, are neurotic; and some very religious persons are not neurotic. Furthermore, as Streeter has pointed out, there is no proportionate variation between the intensity of the religious experience and the extent of the neurosis: if there were, "atheism would be a sign of a complete cure of neurosis". Nor is an increase in religiousness signalized by increase in mental disorder. We must conclude that the religious attitude can not be identified with neurosis.

We thus maintain that the numinous feeling is a normal, not neurotic experience. Religion is not a pathological neurosis. It is normal for man to react toward totality as he conceives it, and such reaction, so far from being a sign of

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(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality", pp. 268, 281 - 283.

mental disease, is really both a sign of health, and also is itself curative of mental disease.

#### IX. An Objective Correlate to Man's Projected Ideal Exists.

##### 1. A mere fiction would not continue as an object of belief.

We would now maintain that the object of reference for man's normal, conscious, numinous experience, must be more than the mere idea of God, that is, the object of reference must lie behind that idea: it must BE God. We have previously found that God is a "necessary object of experience", and not a mere mental creation of man. Furthermore, such a "mere creation of the mind of man" could not be to man a continuing evoker of a religious attitude. The religious reaction of man would not continue, in such a case, to be a universal phenomenon, for "if the world of man's moral and religious life is the mere projection of the emotional imagination, it is a world in which that life can not continue to live". (1). Man can not live on exploded fictions: "the insight that his deepest life is but 'the baseless fabric of a vision' must bring with it, sooner or later, the downfall of the life thus undermined". If there were not objectivity to match the projection of man's idealizations, man would lose the power and desire to project those ideals, ideals behind which his trusted realities continually turn out to be mere fancies. Even if, in the absence of a god, man as we know him now must fabricate

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(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles", pp. 406, 407.



a fictional one, still such an unreal fabrication could not continue to be an object of reference for the religious experience of continuously, normally, religious man. The survival of a religious attitude toward an ideal imagined as a personal entity, supposes the actual existence of such an ideal as imagined. Men continue to report that they are discovering, as others before them have done, Meaning in the universe - have experienced immediately an objective, personal correlate to their ideal. This experiencing of Reality, or this worship of God, has such an enduring hold on men, that we have here "a remarkable perversity, if, somehow, the hope of knowing God is continuously being unrealised and frustrated". (1). And a God who is being known, must exist.

## 2. Necessity of Being belongs to Perfection of Being.

Thus far, in speaking of a real God-experience, as introspectively reported by normal men, we have not left the field of introspectionist psychology. We believe that these data of psychology, the reports of introspection, warrant the positing of an objective correlate to man's projected moral ideal. Now, if we dare, we should like to transgress the limits of a strict empirical psychology long enough to say that it further seems necessary that an objective correlate to man's projected ideal actually exists, because this ideal, man's highest conceivable perfection, must, from the nature

(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p. 152.

of the case, have existence as its attribute. In his ideal, which is a concept as we have seen, constituted of apotheosized character traits, man possesses an idea of a Being as perfect as he can conceive. For him, therefore, this conceived Being is absolutely perfect, as distinguished from any conceived being of a less degree of perfection. But he can conceive of a Being of the greatest conceivable degree of perfection as existent - as he actually does do - so existence must of necessity be an attribute of that conceived Being. For if he conceives of such an ideal, but claims to disbelieve in its existence, he still conceives of a being to whom he can not conceive a superior. Only he affirms that this being does not exist. But he is here self-contradictory, for the being which he conceives as the most perfect whom he can conceive, is thus found to be inferior to some other being, who, in addition to all his other perfections, possesses also the attribute of existence. Necessity of being therefore belongs to perfection of being. It seems to us that this line of reasoning holds good, whether or not "existence" is considered merely as another attribute among attributes.

Anselm first stated this course of reasoning, and it has probably never been better stated. (1). Augustine tersely says: "God is more truly thought than he is described; and exists more truly than he is thought".

We have noted several converging lines of thought: phil-

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See Anselm; "Prosologion", II.

osophical need, and psychological experience, and moral consciousness, all testify to the existence of an objective correlate to man's ideal. If either of these by itself be considered inconclusive, together they seem to be complete: "if the God revealed by religious experience is found to be, in fact, the God required by the moral consciousness, and the God required to explain the world as we find it, and the God revealed in historical Christianity, then the probability that each of these largely independent lines of approach to God is based on error, becomes small". (1). We have mentioned the psychological religious experience, and the moral consciousness, and the philosophical need; presently we shall deal with the last of these lines of thought mentioned by Thouless, namely, the hypothesis offered in the Christian religion. (2).

In our treatment of the problem of the objective correlate to man's ideal, we have thus far held to the following tenets:

1. The survival in man of the religious attitude demands an object of reference for that attitude.
2. The idea of God is not a mere projection of a diseased mind, but rather, the projection is a normal process.
3. The highest perfection conceivable by man must have existence as an attribute.

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(1). Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion", p. 282.

(2). See Chap. XV.

4. The reported God-experiences of normal dependable subjects must be accepted as unquestioningly as any other introspective data.

5. God-experiences of normal men presuppose a God experienced.

3. Man's consciousness of his imperfection implies a Perfect.

Let us consider another point. Self-consciousness, as we have seen, arises only in the social experience. Man becomes conscious of himself only in the society of others. Self-consciousness involves other-consciousness. It also involves a consciousness of the dependence of Self and others, that is, a realization of the finiteness of Self and others. A self-conscious man knows himself to be not independent. But he can know himself to be finite only because there is an Infinite. Man knows his finiteness, not in comparison with other finites, but in comparison with an Infinite. Man's self-consciousness involves a consciousness of his finiteness both in knowledge and in goodness: he knows his moral ideal is unattained, and he feels that an actual moral ideal must exist, because he knows himself to be only an approximation to it. In saying, "I am not perfect", he distinguishes himself from an entity which is perfect, just as when he says, "I", he distinguishes himself from "other". Consciousness of Self as finite implies the existence of a Self which is Infinite. (1).

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(1). See Descartes, p. 36, of this Essay.



#### 4. Creative Energy becomes Differentiated into Instincts.

The final point we desire to make in connection with the question of the existence of an actual correlate to man's projected ideal, is the hypothesis that a Creative Energy exists behind the functioning of the various instincts of man, and becomes differentiated in the urges of the specific instincts: there is a "general 'go' of the personality" which is "oriented in various directions". (1).

In the first place, it is to be noted that the whole man, as a living organism, is impelled to move toward a completeness which he considers satisfying. This completeness or fullness of life is the goal of life, the "most compelling motive of life". (2). (3). This law of completeness operates at all levels: the "goal" of the reflex might even be said to be the completion of the reflex act; the goal of the instinct is its functioning to the point of complete fulfilment; the goal of every higher organized system within the personality is the completeness of that system, which is to be attained only through its unhindered activity; so also the goal of the individual man is completeness of life, and, like every organism, he moves or strives toward his completeness. There is manifested a need of the whole man, when, on a higher level, with the rise within him of the conception of spirituality,

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(1). Gordon; "Personality", p. 134.

(2). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals", p. 8.

(3). See Tansley; "The New Psychology", p. 157.

he feels that he "must enter into relations with the universal spirit". (1).

In order to arrive at some conclusion about the nature of this fundamentum "need", "drive", or "urge", we shall consider several concepts, all of which point to our thesis regarding the existence of a Creative Energy behind instincts and functioning through them.

a. "Life Impulse".

The first of these concepts is Drever's "life impulse", which we have already noted. In describing this life impulse, Drever uses the following words: "A very strong case --- can be made for the view, that our whole experience is determined by an activity which is also experienced, but which does not arise from experience. For the origin of this activity, we must look, as it were, behind experience, --- our hypothesis is, that this activity, which we experience, but which also determines experience, is the 'life impulse' become conscious in us". (2).

b. A second concept to be noted is what Drever calls "instinct interest". He says: "We ought to be able to get a clearer notion of the interest factor involved in instinct-experience. Interest is the universal characteristic of behaviour-experience. It is also the primary meaning of the situation, in that it is the immediate consciousness of a re-

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(1). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution", p. 87.

(2). Drever; "Instinct in Man", p. 84.

lation between self and presented situation, a relation that is primarily felt. The only aspect in which instinct interest differs from interest in general, is that it is not determined by or derived from previous experience of the situation, or due to needs which have arisen as a result of experience, but is due to original needs ---". (1).

c. "Feeling of worthwhileness".

One phase of this interest, the author describes by using the term, "a feeling of worthwhileness". The instinct interest, or this feeling of worthwhileness, is, on its first appearance, affective. (2). It is fundamental in the "primary tissue" of meaning. It is the basis of emotion, in that, "emotion is due to the temporary suspending of, or disturbance of, the normal transition from worthwhileness to satisfyingness". The point to which we here call attention is not to a theory of emotion, which we have discussed previously, (3), but to the fact that we have here an affective ultimate, which is one stage precedent to emotion itself, and furnishes an affective basis for meaning and the conscious evaluation of situations and objects. In McDougall's well-known definition of instinct, he speaks of the tendency of the instinct's stimulus to attract the attention of the possessor of the instinct. From the side of the conscious reacting organism, this capacity to appreciate

- (1). Drever; "Instinct in Man", p. 141.  
 (2). Drever; Op.Cit., pp. 130, 142, 143.  
 (3). This Essay, p. 153.

the instinct's efficient evoker, is very similar to Drever's "feeling of worthwhileness" on the part of the subject. It further seems that a development or differentiation of this affective ultimate which is descriptively termed "worthwhileness", is what McDougall calls "purpose", the teleological element in instinct. James's hen (1) shows this instinctive appreciation of value and meaning of a situation, in considering the nest full of eggs as most obviously something to be sat on.

#### d. "Purpose".

The next concept to be noticed is "purpose", a development of the innate appreciation of worthwhileness. The purposive, teleological factor does begin in a humble way as little more than a mere modification of mechanical process, in which there is but a slight trace of any purposive element, but its control is gradually extended "till it begins to occupy the position of a central organizing power" in the case of the higher conscious behaviour.

The lowly beginnings of purpose are not in conflict with the modern physical tenet that matter itself is not, after all, such a hard and exclusive substance as was once thought, but is rather "ultimately explicable in terms of energy", (2), (3), that is, for a mode of behaviour.

(1). James; "Psychology", Vol. II, p. 386.

(2). So, Eddington, in Gifford Lectures, 1927.

(3). Simpson; "Man and the Attainment of Immortality", pp. 9, 267.



## e. "Root Interest".

We next note what Hobhouse calls "root interest" - a general alertness, which is wider than any specific instinct. He says: "An important case among higher animals is that where the instinctive tendency, vague and general in itself, gets precision from experience by the elimination of responses which do not satisfy the root-interest, and the encouragement of those that do. --- Man has his innate impulses and tendencies --- roughly correlated with the root-interests". Even the animals seem to have a continuous feeling of anxiety and stress as long as danger appears to threaten. "It remains that this general alertness is something much wider and therefore closer to the root-interest, than any specific instinct". (1).

## f. "Sense of Want".

McDougall speaks of a "sense of want" inhering in the living organism as such. We are justified in "assuming that the persistent striving towards its end which characterises mental process and distinguishes instinctive behaviour most clearly from mere reflex action, implies some such mode of experience as we call conative --- which in animals is a mere impulse, or craving, or uneasy sense of want". (2).

## g. "Hormé".

McDougall's hormic theory posits an energy, or hormé, which McDougall identifies with Jung's "libido". It means all instinctive energy, all energy liberated from the instinctive

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(1). Hobhouse; "Social Development", p. 138.

(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 29.

dispositions. "It is related to Bergson's 'élan vital' ".  
 "δρμη" means "force, attack, press, impetuosity, violence, urgency, zeal". Hormé is the total instinctive energy which is capable of liberation through instinctive reaction. (1).

#### h. "Religious Aspiration".

Hocking speaks of religion as "anticipated attainment", the "function of in-letting or osmosis, between the human spirit and the living tissue of the universe wherein it is eternally carried". "Every instinct, in what it deeply drives toward, shows the trait of religious aspiration --- creativity in some sort is what satisfies, and alone satisfies every instinct, and creativity is precisely what religion strikes out in them, in the process of holding them to their own unity". Religious aspiration is this creativity. Thus, our human life, with its functional basis of instincts, is "only an apprenticeship in creativity". This creativity is dependent for its finality upon "the independent", of which my best creativity must win the consent "before it can take the status of truth, even in my own eyes". "All finite creativity contemplates this other, which by implication is not a product of its will; it is this radically independent reality which religion seeks to know and which alone it can worship". Thus "God, who is truly said to explain man to himself, must explain me to myself. What I require to find in a god is that 'this is what I have wanted; this is

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 (1). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology", p. 27.

what I have been meaning all the time. The world as I now see it is a world in which, as a primitive, various, infinitely discontented will, can completely live and breathe' ". (1).

i. "Élan Vital".

We next note Bergson's concept of "élan vital", which closely resembles McDougall's "hormé". Bergson says he sees "in the whole of evolution of life on our planet, a traversing of matter by the creative consciousness, an effort after freedom, a force of ingenuity and of invention, something which remains imprisoned in the case of beasts, and which becomes loosed in a definite way only in man". (2). Bergson's vitalism means that will is free; life is free, spontaneous, creative, and unpredictable; it is the expression of élan vital, which pushes forward in man against matter, matter being both its stimulus and obstacle. Living souls are the forces creating both themselves and their world. Behind and above all these individual embodiments of élan vital is the original and originating Whole, the ultimate vital impulse or God. Bergson's idea resembles the meaning in the ancient Latin hymn:

"Deus rerum tenax vigor".

j. "Libido".

Jung's "libido" is a relative unity whence issue the multiplicity of instincts. It is "the divine in us". It is psychic energy, a characteristic manifestation of life, capable of

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(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", pp. 23, 25, 31, 153, 154, 451.  
(2). Bergson; "L'Energie Spirituelle", p. 19.



transformation from one form to another. "The whole art of life shrinks to the one problem of how the libido may be freed in the most harmless way possible". (1).

k. "Attitude to Appropriate an Unrealized Value".

Another concept contributory to our conclusion is what Irving King calls "the attitude to appropriate an unrealized value". King thinks of religion as "a specialization out of a primitive and relatively undifferentiated consciousness". "Religious consciousness is a form of reaction whose stimuli are some sort of an unrealised value which the reaction serves to appropriate". (2).

Corresponding closely to this concept of King's is that concept which Brown calls "a direct vision of the idea", a concept involving, on man's part, an intuitive appreciation of values. Viewing this relationship between man and Reality from the upper side rather than from the under side, it may be said that "the normal human mechanism, physical and psychological" is "a mechanism of revelation. --- It is only through a view such as this that one can allow any place for truth, beauty, and goodness. They are not explained in terms of chance reactions to environment. These values are eternal because they are out of time, although revealed in time. The purpose of life is to get in touch with them". The contact is made by man by means of his "direct vision of the idea or the relationship between ideas. --- I am inclined to think that

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- (1). Jung; "The Psychology of the Unconscious", pp. 150, 227, 233.  
 (2). King; "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness", pp. 4, 1.



here one has the soul, the ego, reacting in its essence". (1).

1. "Numinous Feeling".

Another concept to be noted is the "numinous feeling" of Otto. The numinous feeling "means the unique apprehension of a Something, whose character may at first seem to have little connection with our ordinary moral terms, but which later becomes charged with the highest and deepest moral significance. Numinous means the specific, non-rational religious apprehension of the religious object on all its levels, from its first dim stirrings when religion can hardly yet be said to exist, to the most exalted forms of spiritual experience". "This mental state is perfectly sui generis; as is the case with every irreducible and elementary datum, it is not definable in the narrow sense, but is only capable of discussion. --- Our 'X' is not, in the narrow sense, capable of being taught, but it can only be evoked, awakened". (2). It precedes the "feeling of dependence" of Schleiermacher, which follows as a result of it. The object of the numinous feeling is a "mysterium tremendum", a mystery to be feared, an unknown to evoke awe. The elements of "tremendum" are awefulness, over-poweringness, and energy or urgency. The numinous feeling is the experience of creature-hood - "Kreaturgefuehl".

m. "Acknowledged Activity", "Mind", or "God".

A final concept to note is Morgan's "acknowledged activity",

(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality"; pp. 132-133, 296.

(2). Otto; "Das Heilige", Preface, also p. 7.

or "Mind", or "God". Morgan says: "It will be clear, I suppose, from my whole treatment of emergent evolution, that the operation of Activity - the word 'operation' is here admissible - can no wise be restricted to any level in our pyramid - either to that of life, or of mind, or of reflective consciousness, or of deity. Acknowledged Activity is OMNIPRESENT THROUGHOUT if it be present at all. It will also, I suppose, be clear that the avenue of approach towards Activity in each one of us must be sought in some kind of immediate acquaintance within the current changes of one's own psychical system. All other avenues of approach must be indirect as the outcome of reference. Within us, if anywhere, we must feel the urge, or however it be named, which shall afford the basis upon which acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What then does it feel like? Each must answer for himself, fully realising that he may misinterpret the evidence. Without denying a felt push from the lower levels of one's being - a so-called driving force welling up from below - to me it feels like a drawing upwards through Activity existent at a higher level than that to which I have attained. Of course, I am quite ready to admit that those who do not have this feeling of being attracted by the Ideal, and who build an explanation thereon, may be mistaken. Hence my reiterated speaking of acknowledgment. What I here acknowledge is a really existent Ideal, independent of my emergent ideals, and of the emergent quality of deity, in much the same sense as I acknowledge a physical world existent independently of my perceiving it. --- This Ideal within the

human person, but Transcendent of his human level of deity is God - completing the scheme of relatedness from above. But in and through Activity, universal from base to apex of the whole emergent pyramid, God is no less Immanent. Substantial to all the substantial togetherness which suffices for naturalistic treatment, is the planful Activity in and through which its stuff has being, and is held together". (1).

#### n. Summary.

From these various concepts, let us collect what is significant, and draw a conclusion.

Behind the impetus to activity which inheres in instincts, we hold that there is a life impulse, libido, hormé, or élan vital. This original vital impulse or energy is manifested through living organisms. It becomes conscious in man through a conative striving, and thus determines experience for man. It is the divine in man, which is, through man, tending toward self-revelation. This ultimate energy becomes differentiated into the urges of the respective instincts, being of course wider than any one of these instincts. It is the basis of a "root interest", a general alertness. The various instincts may thus be considered as a mechanism of revelation for this primal life impulse. On the affective side, this revelation manifests a feeling of worthwhileness or instinct-interest, which develops into a teleological purposiveness for the individual. Here in the feeling of worthwhileness inheres also

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(1). Morgan; "Emergent Evolution", p. 208.

the basis for the intuitive appreciation of values, which is fundamental to art, morality, and religion. The immediate apprehension of the religious object is based upon this intuitive appreciation of values. Religion aspiration has its roots in this affectively toned urge to creative activity, which alone satisfies instincts.

An "Activity", Mind, or a Pervading Power, according to our theory, functions behind and through the specific instincts, revealing itself in instinctive "urge". This power is the Divine in man. God is immanent. Moreover, normal men report experiences of God which must be accepted as experiences of Reality. God, as the religious object, "offers that identity without which creative freedom itself would lack for us all meaning". (1). He is the Something which is creatively active in an immanent way in self-conscious individuals. "God" is the ultimate creative element in the formation of ideals, for His is the Primal Creative Energy which becomes affectively differentiated into instinct-interest.

X. The Energy of God is the Source, and God the Goal of Moral Striving.

Instinct-interest, as we have noted, when disturbed, develops into emotion; emotions become organized into sentiments; and sentiments or selves become the constituents of personality, presided over in the case of mental health, by a worthy

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(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", Preface, p. XVII.



master sentiment, which becomes, when the person evaluates it as supreme, the goal of the individual. "The ultimate ethical force which the individual individuates, that is, turns into elements of his own personality, is God's". (1). Thus we conceive the energy of God to be the source, and God to be the goal or ideal of moral human striving.

We can now say with Brown that religion is the chief integrating power for personality; that it is essential to mental health. When the Self evaluates sentiments, precedent to a choice of a master sentiment, there seems to be implied an "unknown quantity" beyond Self, a something to which Self feels impelled to refer as a standard, and to submit. Or viewed in another way, we may say that a sense of failure at attaining his ideal, or his sense of incompleteness, of imperfection, remains inherent in man and this sense of incompleteness implies a standard beyond. Accompanying this sense of imperfection, is a "desire after the peace of unity". (2). In the words of Hocking: "Worship, ideally speaking, is capable of fulfilling all the functions of the other means of re-integrating self-hood". (3). Religion, if sincere, is the triumphant reconciliation of all inner contradictions.

#### XI. The Religious Attitude in the Restricted Sense.

We have intimated that the affective response to the to-

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- (1). Jones; "A Faith that Enquires", p. 186.
  - (2). Leuba; "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena".
  - (3). Hocking; Op.Cit., p. 536.

talities of things is the religious attitude. This is true, however, only if religion is considered very broadly to include philosophy, art, and ethics. The intellectual attitude to the universe which functions through philosophy has its affective tone; and the aesthetic attitude manifests also an affective tone; and the moral attitude, as we have seen, is based chiefly upon the affective elements in man's nature. But the appreciation of the true, the beautiful, and the good, that is, philosophy, art, and morality, is unified and consummated in something still higher, the real religious experience. In the unique religious experience - a sane, mystical, immediate consciousness of the Divine - all the needs of man are understood and satisfied; here is the possibility of attaining an integrated, a complete, personality, the possibility of "unifying in wish and will, as reason does in principle, the whole moral existence of man". (1).

XII. Religion and Morality are not Dissociable, and not Identifiable.

Thus we neither dissociate religion from morality as Ribot does when he says, "In the beginning the religious feeling is not only stranger to morality, but even in conflict with it" (2); nor do we identify the two as Ames does when he claims that religious consciousness, moral consciousness, and social consciousness are interchangeable terms (3); or as Coe does in the words, "If it is asked wherein religious value

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(1). Hocking; Op.Cit., p. 578.

(2). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions", p. 315.

(3). Ames; "The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 168.

is distinct from ethical value, the answer is that it is not distinct from ethical or any other value" (1); or as Hall does when he states that religion is the ethical experience transmitted and essentially inherited.(2).

1. The ideal of morality need not actually exist; the Ideal for religion does.

Rather, we agree with Bradley when he says that morality has an ideal which does not yet exist, but religion has as its ideal a realized embodiment, an actually existing object of reference (3); and with Taylor when he makes the same distinction, "It is essential to the religious experience that its object should be accepted as the really existing embodiment of an ideal. --- In the ethical experience, the ideal is apprehended as something which does not yet exist, but has to be brought into existence by human exertion" (4); and with Pratt, when he distinguishes religion and morality by saying that in all religions which are well developed, there is an attitude to a Controller of destiny, which is religion, and a system of teachings about the conduct of life, which is morality. (5).

2. Religion and Morality are vitally connected.

However, religion is vitally connected with morality. As

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- (1). Coe; "The Psychology of Religion", p. 74.
  - (2). Hall; "Educational Problems", Vol. I, p. 207.
  - (3). Bradley; "Essays on Truth and Reality", p. 441.
  - (4). Taylor; "Elements of Metaphysics", p. 391.
  - (5). Pratt; "Psychology of Religious Consciousness".

the histories of races and individuals testify, the two advance together, and deteriorate together. Their fate seems to be a common one, for when a race or individual possesses a vital religion, there is a correspondingly high morality manifested, and when religious belief grows cold, moral customs grow lax: "it is a fact of observation that morals and religion advance together and deteriorate together in the history of the race as in that of the individual. --- But in proportion as sympathy, the affective sentiments, altruism, and, on the whole, morality, develop, the idea of God is increased". (1).

### 3. Religion affects moral practices.

Moreover, religious belief influences moral ideas and practices: "enormous is the influence which the belief in supernatural forces or beings or in a future state, has exercised on the moral ideas of mankind". (2). Conscience, also, is in most men combined with the religious sentiment. (3).

### 4. Religion involves a felt personal relationship with an accepted god.

The difference between religion and morality is, that in the former there is the unique characteristic of a sense of personal relationship with a god, which is not an element in the latter. Moral duties become religious rather than merely ethical, when viewed in the light of their relationship to a

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(1). Clavier; "L'Idée de Dieu chez l'Enfant", p. 93.

(2). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas", Vol. II, p. 745.

(3). Shand; "The Foundations of Character", p. 57.



Universal Order and Orderer. Religion has its duties, as truly as does ethics, but in religion there is the additional element of a felt personal relationship with a god, and this relationship colours the whole catalogue of duties both religious and ethical. When the consciousness of the Divine Purpose in the universe fills a man's life, and when the ethical feeling takes on a "moment of resignation and reverence" (1) to that purpose, man is on the way to becoming religious. The element of personal relationship in religion is brought out in McDougall's analysis of the religious emotion. He makes this emotion to include wonder, negative self-feeling, fear, and tender emotion. Such emotions can only be those of a relationship existing between personalities - human and super-human.

Bosanquet's Hegelianism leads him to say, regarding the relationship between morality and religion, that "where the religious consciousness emerges, and insofar as the religious attitude is maintained, the finite self is really absorbed; and then the opposition or struggle characteristic of morality ceases to exist as a recognised and fundamental opposition". (2). But we can not accept as the correct statement of the relationship between religion and morality the "absorption of the finite self", "insofar as the religious attitude is maintained". Religion may be considered as the ultimate perfec-

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(1). Hoeffding; "Outlines of Psychology", p. 263.

(2). Bosanquet; "The Psychology of the Moral Self", p. 88.

tion and consummation of morality; but when this consummation is effected, neither are individual moral beings absorbed, nor do religion and morality lose their respective identities.

#### 5. Moral practices test religion.

Furthermore, if morality is perfectly consummated in religion, religion is at the same time, being continuously tested by morality: "ethics becomes the test to which religion must be put". (1). This is true not only of the religion of individuals, but also of the religions under which various ethical systems and moral customs have arisen and exist. "By their fruits ye shall know them".

#### 6. Religion consummates morality.

We therefore hold that religion is the vital consummation of man's moral progress, furnishing him with an actually existing ideal toward which he can advance, and at the same time, in that ideal, offering him a unifier for moralizing his own personality - "an objective unity which may be the archetype and architect of the subjective unity towards which the moral character tends". (2).

#### 7. Man desires an embodied ideal.

An ideal which is to be for man a practicable guide in conduct, must "stand very close to us". Man must bear the ideal within himself, as we have seen - the ideal must be identified with the Self. Thus, the objectified ideal, whom we

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(1). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution", Vol. II, p. 252.

(2). Sorley; "The Moral Life", p. 132.

have designated God, must also be identified with man, if He is to be of any value as a guide. "Hence men have been fascinated by a conception of God-incarnate, visible in the flesh, in all points tempted like as we are --- what goodness in the end can effectively guide and inspire us but the goodness which we observe and recognise in those whom we must judge to be in all essentials such as we ourselves are?" (1).

#### I. Completeness for Personality.

Christianity holds, in the first place, to the possibility of attaining a completeness of personality. This completeness involves the integration and stabilisation of personality by the developing of man's innate potentialities for morality. The founder of this religion says: "I came into the world for a purpose, to save the world." (Matthew 9:10).

#### II. Socialisation.

This hypothesis claims that the process of man's socialisation includes the socialisation of the personality. It is the means of the solution of any inner conflict which might arise between Self and Other. The latent source of conflict of sympathetic love. We have held that the evolution of love, based upon the tender emotion of the personal relationship,

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(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p. 211.

## Chapter XV.

## MORALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN HYPOTHESIS.

There exists among the world religions, one which offers a unique hypothesis. It deals with the essence of that which man evaluates as being the ultimate, and does so in such a comprehensive way that it is not wholly out of place to show how it uniquely satisfies the various elements of the ethical thesis which this essay has tried to present. This is the Christian hypothesis.

## I. Completeness for Personality.

Christianity holds, in the first place, to the possibility of attaining a completeness of personality (τελειος), which involves the integration and stabilization of personality by the developing of man's innate potentiality for morality. The Founder of this religion says: "Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τελειός ἐστιν". Matthew 5:48.

## II. Socialization.

This hypothesis claims that the process of man's integration includes the socialization of the personality, offering as the means of the solution of any inner conflict which might arise between Self and Other, the latent innate element of sympathetic love. We have held that the sentiment of love, based upon the tender emotion of the parental instinct, is the central and most essential factor in harmonizing the impulses for self-satisfaction with those of regard for others.



Christianity speaks thus regarding the innateness of love:

"ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς ".

1 John 4;19. And Christianity goes to the extent of saying that after our love has been drawn out by his love for us, then the harmonizing of self-love with an active, beneficent altruism even toward an enemy, may confidently be expected.

Not only is the golden rule enunciated: "καὶ καθὼς θέλετε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ".

Luke 6; 31: but even if other men are actively hostile to us, this love evoked in us and operative can be made to include even these personal enemies: "ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν " . Matthew 5;44. Indeed, as Temple says, perhaps it is true that "love is never so completely itself as when it enters on complete self-surrender to conquer the indifferent and hostile, and succeeds". (1).

### III. Objective Correlate to Man's Ideal.

Christianity further includes in its hypothesis the assumption that there exists a Personal Objective Reality whom it identifies with the projected ideal of the integrated personality. It offers the authoritative suggestion: "Ye shall be perfected therefore even as your Heavenly Father is perfected".

### IV. This Correlate Identified with Man.

It claims, too, that with this Personal Reality, man has been essentially united, through the incarnation of that Re-

(1). Temple; "Mens Creatrix", p. 285.

ality. This alleged Incarnation boldly says: "ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἐν ἑσμεν". John 10;30.

The Christian hypothesis thus offers to man, as his Ideal, realized, a Concrete, Historical Person, Jesus, who is reported to have said: "ὁ ἑώρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα". John 14;9.

Whether this astounding claim is true or not, the Speaker can not well be accounted for by any evolutionary hypothesis: He is "inexplicable in scientific categories" (1). Neither an environment such as He inhabited, nor an ancestry such as He inherited, can explain Him. It is as though "all of purpose and perfection that was implicit and struggling to expression, becomes once for all explicit" (2). His own explanation of His Being is, that He is God, the Ideal Element "eventuated in history".

#### V. The Ideal and Self are Identifiable.

But more than this, the Christian hypothesis includes the claim that Self-identification with this Ideal is possible. A union with Him is said to effect, or to be, the complete realization of Self and the consummation of the integration of the personality so united. Such a union would mean an infinitely increased moral and spiritual potentiality, a "spiritually and morally tempered condition of prepotency". He Himself says that a fuller life for men is the purpose of

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(1). Simpson; "Man and the Attainment of Immortality", p. 306.  
(2). Simpson; Op.Cit., p. 314.

His coming: "ἐγὼ ἦλθον ἵνα ζωὴν ἔχωσιν καὶ περίσσοι  
 ἔχωσιν". John 10;10. And He claims that man may be one  
 with Himself and God, to attain thereby this fuller life.

"ἵνα πάντες ἐν ὧσιν καθὼς σύ, πατήρ, ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ἐν  
 σοί, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ὧσιν". John 17;21.

# 1. The highest Self can thus be Integrated, Saved.

In the Christian hypothesis, this fuller life means the  
 realization of the highest Self. The "soul" is held to be  
 something which is to be saved, or won. "ὅς γάρ ἐστιν θέλησιν τὴν  
 ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν σῶσαι, ἀπολέσαι αὐτήν: ὅς δ' ἂν ἀπο-  
 λέσαι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ  
 εὐαγγελίου σώσει αὐτήν". Mark 8;35. The  
 highest Self, as the present essay has noted, must be saved  
 at the sacrifice of lower selves. If these lower selves are  
 not sacrificed to the higher, and the welfare of the highest  
 Self alone made predominant within the personality, there  
 results the "loss" of that "personality-which-might-have-  
 been", because the core of that personality was not given  
 the undivided opportunity to realize the potentiality with  
 which it was laden. The Christian hypothesis claims a person-  
 ality divided to be a personality lost. "οὐδεὶς δύναται  
 δουρὶ κυρίου δουλεύειν --- οὐ δύνασθε θεῷ δουλέειν  
 καὶ μαμωνᾷ". Matthew 6;24.

# 2. Self and Other harmonized.

All men, united with Deity through their union with the  
 alleged Self-revealing Incarnation of Himself, are said to  
 become one, and there results, the hypothesis claims, the solu-

tion of the conflict between Self and other. The selfish life is said to be suicidal, for if some lesser self is made supreme in the personality, the higher self, which includes "other", can not be realized, or saved, and the personality is unintegrated, that is, lost.

#### VI. The Pragmatic Test.

On the other hand, men of all races, times, and civilizations, say they have discovered, in some kind of an intimate relation with the alleged Incarnation of Reality, that they were freed from tormenting inner conflicts, and experienced a new mastery of themselves and the peace which results from such a solution of duality or multiplicity of personality.

Such a subject, Paul, writes thus of his integrative experience: "συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἀνθρώπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν μου. ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος. τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; χάρις δε τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν". Romans 7;22-25.

To summarize. We maintain that morality is the socialized behaviour of the integrated personality. Personality involves affective instinct-interests which ultimately become organized by way of emotions into sentiment systems, which systems, however, may represent conflicting selves. Only the sentiment of self-regard is powerful enough to effect an integration of such possibly diverse interest-systems as, for



example, Self and other. But no system is essentially hostile to any other; even self-interest and other-interest are inextricably united in an innate bi-polar urge. Society impresses a socialization from without, and innate sympathetic love impells to socialization from within, so that as a result the enthroned sentiment of self-regard may become a worthy sovereign among the various selves, and the personality become moralized. The process of integration of personality under the sovereignty of the sentiment of self-regard involves the formulation of ideals, one of which may be chosen by the Self to be the dominant motive of the personality. These ideals are conceptualizations of desirable experiences. The most perfect ideal conceivable by man is more than a mere projection of man's desires; it has as an actual correlate, Deity. In order to be a practicable ideal, Deity must not only be more than an Idea, but He must also be like unto us. "The Christian system --- essentially based on the law of love, preserved the self as an eternal soul whose salvation was the keystone of the arch of conduct". (1). The Christian hypothesis claims that man's goal is attainable by way of his union with the historical, concrete Embodiment of the actual objective correlate to man's projected ideal, which embodiment is, therefore, for man's character, both archetype and architect, as man struggles toward integration and moralization of his personality. It further claims that

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Hobhouse; "Social Development", p. 242.

this union with the Incarnation, instead of effecting a loss of human personality, is rather the perfected integration, and complete realization, that is, the consummation of, that personality.

PART THREE.

PREVIOUS EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES

TO THE

STUDY OF SEXUALITY.

## PART THREE.

We shall mention here only some representative ones, viz. ex. 42.30

## PREVIOUS EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES

TO THE

## STUDY OF MORALITY.

## Chapter XVI.

Mark A. May and Hugh Hartshorne have given a large bibliography on the subject of character tests for the years 1920 to 1925. (1). The list of references numbers 196. Since that time, many more tests have been devised and used, so that an up-to-date bibliography would greatly exceed that figure. We shall mention here only some representative tests which bear more closely upon our problem.

Some of these tests were meant to measure, objectively, certain types of behaviour and certain personality traits, and others aimed at detecting the presence of certain traits without any attempt at measuring them.

#### A. Objective Measurement of Traits and Types.

The attempt has been made to detect deception by pneumographic records, and by noting changes in blood-pressure after lying. And Eva R. Goldstein (2) gives as her results from detecting deception by measuring association times, that the time required to perform simple exercises in addition and subtraction was increased by the consciousness of deception.

May and Hartshorne (3) have produced a procedure for building a scale for measuring dishonesty. The technique is that of duplicating papers. Test papers were duplicated by the examiner, and then returned to the pupils who correct or grade them. Opportunities of varying ease are given for dis-

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- (1). "Personality and Character Tests" in "Psychological Bulletin", Vol. XXIII, No.7. July, 1926.
  - (2). In "American Journal of Psychology", Vol. XXXIV, p.562. 1923.
  - (3). "First Steps Toward a Scale for Measuring Attitudes".



honestly changing the answers before they are graded. The changes made by the dishonest pupils are shown by comparing the graded papers with the duplicates of the originals. A scale is based upon the ease of cheating, and the number of pupils cheating.

Franz Weigl gives (1), as one of nine parts composing a test, a technique for catching a child in dishonesty. But there is no scale attempted for measuring the trait.

#### B. Measurement of Affective Aspects.

Many tests have been devised for measuring the affective aspects of personality: these include techniques for measuring instincts and emotions, mood and temperament, and attitudes and prejudices. A method of approaching the objective study of character recently revived into favour is by way of the analysis of personal interviews with subjects. Finally, the content of the child mind has been studied by means of drawing conclusions from a large number of replies to questionnaires.

#### Instincts and Emotions: Relative Strength of Emotions.

Emotions have been studied laboratorially to discover their relative strength, in several ways. Henry T. Moore approached the problem through the technique of association times to cue words.(2). He reports that a preliminary test was given, in which the subject responded to customary words with verb forms. This gave S's normal verb reaction time.

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(1). "Untersuchungen ueber Gesinnungspsychologie und Moral-paedagogik im Schulalter", in "Zeitschrift fuer Paedagogische Psychologie". January, 1926, p.12.

(2). "A Method of Testing the Strength of Instincts" in "American Journal of Psychology", Vol.XXVII, p.227. 1916.

Then S was asked to respond with a verb to each of a series of words which were heavily laden with affect. These words were chosen to represent what Moore calls ten tendencies of great social importance ( instincts ). The time of response, when compared with S's normal verb reaction time, measures the strength of the tendency to which the word in question belongs.

W.E. Blatz measured the emotion of fear by noting emotional physiological manifestations. (1). The emotion was aroused by precipitating S backward unexpectedly while seated in a chair. Cardiac and electrical changes were registered by an electro-cardiograph, which is a string galvanometer with a photographic device which records changes in the electromotive force of S. For recording respiratory changes, an electrical pneumograph was used. Changes were registered on the moving film. Subjects were unsuspecting. Their normal records were first taken. Then records were taken when the subjects were sophisticated. The results were: involved in the emotion of fear there is an initial cardiac acceleration, followed by a retardation. There was respiratory retardation. The electro-motive force in S's body was increased.

Floyd H. Allport (2), as a laboratorial technique for testing emotional strength, reports the use of free asso-

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- (1). "The Cardiac, Respiratory, and Electrical Phenomena Involved in the Emotion of Fear", in "Journal of Experimental Psychology", Vol. VIII, p. 109. 1925.
- (2). "Social Psychology", pp. 116, 134.

ciation. S is asked to respond to a spoken word with the first word that enters his mind. The presence of a complex or an attempt at inhibition results in an increase in the normal reaction time. In using this familiar technique, Jung discovers two broad types of response words: Objective, non-emotional; and Subjective, emotional. Thus there may be four types of emotionality: the objective; a complex type which reveals the presence of special "sore points"; the definition type which gives a definition to compensate for a felt ignorance; and the predicate type, which is ego-centric, possessing strong personal evaluations.

#### General Emotional Instability.

General emotional instability has been tested by the measurement of the psycho-galvanic reflexes. Syz (1), at Johns Hopkins University, found that emotional reactions as measured in this way did not correlate with the introspective reports given by a group of mature medical students. C.L. Burt used this technique (2) as one of a series of tests of emotional instability. When taken along with other tests, all of which may then act as checks on each other, the psycho-galvanic method has been found to be of some service, but there may be some question whether or not it is emotionality that it really measures.

#### Paper-Pencil Tests of Emotional Instability.

Emotionality and emotional instability have also been

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- (1). "Psycho-galvanic Studies on Sixty-four Medical Students", in "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. XVII, Part I. July, 1926.
  - (2). "The Young Delinquent".

studied by means of various paper-pencil tests. Dr.S.L. Pressey's Cross-Out Tests are well known. The experimenter asks the subject to cross out from separate word lists those words which denote things unpleasant to him, and about which he has worried, and which he considers wrong. By the number and quality of the words crossed out, E tries to determine the "emotional spread" and other aspects, such as the presence of complexes. The fault of this test is, that the introvert may ignore those words which would be indicative of his emotional life; this omission would be a defence reaction against the invasion of complexes. In any such test, the good-will of S must be secured. Any reticent reserve, however, on his part, might be overcome by allowing him to omit any identifying data, such as his name.

Emotional questionnaires have been extensively used to study emotional instability. G. Hymans and E. Wiersma (1) used a list of ninety questions which they sent to 3,000 physicians, about families which the physicians knew intimately. The questions were framed with a view to classifying the character-types of the children of the families.

Woodworth attempted, according to Allport,(2) to get an index of emotional instability by a list of questions to be answered "yes" or "no". The questions given to S provide him with an inventory of complaints and difficulties. Each question answered is supposed to mean that S is peculiar in that

(1). See Webb, "Character and Intelligence".

(2). Allport; "Social Psychology", p. 127.



respect. Interest is shown in the number of particular items reported. The average person has an average number; while soldiers with nervous disorders, for example, are found to have a large number. The purpose is to find an index of the degree of S's mental wholesomeness. A fault of this approach is, that it is based upon self-estimation, and is therefore liable to distortion.

Emotionality has also been studied by the personal rating of subjects by several judges. S is rated by several judges in regard to certain selected traits. There are two varieties of rating: first, scoring; a subjective scale, say 1 to 5, is imagined, and this is used as a basis to express the degree of each trait which the judge thinks S has; second, the ranking method, in which the judge ranks the members of the group to be judged, and S's score is his rank in the group. There are several judges, and a low average deviation signifies the highest reliability of the judges' decision. Rugg of Columbia criticizes, and justly we think, this method by claiming that is valid only when the ratings are made by at least three independent judges, trained in scaling so that they agree on method, and who are all acquainted with the subjects.

George N. Mendenhall, of Iowa University, devised a set of self-rating tests. The character traits were arranged in horizontal lines; one extreme of each trait was at the left of the page, and gradually graded to the other extreme at the right of the page. S checked the word in the horizon-

tal series of words lying between the two extremes, which he thinks characterizes himself as to that particular trait. Hollingworth and Allport correctly criticize all such methods of self-rating as unreliable.

#### Mood and Temperament. Laboratorial.

Not only instincts and emotions, but also mood and temperament have been tested.

M.F. Washburn and students have made studies along this line under laboratory conditions. Her report (1) is as follows. The cylindrical electrodes of a galvanometer were tied to S's hands, and S was asked to think of pleasant, then unpleasant, experiences. The readings as registered by the movement of the bright disk on the scale were recorded. The subjects had previously been asked to rate themselves as to whether they were naturally cheerful or depressed in temperament. The results showed that for the self-judged cheerful group, 40% registered more than 10 degrees, and 35% less than 5 degrees. For the depressed group, 4% registered more than 10 degrees, and 66% less than 5 degrees.

H.T. Moore, in 1921, arrived at an interesting conclusion after an attempt at measuring aggressiveness. He did so by noting the number of times S moves his eyes away from a straight gaze into the experimenter's eyes, while E and S are in personal interview. Distractions are inserted during

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(1). "Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College", in "American Journal of Psychology", Vol. XXXVI, p. 454. 1925.

(2).

the interview: a snake and electric shock were used; and this was all done while S was doing a sum of mental addition. The generalization which Moore makes is, "a stop watch and a pair of fixed eyes are the only indispensable laboratory equipment necessary for estimating roughly the degree of aggressiveness in at least four-fifths of the subjects".

#### Paper-pencil: Will-temperament Test.

Temperament has been tested by a paper-pencil technique by June Downey with her "Will-temperament Tests". These tests claim to measure temperament by measuring 1. speed, 2. forcefulness and decisiveness, 3. persistence and care, of reactions in hand-writing. These three variables seem to the author to reveal the amount of S's available energy. For each of these three variables, Miss Downey devised four tests, offering such conditions as maximum speed, disguise of hand-writing, speed with eyes closed, counting by three's while writing, trying to persuade S that he chose one of two envelopes when he really chose the other, blocking the pencil while S writes blind-folded, writing as slowly as possible, copying a model, and writing in a narrow space of paper. Each of the twelve tests is scored by ten's. The contention is, that S's volitional pattern or will-profile is revealed. The test takes one and one-half hours per subject to give. It does not prophesy S's reactions, but the general nature of those reactions may be predicted: whether they will be strong or weak, aggressive or submissive, and deliberate or impulsive.

Mark A. May gives the judgment that the greatest value of these W-T tests is not as a measure of character so much as research methods. (1). Allport expresses his doubt whether the sphere of temperament is really touched by these tests. (2).

### Attitudes and Prejudices.

Not only have temperament and emotions been tested, but attitudes and specific prejudices have been experimentally approached.

Goodwin B. Watson at Columbia used a word cross-out test, a degree of truth test, a moral judgment test, an arguments test, and a generalization test. All were standardized and a scoring method devised. He claims that a prejudice profile is possible, based on these tests. A typical question found in the "degree of truth test" is: "Poor men can not get justice in the courts today". In each case, of which this is an example, S may check on a scale whether the statement is

(2) so true that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it false.

(1) probably true, or true in a large degree.

(0) uncertain or doubtful.

(-1) probably false, or false in a large degree.

(-2) so false that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it true. (3).

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(1). May; "The Present Status of the W.T. Tests", in "Journal of Applied Psychology", Vol. IX, No.1, March 1925.

(2). Allport; "Social Psychology", p. 132.

(3). Watson; "The Measurement of Fairmindedness".



Hall reports the results of testing children for lies. Duprat is reported as classifying lies into 1. affirmative, due to exaggeration; 2, negative, elaborate denials, dissimulation etc.; 3, sophisticated lies. Liars are classified into 1. Imaginative, who correspond to the affirmative type of lie - pride, boasting; 2. Negative, those who lie from fear, shame, or anti-sociality; 3. Pathological liars. Hall also reports the results of W. Stern, who used subjects 7 to 18 years of age, and of M. Lobsien who used 469 boys and girls 9 to 14 years of age. (1).

Specific interests have also been tested, by means of such methods as cross-out tests, information tests, free association, and by noting children's actions in museums. Under this classification might be listed vocational tests of various kinds.

Social-Ethical Ideas and Judgment have been studied by methods of ranking or rating of traits, ranking of persons, presenting to S imagined life situations, identifying by S of the moral element in a situation, and by having S state moral reasons for questions given.

Under the method of ranking or rating of traits, might be mentioned Kohs, Fernald, Droege, Weigl, and Brotemarkle. The ethical discrimination test of Kohs has S evaluate punishments which S thinks should accompany certain offences.

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(1). Hall; "Educational Problems", Vol. I, p. 365.

G.G.Fernald has S arrange a shuffled series of crimes of widely varied gravity, in the order of their magnitude, from the least to the most serious offence. The norm is obtained from a group of normal legal and professional men who are popularly considered to be morally established. A criticism of this test is, that even "normal" moral individuals may deviate from the norm, because of personal attitudes toward certain offences.

Joseph Droege reports the following. He has S evaluate punishments which have been inflicted upon the scholars, a list of which has been furnished E by the scholars themselves. Droege found sex and age differences in the judgments of punishments. (1).

Weigl had S arrange a list of acts in the order of their goodness, and other acts in the order of their badness.

Brotemarkle devised a comparison test. The "Basic Moral Principle" is represented by two extremes, good and bad. Words are to be arranged by S in their comparative relation between these two extremes. The score is the number of deviations from the norm in each case. It was found that adults have fewer, about half, deviations than adolescents. This test is probably over-difficult for immature minds, and the results are rather meagre.

F.Webb used the method ranking by persons, to approach

(1). Droege; "Die Strafe im Urteil der Schueler", in "Zeitschrift fuer Paedagogische Psychologie", Vol. 27, p. 393. September, 1926.

the study of Social-Ethical Ideas and Judgment. He collected ratings made by school and college students, and found a correlative tendency which he called a "general factor" of character. Its presence is shown by the variety of virtues and its absence by the variety of defects. Desirable traits were found to correlate positively; so too the undesirable traits; the desirable and undesirable correlated inversely. There was found a positive correlation between admirable qualities and intelligence. Allport says that Webb's concept of a general factor "is to be explained in terms of the highly integrated organization of allied drives. 'G' is really a genetic factor, and consists in the formation of many prepotent habit trends all developed in one direction by social approval and disapproval. The fact of intelligence merely increases the rapidity of fixation of those socially useful habits. Intelligence, being a capacity, is innate; whereas excellence of character, consisting essentially of habits, is acquired". (1). (2).

Allport gives seven main requirements for accurate rating of persons by judges in this ranking-of-persons method of studying social-ethical ideas and judgment: 1. Selection of traits that are genuine, fundamental, and distinct; 2. Sufficient number of raters, preferably who see the individuals

(1). Webb; "Character and Intelligence".

(2). Allport; "Social Psychology", p. 138.

(1). Allport; Op.Cit., p. 138.

from various view points; 3. A thorough knowledge and mutual agreement among the raters as to the exact meaning of the various traits; 4. A sufficiently extended acquaintance during which the rater has the traits in mind; 5. Basing the judgments on actual facts of behaviour, and not on general impressions; 6. Practice in the use of the scale; 7. Avoidance of the tendency to allow a good or bad opinion of the subject in one trait to bias one's judgment in regard to another trait. (1).

An interesting contention has been made by Terman, based on the ranking-of-persons method. Ratings by teachers and by elders, in comparison with intelligence test scores, show that the mentally superior child is also usually superior in personal and moral traits. A high correlation of intelligence and character is to be expected under favourable environmental conditions which usually exist in the case of superior children. Terman refutes the notion that the intellectually precocious child is one-sided.

In tests where imagined situations are presented to S, these situations may partake of the nature of dilemmas, the foresight of consequences, or moral judgments.

Dilemmas, based on moral knowledge, are the basis of tests contrived by Hartshorne and May, McGrath, Fernald, and Schwesinger. Hartshorne and May describe the process of building a set of moral knowledge tests. The first step is to de-

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(1). Allport; Op.Cit., p. 130.



termine the field of knowledge to be covered by the proposed tests, and reducing to test form as much of this material as possible. The whole consisted of 1. word tests, (opposites, similarities, and word consequences); 2. sentence tests, (cause-effect, true-false as applied to duties, multiple choice test of comprehension, dilemma stories, foresights, recognitions of moral categories, true-false test of moral principles, application of knowledge of moral principles to dilemmas, and social-ethical vocabulary test); and 3. the good-manners test, (true-false applied to etiquette). Moral knowledge tests seem to reflect codes, and there is considerable over-lapping among these codes. The home was found to be the outstanding source of knowledge of right and wrong, friends coming second. Girls were found to be consistently higher than boys. The child was found to be influenced more by the group code than by the individual code. (1).

M.C. McGrath, in a cumbersome and lengthy battery, included four moral knowledge tests. She included questions, cross-outs, similarities, differences, definitions, stories, moral situations, and pictures in her complete battery. The subjects were 4,000 children. This was an attempt to standardize a test of moral knowledge, and to find at what age a child is alive to respective moral problems.(2).

G.G.Fernald's battery includes dilemmas, definitions of moral terms, evaluation of punishments, and the selection of

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- (1). Hartshorne and May; "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong".
  - (2). McGrath; "A Study of the Moral Development of Children", "Psychological Monograph", 32, No. 144. 1923.

reasons against certain types of bad conduct.

Schwesinger used a social-ethical vocabulary test which she reports reveals the fact that it requires, besides native mental capacity and school training, a certain home cultural training to develop a social-ethical vocabulary. There is, apparently, no relation between school placement of a child and his honesty. Language was found to grow progressively through the school grades, but honesty did not show the same tendency. (1).

Closely allied to the dilemma method is the foresight-of-consequences method of testing. An example is the story-completion item of Weigl's battery, which involved a foresight of consequences.

L.W.Kline is reported as finding, after testing 2384 children, that judgments of right and justice by children between the ages of 8 and 18 are more due to emotional than to mental processes, and more altruistic than selfish. Girls are more sympathetic than boys, and more easily prejudiced. (2).

F.C. Sharp found that in judging morals, a rigouristic attitude tends to disappear with intellectual progress, which progress inclines us to look at situations as wholes. With the less educated, custom or uninherited manner of conduct is more potent, the general consensus of the community is more obligatory, and the conscience of the majority is

(1). Schwesinger; "The Social-Ethical Significance of Vocabulary".

(2). Hall; "Educational Problems", Vol. I, p. 236.

regarded as a safer guide than one's own. (1).

M. Schaefer and G.A. Johnston have devised tests which ask S to state the moral reasons for certain questions.

Schaefer received 1109 answers to the questions: "Warum ist das Stehlen verboten?" and "Warum ist das Luegen verboten?". He gives as his results: "Children from 12 to 14 often, on the one hand, reproduce memorized rules thoughtlessly, and on the other, some reproduce them as they have been, by suggestion, instilled by the authority of the teacher, and of the spiritual and catechetical-religious instruction". The motives which Schaefer discovered he classifies as follows:

I. Religiously coloured motives.

1. Egoistic. (fear of hell, etc.)

2. Fear before God's law.

II. Non-religious motives. ("worldly" or "political").

A. Attention to their own well-being.

1. Pure bodily punishment.

2. Personal punishment in ideal sense. (career, future, opinion of comrades).

3. Conscience. (view of himself).

B. Well-being of S's family.

C. Social well-being - the state.

As to the development of an altruistic attitude, Schaefer found: "Up to the end of the fourteenth year, my subjects

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(1). Hall; Op.Cit., Vol. I, pp. 238-239.

are, toward their environment, generally egoistic --- after the fourteenth year, they are socialistically altruists". And the weak-minded were found to be consistently egoistic. (1).

G.A. Johnston reports a test given to 329 second year male and female students at the Glasgow Training College. The subjects had had logic and one year of psychology, and were average in intelligence and education. They were first asked to give a snap judgment as to the morality of an improvised case presented to them. Then they were asked to reflect upon their first decision, and, if they desired, to change their first judgment. It was found that in giving the reasons as the bases of their judgments, "certain classes have unconsciously adopted an attitude to life which expresses itself in all their answers to problems". Students gave reasons for their judgments, but very few of them made reference to anything that could be called a moral principle. A good many seemed to be at the level of proverbial morality, and in support of their judgments they frequently quoted proverbs. If any principle was given at all, it was based on the "motive" idea, or, in a few cases, on conscience, instinct, love, vocation. Some implied a universal principle by saying that the case cited was all right, but an exception. 85% believed that reason is the basis of moral judgment. After the period of reflection, 16% of the judgments

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(1). Schaefer; "Elemente zur moral-psychologischen Beurteilung Jugendlicher", in "Zeitschrift fuer Paedagogische Psychologie", Vol. XIV, p. 47. 1913.



were changed - 4% right to wrong, and 12% wrong to right. Johnston concludes: "Moral judgment cannot be merely a matter of instinct, nor of immediate perception or intuition, for in that case such a large proportion of alteration after reflection would be inconceivable". "Snap judgments imply conventional standards, while reflection has shown these conventional standards to be inadequate". (1).

#### C. Analysis of Personal Interviews.

Analysis of personal interviews is a favourite recent method of investigating character traits. Meltzer, using this method, withna little more control than in the Freudian Free Association Test, reports as follows. E addresses S thus: "Tell me everything ( ) means to you", and he carefully and sympathetically draws out the S by putting questions to him. In the fifth grade it was found that meanings begin to emerge in the child's mind. The list of concepts used was secured from popular magazine articles, using those found frequently. The responses were analyzed and tabulated; the number of correct ideas, number of wrong ideas, number of correct examples, number of wrong examples, number of responses, number of words used to explain each concept. The scoring was based on numerical values assigned to various grades of answers. (2).

Gruehn reports that Kuelpe, a pupil of Wundt's, found

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- (1). Johnston; "Experimental Investigation of the Psychology of Moral Judgment", in "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. XV. 1925.
  - (2). Meltzer; "Children's Social Concepts".

that "psychological description could be perfected through careful control of the experience to be observed, more exact observation, and a more precise record by the observer of the results of his observation". Gruehn applied this method to a study of religious feeling. The subjects were given selected religious texts to read, or were put through association experiments, and were required to describe their experiences. He reports the "discovery of a new class of experiences which have been called 'self-functions' or 'appropriation-acts'. These functions or acts bring ideas into intimate contact with the self, so that they become personal possessions of the self. They help to explain the phenomenon of transfer, identification, and empathy. They also determine the hierarchical arrangement of ideas. It appears that in the genuine religious experience, ideas, discursive thinking, and processes of volition play a secondary role".(1).

David Katz at Rostock studied the emotional reactions in children as revealed in their talks with adults. He and his wife have recorded, word for word, over 300 chats which they held in the evening at bed-time with their two sons, aged 6 years 9 months, and 5 years 3 months, and have made a detailed analysis of all the psychological factors involved in the answers given by the children to definite questions. Katz reports a definite awakening of conscience within the children as the talks progress from week to week. The chats are confessional in nature, and attention is given by

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(1). Gruehn: "Methods and Results of Recent Investigation of Religious Feeling".

the parent-observers to the establishment of desirable motives, will power, and self-criticism within the the subjects.

(1).

Carl Schneider also reports the results of a similar Kuelpe-Girgensohn method. He chose four widely different subjects: an evangelical theological student, a South African teacher, a student claiming no religion or morals, and a Jewish mathematics student. The following poem was read to each S:

"Ich bin ein Wandersmann, und keiner geht mit mir,

Ich bitte Gott, dasz ich den Weg zum Himmel nicht verlier".

S was then asked to introspect carefully as to his mental content, as he thought back over the lines. Schneider reports his result: "The whole man always speaks in each revelation of his spirit; behind each manifestation, lies his psychic structure as a whole, and each of its workings-out gives us glimpses into the total psychic life". Although there is a deep-lying something, the innate source of religious attitudes, there are individual differences which graduate from one limit of religiousness to the other, and this innate something is not a "definite religious Apriori". "Although the religious-psychic life is rooted deep in the constitution of man, there are still differences of structure which evoke a variegated colouring of the religious life; there is not however a sharp boundary between religious and

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- (1). Katz; "Emotional Reactions of Children as Expressed in Their Talks with Adults".

non-religious structures. --- A definite religious apriori of a psychic kind is only an abstraction". Further, a trans-psychic minimum was found to be the source of religious belief, and in this over-psychic factor, inheres the difference between religion and introverted ego-decision, and between prayer and mere feeling. "Each religious element grows out of a trans-psychic minimum, a factor which is psychologically no further analyzable in an objective way, or an over-psychic-spiritual factor. Only through this factor is it possible to distinguish clearly between religion and introversion, prayer and feeling". The discoverable data for the psychology of religion are not the undifferentiated glory of the divine spirit, but the differentiated manifestations of it in individual men; trans-psychic factor is broken up into manifold forms, as light by a spectrum; "to discover these thousand colours and thousand forms is the task of the psychology of religion". (1).

#### D. Content of Children's Minds.

Of numerous tests intended to study the content of the child mind, three will suffice as examples.

Hall reports an early Berlin investigation. Out of 10,000 children, 7827 boys and 5067 girls had ideas of God. 7279 boys and 7247 girls had a concept of the number 4, etc. As to the moral concepts, girls were more specific than boys,

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(1). Schneider; "Gibt es einen religioesen Menschen?"



and also more conventional. (1).

In Annaberg, Germany, in 1890, Dr.D. Hartmann gave as his results, that of 660 boys, 32% knew the inside of the Berg church, 69% could count to 10, etc. Of 652 girls, 72% knew the church-yard, 61% had ideas of God, 34% attended divine service, etc.

In the "Paidologist", Vol. II, 1900, it is reported that J. Olsen, in Varde, Denmark, tested 5600 in much the same way as was done at Annaberg.

Tests of such a kind are of no value except to show the road by which the testing of children has travelled.

In looking over these various tests, it is evident that few have studied the growth of moral ideas, as moral accountability develops in the maturing child. McGrath's battery does attempt to find at what age a child becomes alive to various moral problems, but no attempt is made to trace the evolving of a moral consciousness. Schwesinger submits evidence to stress Terman's claim that word-knowledge is an almost sure single test of intelligence; and to show the dependence of a knowledge of right and wrong upon a grasp of the terminology in which moral concepts are stated - a finding which is significant for the procedure adopted in the present essay. But she does not trace any line of genetic development of moral ideas. Meltzer found that it is in the

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(1). Hall; "Aspectsof Child Life and Education", pp. 1, ff.

fifth grade of school ( ages 10 to 12 ) that meanings begin to emerge in the child's mind along the line of social concepts, and further, he traced in the minds of children the development of some of these important social concepts; but he did not study the problem from the psychological so much as from the sociological view-point, and he accordingly did not deal with the psychological aspect of the functioning and constitution of the child's mind. Carl Schneider dealt with the problem of whether or not there is a religiousness naturally innate to man, but did not deal with any development of such a characteristic. There is a field for the study of the development of moral ideas in the child mind, considering morality to be not only socialized, but psychically integrated, behaviour.

## PART FOUR.

## EXPERIMENTAL.

## INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PUPIL.

On the following pages there are some questions for you to answer. Say just what you think. We do not care if your answers will equal those of an expert. They are given to anyone.

Ask such question before you go on to the next.

Wait for any question.

Don't be in a hurry, but don't waste any time.

Question 1. If he did not say so, would a child say so? Question 1.8 gives four points of view.

Question 1.9 gives four points of view.

Name.....

Age—Years.....Months..... School.....

Parents' Occupation.....What Church or

Sunday School do you attend?.....

How many brothers and sisters have you?.....

How many older than you?.....

## INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PUPIL.

On the following pages there are some questions for you to answer. Say just what you think, for if you do, your answers will count more. Your answers will not be shown to anyone.

Answer each question before you go on to the next one.

Don't miss out any question.

You need not hurry, but don't waste any time.



I. Suppose you could be somebody else—anybody whom you know, or any character you have read about, or heard about:—

1. Whom would you choose to be ?

2. Read *carefully* the following words, and *underline every word that names something you like about the person* whom you have chosen—things in that person that made you choose him or her.

Underline as many words as you wish, and in any column you like.

athletic	cautious	aid	cheerful
beautiful	good	charitable	chummy
brave	humble	forgiving	courteous
brilliant	modest	generous	friendly
dashing	obedient	gentle	honest
famous	peaceful	helpful	honoured
firm	pure	humane	loyal
heroic	respectful	kind	obliging
influential	retiring	loving	patriotic
morally brave	reverent	merciful	peculiar
persevering	steadfast	self-sacrificing	politician
strong	temperate	sincere	sociable
wealthy	unselfish	sympathetic	solitary

3. Now draw a circle around the three words which tell the three things you like best in this person.

4. Do not change any of your marks, but answer this question :  
If you did not choose \_\_\_\_\_ why didn't you ? Here are several possible answers to this question. Mark with a cross the one that gives your reason. Mark several if you want to.

- (a) I didn't think of him.
- (b) I was ashamed.
- (c) I would, if I did it over.
- (d) I admire him less than the person I named.
- (e) He was too mild.
- (f) I would not want to suffer as much as he did.
- (g) I would not want people to hate me as they hated him.
- (h) I want to live longer than he did.
- (i) He was not manly enough.

II. 1. Underline every word that tells something you think is wrong—something you would be blamed for.

boasting	praise	cad	foresight
bullying	reserve	clubs	indiscreet
confident	self-denial	exclusiveness	reckless
daring	shy	friendly	venturesome
dashing	tattling	gangs	wary
dignity	timid	hermit	worry
meddlesome	affectionate	intolerance	anger
over-dressing	devoted	prejudice	fighting
self-possessed	flirting	queerness	grudge
self-respect	generosity	selfishness	indignant
talking back	indulgence	shrewd	passive
touchiness	ingratitude	unsociable	rage
backward	neglect	anxiety	revenge
day-dreaming	passion	cautious	submissive
flattery	partiality	coward	supine
listless	stinginess	falter	temper
meekness	tender	fear	unfeeling
patience	thoughtful	foolhardy	wrath

2. Look over all the words again, and pick out the *four* which you think are the *worst*—what you would be most blamed for.

Draw a circle around each of these four words.

3. Read the words again, and *mark with a cross* the *four* which you think are the *least bad*.

III. Here is a question for you to answer. Below it there are seven possible answers. Read the question and all the answers, and mark with a cross the answer which you think is best.

Why should you try to be good ?

1. If I am bad, and get caught, I am punished.
2. When I am good, I feel better inside.
3. If I am good, I shall get on better in the world.
4. When I am good, it pleases God.
5. When I am good, my friends respect me more.
6. I should be good just because I know I ought to be.
7. I should be good because Nature punishes those who break her laws.
8. If you have any reason which you think is better, write it

down here :—

IV. Write the best answer you can to this question :

What do you think it means to be good ?

## Chapter XVII.

## Report of the Results of the Present Experiment.

The problem of our experimentation is the development of moral ideas during early adolescence. The results obtained from children between 9 and 11 years were so meagre, that the ages of our subjects are limited, for the purpose of drawing conclusions, to 12 years and upward. The results of the later years are included in the tables, with the knowledge and understanding that the dependability of conclusions and the number of subjects decrease proportionately.

A copy of the test is herewith submitted. The time required for giving the test ranges from 40 minutes in the case of the younger subjects to 25 minutes in the case of the older.

## Construction of the Test.

Page one of the test asks personal questions of the subject, and also gives instructions for marking the questions which follow.

Question I,1 asks the subject for his choice of an ideal. Question I,2 gives an opportunity to underline those character traits which the subject thinks his ideal embodies, and which he likes in that ideal. Question I,3 asks the subject to encircle the three traits which he likes best in his ideal character. Question I,4 asks why the subject did not choose the Christian Ideal, if he did not do so, giving a choice of 9 reasons. Question I,2 gives four columns of thirteen words each from which the liked and preferred traits are to



be chosen. Each column is arranged alphabetically. Columns 1 and 2 contain words relating to the sentiment of self-regard: some show obviously an over-self-assertiveness, such as "dashing"; some show an under-self-assertiveness, such as "retiring"; and others show a comparatively healthy balance in assertiveness, such as "firm". Columns 3 and 4 contain words relating to sociality: some show an attitude of positive sociality, such as "self-sacrificing" and "aid"; others, an attitude of negative sociality, such as "peculiar" and "solitary"; and some show a healthy balance of the two, such as "sincere" and "courteous".

The columns contain synonyms of varying difficulty, such as "friendly" and "sociable". Some of the words in columns 1 and 2 have synonyms in columns 3 and 4, for some traits of well-balanced self-regard involve a certain degree of healthy socialization. This is so because ultimately integration of personality involves socialization: thus, "unselfish" is listed as a self-regarding trait, and "kind" as a socialization trait; the former emphasizes the self-regarding aspect of the category, and the latter, the socialization aspect.

Questions II, 1, 2, and 3 ask the subject to mark words designating traits and actions which he considers wrong, worst, and least bad, respectively. Four columns of eighteen words each are supplied. Each successive group of twelve words is arranged alphabetically. The first twelve, "boasting" to "touchiness"; and the second twelve, "backward" to "timid";

and the fifth twelve, "anxiety" to "worry", are related to self-regard: the third twelve, "affectionate" to "thoughtful"; the fourth twelve, "cad" to "unsociable"; and the sixth twelve, "anger" to "wrath", are related to sociality. Some of the words designate an unhealthy poverty of self-regard, such as "backward", "anxiety"; or a poverty of sociality, such as "ingratitude", "selfishness"; others designate a healthy condition in self-regard, such as "self-respect", "foresight"; and some, a healthy condition in sociality, such as "generosity" and "thoughtful"; some designate an unhealthy self-assertiveness, such as "boasting" and "foolhardy"; and some designate an unhealthy social aggressiveness, such as "flirting" and "grudge". The words designating desirable and undesirable degrees of self-assertiveness and social aggressiveness are arranged haphazard, for the basis of the word order is alphabetical.

Question III tests the motives for morality. The subject, in answering the question "Why should you try to be good?", has a choice of seven answers from which he chooses the one he thinks best. He may also write in an original answer, if he likes. The motives included are fear of punishment, conscience, worldly success, religious, and social approval. Answers two and six relate to conscience, the first being the more naively and simply expressed. Answers one and seven relate to punishment; the first, to immediate retribution, the second to "natural causes".

Question IV asks the subject to give what he thinks is

the content of "the good". No leads are furnished him, except those he discovers in the preceding questions of the test.

#### Method of Giving the Test.

In three of the five schools tested, the writer gave the test in person. In the case of the American school, the instructions were written to the principal, who instructed the various teachers in the required technique, and they tested their respective groups. In one Scottish school, the writer gave the technique to the various masters, who in turn tested their respective groups. The Scottish schools tested were the Flora Stevenson, Parson's Green, James Clarke, and James Gillespie's, all in Edinburgh. The American subjects were pupils in the Central Junior High School, Springfield, Ohio. These schools are henceforth designated by letters in this essay.

Before the tests were distributed, the examiner said to the children: "I am going to give each one of you a paper with some questions for you to answer. Do not read the questions until every pupil has his paper: we shall read them together". The tests were then distributed, and the examiner continued: "On page one, the first line, write your name. If you do not care to do that, just say whether you are a boy or a girl. On the next line, write your age: thus, if you were thirteen years old in December, your age now, (in May) would be 13 years 5 months. Then write in the name of this school, and what your father does to earn a living. If he is dead, perhaps your mother works, e.g. takes in lodgers; if so, write

that in. If both parents are dead, omit the question. Then write what church or Sunday School you attend. Next, how many brothers and sisters have you? Do not count yourself, for you are not your own brother or sister. Then tell me how many are older than you. Now we shall read together the instructions. ( This is done ). Now turn over to the next page, where the questions begin. Question I,1. You may choose anybody at all - a character in a book, someone who lived a thousand years ago, or someone who is living now, or someone who never lived. In Question I,2, if there are any words you do not understand, just omit them. In Question I,3, you will have three circles, one circle around each of three words. These words may be in any column you like. Now look at Question I,4. 'Do not change any of your marks, but answer this question: If you did not choose (     ) why didn't you?'. I have erased a name here, so you can not answer this question until I give you that name. I shall give it to you when you have finished all the other questions. Just omit this question until you have finished all the other questions; then raise your hand, and I'll tell you what word to write in. Save Question I,4 until the last. (The name to be inserted is Jesus).

Question II,1. Here are four columns of words. Underline every word that names something you think is wrong. Underline as many or as few words as you like, and in any column. Question II,2. Now read again all the words of Question II,1, and pick out the four which you think are worst, and draw a circle around each of these four words. You will have circles, one around each word. You may choose your words from any of



the columns that you like, or from only one if you think the four worst are all in one column. Question II,3: mark with a cross each of the four words you think are the least bad. Do not mark any word here that you have marked before either with a line underneath or a circle. Now Question III on the next page. Read all the answers to the question, and choose the one you think is best. Choose only one. Mark it with a cross. If you have a better answer of your own, write it in. Question IV: "What do you think it means to be good?". Don't look at your neighbour's paper - say what you yourself think. I'll stay in the room, and if you have any question to ask, raise your hand, and I'll come right to you. If there are any words you do not understand, just omit them, don't ask me their meanings. Before you begin, now, are there any questions? If not, carry on. Do your best, for I want to compare your answers with the answers given by pupils in (the other Scottish schools) and with those given by some American children".

#### The Children Tested.

The four Scottish schools are all of practically the same standing: the parents are mostly skilled labourers and shop-keepers; a few are professional folk. The churches attended are, with exceptions so few as to be negligible, Christian Protestant. The families are of average size, the number of children ranging from one to five, with a very few larger.

The American school enrolls pupils slightly older than

the four Scottish schools. The "Junior High School" represents approximately the eighth to tenth years of school life. The ages of the school tested range from thirteen to seventeen years. Negroes number about 24% of the children tested. These results from the coloured children were not isolated, for such a procedure would have created a selected group. The American parents pursue occupations comparable to those of the Scottish parents. The churches attended show a much larger variety than those attended by the Scottish children: there are represented sixteen branches of Christianity. A larger percentage of Americans than of Scottish subjects report no church attendance. The families of the American children are larger than those of the Scottish, the number of children frequently rising to seven and eight.

The total number of children tested is 1656, distributed by age, sex, and nationality as follows.(1).

#### The Grading of the Tests and the Tabulation of Results.

The answer given to each question by each boy and each girl was recorded by tally. The records of the five schools were isolated, in order to show any differences which a difference in school might have caused: it was found, however, that the results from the five schools paralleled each other. The records of the two sexes, and of the various ages, by half-years, were likewise isolated. In the records of Question I, 1, for the American results, the heading "American History" was substituted for the heading "Scottish History".

Typical preliminary tally-records are the following:

(1). See Graph 82.

Question I, 1. American Girls. Age  $13\frac{1}{2}$  - 14.

## American History.

Washington.

1

Booker T. Washington.

## Other Nations.

## Living Men.

Lindbergh

1

## Cinema Stars.

Mary Pickford,

Lillian Gish, etc.

TH 1

## Literature.

## Philanthropists.

## Athletes.

Helen Wills.

11

President (or Mrs.  
Coolidge).

1

## Friends.

TH 1

## Teachers.

## Deity.

1

## Men

TH 1

Question II, 1 (only the first column). Girls. Age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  - 15.

Schools.	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.
Boasting.	IIII	I	IIII II II	IIII	IIII III
Bullying.	IIII	I	IIII II II I	IIII	IIII III
Confident.			II		II
Daring.	I				IIII
Dashing.	I		I	II	III
Dignity.	III		I	I	
Meddlesome.	IIII		IIII II II	IIII	IIII I
Overdressing.	IIII		IIII	IIII	IIII
Self-possessed.	I		IIII	I	
Self-respect.		I	IIII		II
Talking-back.	IIII		IIII II II I	IIII	IIII IIII
Touchiness.	I		IIII	III	IIII
Backward.			II	II	IIII
Daydreaming.	II		IIII	I	IIII
Flattery.	IIII		IIII II II	IIII	IIII
Listless.		I	II	III	IIII
Meekness.					I
Patience.					I



The preliminary tallies for the whole test, of which the two pages immediately preceding ( 342, 343 ) are samples, are herewith submitted as "Exhibit A".

These tallies for all the questions of the test were then transferred, in figures, to a single scroll, which is herewith submitted as "Exhibit B". The various schools, the two sexes, the various ages by half-years, were still isolated in this scroll-record. Into this scroll-record there were then inserted at the various ages, sexes, and nationalities, the respective percentages of these ages, sexes, and nationalities. The American percentages were inserted at their proper places in pencil instead of ink. A sample section of this scroll-record follows, page 345. Thus, for age eleven: 2 boys from school "A", and 9 from school "B", and none from the other schools, that is, 33% of the Scottish boys liked "athletic" as a trait in their ideal: 6 girls from school "C", and none from the other schools, or 16% of the eleven year old Scottish girls liked "athletic"; 2 boys from school "C", and none from the other schools, or 5% of the Scottish boys of eleven preferred "athletic", and no girls. For the age thirteen, at which age American pupils enter the record, 13 boys from school "A", 8 from school "B", 59 from school "C", that is, 68% of Scottish boys, and 80% of American boys of thirteen years like "athletic". 33% of the Scottish boys and 50% of the American preferred "athletic". 5% of the Scottish girls and 8% of the American preferred "athletic".

Question I, 2 (traits liked) and Question I, 3 (traits preferred).

Ages.		11.	11½.	12.	12½.	13.	13½.	14.	14½.	15.	15½.	16.	16½.
Liked		2 9	1 8	11 5	12 4	13 8	15 3	3 5	1	4		2	
	Boys.	.33	.48	.56	.47	.68 .80	.50 .72	.38 .60	.50 .56	.50 .80	.17 .70	1.00 .84	.50 .45
			2	9	1 8	6	10 5	5 1	6	1	2		
	Girls.	.6	.1	.11	.22	.24	.25	.12	.8	.4	.7	.2	.4
Preferred		2	1	8	14	27	23	21	21	1	2	1	2
	Boys.	.105	.07	.26	.20	.33 .50	.33 .40	.10 .32	.21 .50	.33 .43	.09 .35	.50 .36	.0 .14
				2	2 1	2 1	1 1						
	Girls.	.0	.03	.03	.08	.05 .08	.06 .24	.07 .16	.12 .24	.07 .10	.06 .21	.07 .0	.0 .0
Disliked													
	Boys.												
	Girls.												

These percentages for the whole test were then graphed. Red ink was used for the girls' records, and blue for the boys', except for Graph 48, which is self-explanatory. Graphs 1 and 2 are for Question I,1. Graphs 3 to 22 are based upon Question I,2; Graphs 23 to 34 upon Question I,3; Graph 35 upon Question I,4; Graphs 36 to 64 upon Question II,1; Graphs 65 to 76 upon Question II,2; Graph 77 upon Question II,3; Graphs 78 and 79 upon Question III; and Graphs 80 and 81 upon Question IV.

Records were then made, in Question I,2, of the years at which the various traits showed their highest percentage of choice by the children. Traits relating to self-regard were isolated from those relating to socialization, for comparison. This record follows on pages 347, 348, 349. Thus, in the case of Scottish boys, the highest percentage choosing "athletic" was seen from the record to be at 16 years; "beautiful" at 11 years; "brave" at 12 years; "brilliant" at 16 years, and so forth. When the highest percentage of subjects chose any one trait at several ages, the earliest age at which the percentage reached this highest point was taken: thus the highest percentage of Scottish boys to choose "brave" was 100% - this happened at the two ages 12 and 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 12 was taken as the age for the record.

These results were then graphed. See Graphs 11 to 14.



## Scottish Children.

## Self-regarding Traits.

Age.	Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
11	Beautiful. Wealthy.	2	Brave. Famous. Strong. Wealthy. Obedient.	5
11 $\frac{1}{2}$	Famous.	1	Stumble.	1
12.	Brave. Brilliant. Firm. Strong. Obedient.	5	Cautious.	1
12 $\frac{1}{2}$	Peaceful. Steadfast.	2	Beautiful. Heroic. Peaceful.	3.
13.		0		0
13 $\frac{1}{2}$		0		0
14.		0		0
14 $\frac{1}{2}$		0		0
15.	Dashing.	1		0
15 $\frac{1}{2}$	Morally Brave. Good. Retiring.	3.	Athletic. Firm. Influential. Persevering. Modest. Temperate. Steadfast.	7.

## Socialization Traits.

Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
Charitable. Gentle. Helpful. Kind Loving.	5	Merciful. Chummy.	2
Merciful Loyal Sympathetic	3		0
Generous. Obliging. Friendly. Politician.	4	Forgiving Loyal.	2
	0.	Helpful. Cheerful. Honest.	3.
	0		0
	0		0
	0		0
	0		0
Honoured.	1		0
Humane. Cheerful. Self-sacrificing. Peculiar. Sociable.	5.	Charitable. Gentle. Courteous. Solitary.	4.



## Self-regarding Traits.

Age.	Boys.	no. Traits.	Girls	no. Traits.
16.	Athletic. Brilliant. Persevering. Modest. Peaceful. Respectful. Pure. Reverent. Temperate. Unselfish. Cautious.	11.	Brilliant. Good. Pure. Respectful. Retiring. Reverent. Unselfish.	7.

## Socialization Traits.

Boys.	no. Traits.	Girls.	no. Traits.
Aid. Forgiving. Sincere. Chummy. Courteous. Honest. Patriotic.	7.	Generous. Humane. Kind. Loving. Self-sacrificing. Sincere. Sympathetic. Friendly. Honoured. Obliging. Sociable.	11.

16½.	Influential. Heroic. Humble.	3.	Dashing. Morally Brave.	2.
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Solitary.	1.	Aid. Patriotic. Peculiar. Politician.	4.
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## American Children.

13. Brilliant.  
Persevering.  
Wealthy.  
Cautious.  
Reverent.  
Steadfast.

6.

Beautiful.  
Firm.  
Steadfast.

3.

Aid.  
Charitable.  
Politician.  
Sociable.

4.

Helpful.  
Merciful.  
Obliging.

3.

13½. Firm.  
Heroic.  
Modest.  
Retiring.

4.

Athletic.  
Brilliant.  
Influential.  
Obedient.  
Respectful.  
Reverent.

6.

Forgiving.  
Humane.  
Kind.  
Merciful.  
Sincere.  
Sympathetic.  
Loyal.  
Peculiar.

8.

Aid.  
Forgiving.  
Patriotic.

3.

Age.	Boys.	no. of traits.	Girls.	no. of traits.	Boys.	no. of traits.	Girls.	no. of traits.
14.					Generous.		Sincere. Sociable.	
		0		0		1.		2.
14½.	Brave. Strong. Obedient. Peaceful. Temperate.		Dashing. Heroic.		Gentle. Helpful. Self-sacrificing. Cheerful. Chummy. Courteous. Friendly. Honoured. Obliging. Patriotic.		Gentle. Loving.	
		5.		2.			10.	2.
15.	Influential.	1.		0.			0.	0.
15½.	Respectful.		Cautious. Unselfish.				Charitable. Humane. Sympathetic. Chummy. Courteous.	
		1.		2.		0		5
16.	Athletic. Famous. Morally Brave.		Brave. Morally Brave. Persevering. Strong. Good. Humble. Modest. Pure.				Kind. Honest. Honoured.	
		3.		8.		0.		3.
16½.	Beautiful. Dashing. Good. Humble. Pure. Unselfish.		Famous. Wealthy. Peaceful. Retiring. Temperate.		Loving. Honest. Solitary.		Generous. Self-sacrificing. Cheerful. Friendly. Loyal. Peculiar. Politician. Solitary.	
		6.		5.		3.		8.

Records were then taken in Question I,3, of the years at which the various traits showed their highest percentage of PREFERENCE by the children. The self-regarding traits and socialization traits were again isolated.

These records follow, pages 351, 352, 353.

Thus, it was at 11 years that the highest percentage of Scottish boys chose "strong" and "obedient" as preferred traits; and at the same age, the highest percentage of Scottish girls preferred "beautiful", "wealthy", and "obedient". It was at  $15\frac{1}{2}$  years that the highest percentage of American boys chose "respectful" and "reverent"; at  $15\frac{1}{2}$  years the highest percentage of American girls chose "brave"; and so forth.

These results were then graphed. See Graphs 31 to 34.

Self-regarding Traits.

Socialization Traits.

Age.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
11.	Strong. Obedient.	2.	Beautiful. Wealthy. Obedient.	3.	Forgiving. Gentle.	2.	Honest.	1.
11½.	Brave. Good.	2.	Cautious. Humble.	2.	Loving. Honoured.	2.	Merciful.	1.
12.	Famous. Wealthy. Respectful.	3.	Strong. Unselfish.	2.		0.	Helpful. Obliging.	2.
12½.		0.	Peaceful.	1.	Courteous.	1.	Gentle.	1.
13.		0.	Heroic.	1.		0.		0.
13½.		0.		0.		0.		0.
14.	Beautiful. Firm. Influential.	3.	Athletic. Brave. Persevering.	3.		0.		0.
14½.		0.	Famous. Firm.	2.	Generous. Helpful. Humane. Kind. Honest.	5.		0.
15.	Dashing. Humble. Modest.	3.	Dashing. Pure. Reverent.	3.	Sympathetic. Patriotic. Sociable.	3.	Honoured. Loyal.	2.
15½.	Persevering. Cautious. Steadfast.	3.	Influential.	1.	Merciful.	1.	Forgiving. Sympathetic.	2.



## Self-regarding Traits.

Age.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
16.	Athletic. Brilliant. Morally Brave. Pure. Unselfish. Reverent.	6.	Brilliant. Good. Modest.	3.

16½.	Heroic.	1	Morally Brave. Respectful. Steadfast.	3.
------	---------	---	---	----

## Socialization Traits.

Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
Cheerful. Friendly.	2.	Self-sacrificing. Chummy. Patriotic. Sociable.	4.

Charitable. Self-sacrificing. Sincere. Loyal.	4.	Charitable. Generous. Humane. Kind. Loving. Sincere. Cheerful. Friendly.	8.
--	----	---	----

## American Children.

13.	Athletic. Beautiful. Persevering. Unselfish.	4.	Modest. Respectful.	2.	Generous. Cheerful. Patriotic.	3.	Forgiving. Generous. Gentle. Helpful.	4.
-----	---	----	------------------------	----	--------------------------------------	----	--	----

13½.	Famous. Firm. Strong. Wealthy. Good. Modest.	6.	Athletic. Brilliant. Persevering. Obedient.	4.	Charitable. Kind. Honoured. Loyal.	4.	Charitable.	1.
------	---	----	--	----	---	----	-------------	----

14.		0.		0.			Cheerful. Chummy. Friendly.	3
-----	--	----	--	----	--	--	-----------------------------------	---

## Self-regarding Traits.

Age.	Boys.	no. Traits	Girls.	no. Traits
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .			Heroic. Strong. Good. Unselfish.	4.
		0		
15.	Brilliant. Morally Brave.	2.		0.
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	Respectful. Reverent.	2.	Brave.	1.
16.	Brave. Heroic. Humble.	3.	Famous. Firm. Influential. Pure.	4.
16 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	Dashing. Influential. Obedient. Peaceful. Pure.	5	Beautiful. Wealthy.	2.

## Socialization Traits.

Boys.	no. Traits	Girls.	no. Traits
Honest.		Honoured.	
	1.		1.
Self-sacrificing. Chummy. Friendly.	3.		0.
Courteous.	1.	Kind. Loyal.	2.
Sincere.	1.	Courteous. Patriotic.	2.
Forgiving. Gentle. Merciful. Sociable.	4.	Loving. Honest. Sociable.	3.

Note was next made of all the traits in Question I,2, with respect to the ages at which the sensitivity to these traits INCREASED.

The same procedure was followed to note the years during which sensitivity to the traits DECREASED. The results were compiled for all four groups, Scottish boys, Scottish girls, American boys and American girls.

The self-regarding traits were again isolated from the socialization traits, both in the results and in the graphs.

The records of the years of increasing sensitivity and of decreasing sensitivity follow; that is, the years within which percentages of children "liking" the various traits increased, and within which these percentages decreased; and the records of those of both the self-regarding and of the socialization traits, and of Scottish boys and girls, and American boys and girls. These results are found on pages 355, 356, 357, 358. Thus, the percentage of Scottish boys underlining "athletic" increased between the ages of 11 and  $12\frac{1}{2}$ ; the percentage underlining "influential" increased up to 17; "morally brave", 14 to  $15\frac{1}{2}$ ; and so forth. The percentage of American boys underlining "athletic" increased between the ages of 14 and  $14\frac{1}{2}$ , and between 15 and 16; "brave" increased between 14 and  $14\frac{1}{2}$ , and so forth.

The graphs showing the increase of sensitivity are numbered 15 to 18; those showing the decrease, number 19 to 22.

There follows a collection of typical answers to Question I,2., pages 359 and following.



## Records showing Increase in sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits.

Scottish.

I

American.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Athletic		11 - 12½.
Influential.	Influential	— 17.
Morally Brave.		14 - 15½.
	Morally Brave.	14 - 16
Brave.	Brave.	14½ - 15½.
Brilliant.	Brilliant.	14½ - 16
Dashing.		13½ - 16½.
	Dashing.	13½ - 15.
Famous.		14½ - 15½.
	Famous.	14 - 15½.
Firm.		14½ - 15½.
	Firm.	12½ - 15½.
Heroic.		14½ - 15½.
Persevering.	Persevering.	14½ - 16.
Strong.		14½ - 16
	Strong.	15 - 15½.
Reverent		13½ - 16
	Reverent.	12 - 16
Steadfast.	Steadfast	14½ - 15½.
Temperate.		13½ - 16.
	Temperate.	13 - 16.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Athletic.		14-14½: 15-16
	Beautiful.	13½ - 14½.
Brave.		14 - 14½.
	Brave.	15½ - 16
Brilliant.		15 - 15½.
	Brilliant.	15½ - 16
Dashing.	Dashing.	13½-14½: 15-16
Famous		15 - 16
	Famous.	14-14½: 15½-16½.
Heroic.	Heroic.	14-14½: 15½-16.
Influential.	Influential.	14½ - 15.
Morally Brave.		14 - 14½.
	Morally Brave.	15½ - 16.
Persevering.		13½ - 15.
	Persevering.	15½ - 16
Strong.		15 - 15½.
	Strong.	14-14½: 15½-16.
Wealthy.		14-14½: 15-15½.
	Wealthy.	14½-15: 15½-16½.
Cautious.		14 - 14½.
	Cautious.	15 - 15½.
	Good	13½-14½: 15-16.
Stumble.		13½ - 14½.
	Stumble.	14-14½: 15½-16.
	Modest.	15½ - 16.
Obedient.		14 - 14½.
	Obedient.	14½-15: 15½-16.
Peaceful.		14 - 14½.
	Peaceful.	14½-15: 15½-16½.
Pure.		14½-15½: 16-16½.
	Pure	14-15: 15½-16½.
Respectful.	Respectful.	14-14½: 15-15½.
Reverent.		14 - 15½.
Steadfast.		13½-15: 16-16½.
Temperate.		13½-14½: 15½-16.
Unselfish.		15 - 15½.



## Records Showing Decrease in Sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits.

Scottish.

American.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Beautiful		11½ - 16.
	Beautiful.	13 - 14½.
Brave.		13 - 14½.
	Brave.	12½ - 14½.
Brilliant.	Brilliant.	12 - 14½.
Dashing.		11½ - 14½.
Famous.		11½ - 14½.
	Famous.	12½ - 14.
Firm.		12½ - 14½.
Heroic.		11½ - 14½.
	Heroic.	12½ - 14½.
Morally Brave.		11½ - 14.
	Morally Brave.	12½ - 14.
Persevering.		13 - 14½.
	Persevering.	12½ - 14½.
Strong.		12 - 14½.
	Strong.	12 - 15.
Wealthy.		11 - 15.
	Wealthy.	11 - 15½.
	Good.	12 - 15.
Humble.	Humble.	12½ - 14½.
Modest.	Modest.	13 - 14½.
Obedient.	Obedient.	12 - 15.
Peaceful.		12½ - 15½.
	Peaceful.	11 - 14½.
Pure.		13½ - 15.
	Pure.	12½ - 14½.
Respectful.		11½ - 15½.
	Respectful.	12 - 14½.
Steadfast.		12½ - 14½.
	Steadfast.	13½ - 14½.
Unselfish.		13 - 15.
	Unselfish.	12½ - 15½.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Athletic		14½ - 15.
	Athletic	13½ - 14½; 15½ - 16½.
	Beautiful	14½ - 15½.
Brave.	Brave.	14½ - 15.
Brilliant.		15½ - 16.
Dashing.	Dashing.	14½ - 15.
Famous.		14 - 15.
	Famous.	14½ - 15½.
Firm.		14 - 15.
Heroic.		14½ - 15½.
Influential.		15 - 15½.
Morally Brave.		15 - 15½.
	Morally Brave.	14 - 14½.
Persevering.		15 - 16.
Strong.		14½ - 15.
	Strong.	14½ - 15½.
Wealthy.		14½ - 15.
	Wealthy.	15 - 15½.
Cautious.		14½ - 16½.
	Cautious.	13 - 14½.
Good		15 - 16.
	Good.	14½ - 15.
Humble.	Humble.	14½ - 15½.
Obedient.		14½ - 16.
	Obedient.	13½ - 14½.
Peaceful.		14½ - 16.
	Peaceful.	15 - 15½.
Pure.		15½ - 16.
Respectful.	Respectful.	14½ - 15.
Reverent.		13 - 14.
	Reverent.	13½ - 14½; 14½ - 15½.
Steadfast.		15 - 15½.
	Steadfast.	14 - 15.
Temperate.		14½ - 15½.
	Temperate.	14½ - 15.
Unselfish	Unselfish.	14½ - 15.

## Records showing Increase in Sensitivity to Socialization Traits.

Scottish.			American.		
Boys.	Girls.	Ages.	Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Charitable.		15½ - 16½.	Aid.		15 - 15½.
	Charitable.	14½ - 15½.		Aid.	14½ - 15½.
Forgiving.		15 - 16.	Charitable.		14½ - 15.
	Forgiving.	14½ - 16.		Charitable.	14½ - 15½.
	Generous.	14½ - 16.	Forgiving.		14-15:15½-16½.
	Gentle.	14½ - 15½.		Forgiving.	15 - 15½.
	Helpful.	14½ - 16.	Generous.		14½-15:15½-16½.
Humane.		14½ - 16.		Generous.	15 - 15½.
	Humane.	13 - 16.	Gentle.		14 - 14½.
Kind.		15 - 16.		Gentle.	13 - 14½.
	Kind.	14½ - 16.	Helpful.		14-14½:16-16½.
Loving.		14½ - 15½.		Helpful.	15 - 15½.
	Loving.	14½ - 16.		Humane.	15 - 15½.
	Meriful.	14½ - 16.	Kind.		15½ - 16.
	Self-sacrificing.	11 - 16.		Kind.	15 - 16.
Sincere.		14½ - 16.	Loving.		16 - 16½.
	Sincere.	14½ - 16.		Loving.	15 - 16½.
	Sympathetic.	14½ - 16.	Self-sacrificing.		14-14½:15½-16.
Cheerful.		14½ - 16.		Self-sacrificing.	15 - 15½.
	Courteous.	11 - 16.	Sincere.		14 - 15.
	Friendly.	14½ - 16.		Sincere.	15 - 15½.
	Honest.	14½ - 16.	Sympathetic.		14½ - 15.
	Honoured.	14½ - 16.		Sympathetic.	14½ - 16.
	Loyal.	13½ - 16½.	Cheerful.		15 - 15½.
	Obliging.	14½ - 16.		Cheerful.	14 - 16½.
Patriotic.		14½ - 16.	Chummy.		14-14½:15½-16.
	Patriotic.	15 - 16½.		Chummy.	13-14:14½-15½.
Sociable.		14½ - 16.	Courteous.		14-14½:15½-16.
	Sociable.	14½ - 16.		Courteous.	14½ - 15½.
			Friendly.		14-14½:15-15½.
				Friendly.	15 - 15½.
			Honest.		14-14½:15-16½.
				Honest.	15½ - 16½.
			Honoured.		14 - 14½.
				Honoured.	14-15:15½-16.
			Loyal.		13-13½:15-16½.
				Loyal.	14½ - 15½.
			Patriotic.		13½-14½:15-15½.
				Patriotic.	15 - 15½.
			Sociable.		14 - 14½.
				Sociable.	13½-14:15-15½.

# Records showing Decrease in Sensitivity to Socialization Traits.

## Scottish.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Aid.	Aid.	15 - 15½.
Charitable.	Charitable.	12 - 14½.
Forgiving.	Forgiving.	12 - 15.
Generous.	Generous.	13 - 15½.
Gentle.	Gentle.	12 - 16.
Helpful.	Helpful.	12½ - 14½.
Humane.	Humane.	14 - 14½.
Kind.	Kind.	12 - 13.
Loving.	Loving.	12½ - 14½.
Merciful.	Merciful.	12 - 16.
Self-sacrificing.	Self-sacrificing.	14 - 15½.
Sincere.	Sincere.	13½ - 14½.
Sympathetic.	Sympathetic.	13 - 14½.
Cheerful.	Cheerful.	12 - 14½.
Chummy.	Chummy.	13 - 15½.
Courteous.	Courteous.	12 - 14½.
Friendly.	Friendly.	13 - 15.
Honest.	Honest.	12½ - 14½.
Honoured.	Honoured.	14½ - 15½.
Loyal.	Loyal.	13½ - 14½.
Obliging.	Obliging.	14 - 14½.
Patriotic.	Patriotic.	12 - 13½.
Sociable.	Sociable.	13 - 15½.
		14 - 14½.
		14½ - 15.
		15 - 15½.
		15½ - 16.

## American.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Aid.	Aid.	14½ - 15½; 15½ - 16.
Charitable.	Charitable.	14 - 14½; 15 - 16.
Forgiving.	Forgiving.	13½ - 15.
Generous.	Generous.	13½ - 15½.
Gentle.	Gentle.	15 - 15½.
Helpful.	Helpful.	13½ - 15.
Humane.	Humane.	14½ - 15.
Kind.	Kind.	14½ - 15½.
Loving.	Loving.	13½ - 14½; 14½ - 16.
Self-sacrificing.	Self-sacrificing.	13½ - 14½; 14½ - 15.
Sincere.	Sincere.	14 - 15.
Sympathetic.	Sympathetic.	14½ - 15½.
Cheerful.	Cheerful.	13½ - 14½; 15 - 16.
Chummy.	Chummy.	13 - 14.
Courteous.	Courteous.	13½ - 14½; 14½ - 15½.
Friendly.	Friendly.	14 - 14½; 15½ - 16.
Honest.	Honest.	14½ - 15½.
Honoured.	Honoured.	13 - 13½; 14½ - 15½.
Loyal.	Loyal.	13½ - 14½; 14½ - 15.
Patriotic.	Patriotic.	13 - 13½; 14½ - 15.
Sociable.	Sociable.	13½ - 15.
		13 - 14; 14½ - 16.
		13 - 13½; 14 - 15.



Hero: Jack Dempsey. American Boy,  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years:

athletic, brave, strong, good, unselfish, aid, cheerful, courteous, honest, loyal.

Hero: Tom Mix. American Boy,  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years:

brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, heroic, strong, wealthy, good, respectful, kind, friendly, honest.

Hero: Douglas Fairbanks. American Boy, 14 years:

athletic, brave, brilliant, dashing, strong, wealthy, good, respectful, unselfish, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, cheerful, friendly, honest, loyal, patriotic.

Hero: Jack Dempsey. American Boy,  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years:

athletic, brave, famous, firm, heroic, morally brave, strong, cautious, modest, obedient, peaceful, respectful, temperate, unselfish, forgiving, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, self-respecting, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, patriotic, sociable.

Hero: Mrs. Coolidge. American girl, 14 years:

athletic.

Hero: Calvin Coolidge. American Girl, 14 years:

athletic, strong, good, modest, obedient, peaceful, respectful, unselfish, helpful, kind, loving, merciful, sincere, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, patriotic, sociable.

Hero: Queen Elizabeth. American Girl, 14 years.

beautiful, brilliant, dashing, famous, wealthy, good, peaceful, unselfish, forgiving, gentle, helpful, loving, sincere, friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, patriotic, peculiar.



Hero: Booker T. Washington. American Girl,  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years.

athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, strong, good, obedient, peaceful, pure, respectful, unselfish, charitable, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, self-sacrificing, sincere, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, patriotic.

Hero: Queen Elizabeth. Scottish Girl,  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years.

athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, firm, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, pure, unselfish, generous, gentle, kind, sympathetic, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, sociable.

Hero: Betty Balfour. Scottish Girl,  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years.

beautiful, brave, brilliant, famous, firm, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, humble, modest, obedient, peaceful, pure, respectful, unselfish, aid, charitable, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, humane, kind, loving, merciful, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, obliging, sociable.

Hero: Mary Pickford. Scottish Girl,  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years.

athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, heroic, morally brave, strong, cautious, good, humble, obedient, peaceful, pure, respectful, temperate, unselfish, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, self-sacrificing, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, friendly, honest, obliging, politician.

Hero: Shakespeare. Scottish Girl,  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years,

athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, firm, heroic, morally brave, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, humble, obedient, peaceful, pure, steadfast, unselfish, aid,

forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, sympathetic, cheerful, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, obliging.

Hero: Napoleon. Scottish Boy, 15 years.

brave, brilliant, famous, firm, heroic, persevering, strong, cautious, good, humble, forgiving, helpful, kind, honest.

Hero: Douglas Fairbanks. Scottish Boy, 14 years.

athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, firm, heroic, influential, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, obedient, respectful, unselfish, charitable, gentle, humane, kind, loving, merciful, self-sacrificing, sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, obliging, patriotic, sociable.

Hero: Jeanne Tunney. Scottish Boy, 13½ years.

athletic, brave, brilliant, famous, heroic, influential, strong, cautious, good, humble, modest, obedient, peaceful, pure, respectful, reverent, steadfast, unselfish, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, humane, kind, merciful, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, obliging, politician.

Hero: Betty Nuthall. Scottish Girl, 17 years,

athletic, brilliant, modest, respectful, kind, cheerful, chummy.

Hero: Suzanne Lenglen. French Girl, 17 years.

athletic, brilliant, famous, cautious, friendly, honest, peculiar, sociable.

Hero: Queen Elizabeth. Scottish Girl, 14½ years.

athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, famous, firm, influen-

tial, morally brave, persevering, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, reverent, steadfast, unselfish, aid, charitable, helpful, humane kind, sympathetic, cheerful, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, patriotic, politician, sociable.

Hero: Prince of Wales. Scottish Girl,  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years.

athletic, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, influential, persevering, strong, wealthy, good, humble, modest, peaceful, pure, respectful, reverent, steadfast, temperate, unselfish, charitable, generous, gentle, helpful, humane, kind, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, obliging, sociable.

Question I,4. In answering this question, the largest percentage of boys and girls marked answers "A" and "C". The percentage marking "A" shows a slight tendency to decrease at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  in the case of the boys, and  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 in the case of the girls. The curve of the graph for "B" shows a downward tendency: that is, as years advance, fewer children reported themselves as ashamed to choose Jesus. A negligible number reported a preference for another ideal (D). A number of children, which decreases as age increases, reported Jesus as "too mild" to elicit their worship as hero (E). An appreciable number of both boys and girls, but a larger percentage of boys, report His suffering as being a deterrent to their choosing Him (F). Also an appreciable number report the popular hatred He experienced as undesirable in one whose place they would choose to take (G). In both "F" and "G", the curve of the boys' results rises at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years in a marked degree, and in "H", the curve rises slightly at this age.

There follows herewith a typical section of the scroll record of results of Question I,4, from which the graph was constructed. The figures are the percentages of children of the respective ages marking the answer in question. Thus, 63% of the boys of 11 years marked "A", 32% of the boys of  $11\frac{1}{2}$ , 38 $\frac{1}{2}$  of the boys of 12, and so forth. No results for this question are available from American children. The results are shown in Graph 35.



## Sample Section of Scroll Record of Question I, 4.

## Scottish Children.

Ages: 11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

A. Boys. 63 32 38 69 84 64 70 86 84 81 80 100

Girls. 50 50 63 75 77 71 77 81 52 66 77 50

B. Boys. 18 24. 14 21 19 13 04 07 12 09 16 0

Girls. 08 12. 26 12 12 06 06 07 02 06 07 12

C. Boys. 33 28 62. 53 57 67 58 50 78 63 66 0

Girls. 24 33 57. 69 67 63 67 72 42 54 66 40

D. Boys. 03 0 08 02 05 01 04 0 0 0 0 0

Girls. 08 0 07 01 04 05 04 02 0 0 07 0

E. Etc.

F.

G.

H.

I.

## Question II,1.

A typical section of the scroll record for Questions II, 1, 2, and 3, with only the percentages given, but not the number of votes for each case, follows, on page 366. The American results are inserted in pencil instead of ink. From the results tabulated in the scroll record, Graphs 36 to 47 were constructed.

A sample reading of the section of the scroll record runs thus: at 11 years, "boasting" was marked "wrong" by 87% of the boys and 96% of the girls; it was marked "worst" by 39% of the boys and 39% of the girls; it was marked "least bad" by none. At 13 years, "boasting" was marked "wrong" by 78% of the Scottish boys, 60% of the American boys, 75% of the Scottish girls, and 28% of the American girls. It was marked "worst" by 31% of the Scottish boys, 30% of the American boys, 25% of the Scottish girls, and 12% of the American girls. It was marked "least bad" by 2% of the Scottish boys, 2% of the Scottish girls, and by no American children.



A further study of Question II,1 was made, in order to ascertain the ages at which the highest percentages of children underlined the various "wrongs". The "wrongs" relating to self-regard were isolated from those relating to socialization, and the American and Scottish results were also isolated. The tabulated results follow, on pages 368, 369, 370, and 371.

A reading of these results runs thus: it was at  $11\frac{1}{2}$  years that the highest percentage of the Scottish boys underlined "bullying", "talking back", "meekness", and "foolhardy" as wrong. It was at 12 years that the highest percentage underlined "self-respect", "praise", "self-denial", "shy", "venturesome", and "wary". That is, for example, of the Scottish boys, a larger percentage of 12 year olds underlined "self-respect" than of any other age of Scottish boys; and so forth.

A graph was drawn of these group results as follows. There are listed in the test, Question II, 1, 36 self-regarding wrongs, namely, the 12 from "boasting" to "touchiness", the 12 from "backward" to "timid", and the 12 from "anxiety" to "worry". The other three groups of 12's are the socialization wrongs. Therefore, 11% of the 36 self-regarding wrongs, that is, 4 of them, were underlined by Scottish boys of  $11\frac{1}{2}$  years; 16% by boys of 12 years, 22% by boys of  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, and so forth. These results are drawn on Graph 48.

The graphs all show, for all the children, a pubertal disturbance.



Age at which various "Wrongs" received highest percentages of votes.

# Scottish Children.

## Self-regarding Traits.

## Socialization Traits.

Age	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
11			Boasting. Self-respect. Backward. Daydreaming. Self-denial. Reserve. Cautious. Coward. Foresight. Wary. Worry.		Passive		shrewd. Anger. Fighting.	
		0		11		1		3
11½	Bullying. Talking back. Meekness. Foolhardy.		Dashing. Self-possessed. Touchiness. Patience. Timid.		Flirting. Fighting. Wrath. Shrewd.		Selfishness.	
		4		5		4		1
12.	Self-respect. Praise. Self-denial. Shy. Venturesome. Wary.		Dignity. Praise. Shy.				Indignant. Rage	
		6		3		0		2
12½.		0	Daring.	1		0		0
13.		0		0		0	Temper.	1
13½.		0		0		0		0
14.		0	Venturesome.	1		0		0

Ages at which various "Wrongs" received highest percentages of Votes.								
Ages.	Boys.	no. Traits.	Girls.	no. Traits.	Boys.	no. Traits.	Girls.	no. Traits.
14½.	Boasting. Confident. Dashing. Dignity. Backward. Flattery. Reckless. Worry.				Neglect. Stinginess. Cad. Gangs. Prejudice. Queerness. Anger. Grudge. Indignant. Rage. Unfeeling.		Grudge.	
		8		0.		11.		1.
15.	Touchiness. Listless. Anxiety. Indiscreet.		Confident. Meddlesome. Overdressing. Talking Back. Flattery. Meekness. Tattling.		Clubs. Exclusiveness. Selfishness. Revenge. Submissive. Supine. Temper.		Flirting. Neglect. Stinginess. Cad. Clubs. Gangs. Hermit. Passive. Supine. Wrath.	
		4.		7.		7.		10.
15½.	Meddlesome. Overdressing. Self-possessed. Daydreaming. Tattling. Timid. Coward. Falter. Fear.		Bullying. Listless. Anxiety. Falter. Fear. Foolhardy. Indiscreet. Reckless.		Indulgence. Ingratitude. Passion. Partiality. Hermit. Intolerance. Unsociable.		Indulgence. Ingratitude. Passion. Partiality. Exclusiveness. Intolerance. Prejudice. Queerness. Unsociable. Revenge. Submissive. Unfeeling.	
		9.		8.		7.		12.

Age at which various "Wrongs" received highest percentages of Votes.

# American Children.

## Self Regarding Traits.

Ages	Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
13.	Bullying. Confident. Daring. Dignity. Tattling. Meddlesome. Overdressing. Talking back. Touchiness. Backward. Daydreaming. Flattery. Lustless. Patience. Anxiety. Cautious. Indiscreet. Venturesome.		Flattery. Cautious. Wary.	

18.

3.

13½.	Dashing. Meekness. Praise. Reckless. Timid.		Boasting. Confident. Daring. Dashing. Meekness. Tattling. Falter. Fear. Indiscreet. Venturesome.	
------	---	--	---	--

5

10.

14.	Coward. Worry. Boasting.		Patience. Worry.	
-----	--------------------------------	--	---------------------	--

3.

2.

## Socialization Traits.

Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
Flirting. Indulgence. Ingratitude. Passion. Stinginess. Cad. Hermit. Intolerance. Prejudice. Dwerness. Selfishness. Anger. Grudge. Passive. Rage. Revenge. Submissive. Temper. Unfeeling.		Indulgence. Neglect. Shrewd. Passive.	

19.

4.

Wrath. Gangs.		Passion. Partiality. Cad. Clubs. Intolerance. Grudge. Rage. Revenge. Submissive.	
------------------	--	--	--

2.

9.

Neglect. Tender.		Stinginess. Exclusiveness. Gangs.	
---------------------	--	---	--

2.

3.



Ages at which various "Wrongs" received highest percentages of Votes.

Ages.	Boys.	no. % Traits.	Girls.	no. % Traits.	Boys.	no. % Traits.	Girls.	no. % Traits.
14½.			Listless.				Friendly. Prejudice. Indignant. Temper.	
		0		1		0		4
15.		0	Reckless.	1		0		0
15½.	Timid.		Touchiness. Shy.		Indignant.		Affectionate. Queerness.	
		1.		2.		1.		2.
16.	Self respect. Shy.		Bullying. Anxiety.				Ingratitude. Selfishness. Unsociable. Anger.	
		2.		2.		0		4.
16½.	Affectionate. Devoted. Generosity. Partiality. Clubs. Exclusiveness. Shrewd. Unsociable. Fighting. Supine.		Dignity. Meddlesome. Overdressing. Self-possessed. Self-respect. Talking back. Backward. Daydreaming. Praise. Self-denial. Timid. Flirting. Coward. Foolhardy. Foresight.		Affectionate. Devoted. Generosity. Partiality. Clubs. Exclusiveness. Shrewd. Unsociable. Fighting. Supine.		Hermit. Fighting. Supine. Unfeeling. Wrath. Flirting.	
		10.		15.		10.		6.



A record was next taken of the years during which the sensitivity to the self-regarding wrongs, and also the sensitivity to the socialization wrongs, increased and decreased, in all four groups of children - Scottish boys, Scottish girls, American boys, and American girls.

These results follow, on pages 373, 374, 375, 376, and 377.

The results were then graphed. See Graphs 49 to 64.

Thus, in the case of the Scottish boys, sensitivity to "boasting" as a wrong increased from 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years of age, and also from  $15\frac{1}{2}$  to  $16\frac{1}{2}$ . In the case of the Scottish girls, it increased between the ages of  $11\frac{1}{2}$  and 12, and also between the ages  $13\frac{1}{2}$  and 16, and so forth.

## Records showing Increase in Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.

Scottish.

American.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Boasting.		14-14½: 15½-16½.
	Boasting.	11½-12: 13½-16.
Bullying.		13½-14½: 15-15½.
	Bullying.	13½-14: 14½-15½.
Daring.		11½-12: 15-15½.
	Daring.	11½-12.
Dashing.		14-14½: 15-15½.
	Dashing.	11-11½: 12-12½: 13½-14½.
Dignity.		13½-14½.
Meddlesome.		11-11½: 13½-14½.
	Meddlesome.	11-11½: 14½-15.
Overdressing.		11-12: 13-14: 14½-15.
	Overdressing.	11-11½: 13½-14: 14½-15½.
Self-possessed.		11½-13: 13½-15½.
	Self-possessed.	11-12: 14½-15½.
Self-respect.		11-11½.
	Self-respect.	11½-12.
Talking back.		14-14½.
	Talking back.	13-15½.
Touchiness.		13½-14: 14½-15.
	Touchiness.	12-12½: 13½-15.
Backward.		11½-12: 14-14½.
	Backward.	13-13½: 15-15½.
Daydreaming.		12-13: 13½-15½.
	Daydreaming.	11½-12: 12½-13½: 14½-15½.
Flattery.		11-11½: 12½-13: 14-14½.
	Flattery.	12-15½.
Listless.		12-12½: 14½-15.
	Listless.	11-12: 13-15½.
Meekness.		12½-13: 13½-14: 14½-15.
	Meekness.	14½-15.
Shy.		11-12: 14-15½.
	Shy.	11-12½.
Tattling.		11-12: 14-15½.
	Tattling.	11½-12½: 13½-15.
Anxiety.		14½-15.
	Anxiety.	15-15½.
Coward.		11-12: 12½-13: 14-15½.
	Coward.	11½-12: 13½-14: 14½-15.
Falter.		11-13: 13½-15½.
	Falter.	13-13½: 15-15½.
Fear.		12½-13: 13½-15½.
	Fear.	11-12½: 13½-14.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Boasting.		13-13½.
Bullying.		13-13½.
Confident.		13-13½.
Daring.		13-13½.
Dignity.		13-13½.
Meddlesome.		13-13½.
Overdressing.		13-13½.
Self-possessed.		13-13½.
Self-respect.		13-13½.
	Talking back.	13-13½.
	Touchiness.	13-14.
	Flattery.	13½-14½.
	Listless.	13-14½.
	Meekness.	13-13½.
Patience.		13-13½.
	Self-denial.	13-14.
	Tattling.	13-13½.
Timid.		13-13½.
	Anxiety.	13½-14.
	Cautious.	13-13½.
	Coward.	13-14.
	Foolhardy.	13-13½.
	Indiscreet.	13-13½.
Reckless.		13-13½.
	Venturesome.	13-13½.
Wary.		14½-15½.
Worry.		13-14.

## Records showing Increase in Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.

Scottish.			American.		
Boys.	Girls.	Ages.	Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Foolhardy.		11-11½: 13½-15.			
	Foolhardy.	11-12: 13-14: 14½-15½.			
Indiscreet.		12-13: 13½-15.			
	Indiscreet.	11½-12½.			
Reckless.		11-11½: 14-14½.			
	Reckless.	11½-13: 14½-15.			
Venturesome.		15-15½.			
	Venturesome.	11-12½.			
Worry.		12-12½: 13½-14.			
	Worry.	12-12½: 13-13½.			

## Records showing Decrease in Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.

Boasting.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12\frac{1}{2}:14\frac{1}{2}-15.$	Boasting.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$		
	Boasting.	$11-11\frac{1}{2}:12-13\frac{1}{2}.$	Bullying.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Bullying.	$12\frac{1}{2}-13\frac{1}{2}:14\frac{1}{2}-15.$		Confident.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
	Bullying.	$11\frac{1}{2}-13\frac{1}{2}.$	Daring.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Daring.	$12-12\frac{1}{2}.$		Dignity.	$13\frac{1}{2}-14.$	
	Daring.	$12-13:13\frac{1}{2}-14\frac{1}{2}.$	Meddlesome.	$13-15.$	
Daunting.	$12-14:14\frac{1}{2}-15.$		Overdressing.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Dignity.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12:12\frac{1}{2}-13\frac{1}{2}.$		Self-possessed.	$13-14.$	
	Dignity.	$11\frac{1}{2}-13\frac{1}{2}.$		Selfrespect.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$
	Dignity.	$12-15.$	Talking back.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Meddlesome.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12:13-13\frac{1}{2}.$		Touchiness.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
	Meddlesome.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12:12\frac{1}{2}-13.$	Self-denial.	$13-14.$	
Overdressing.	$12-13.$		Tattling.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Self-possessed.	$11-11\frac{1}{2}.$			Timid.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$
	Self-possessed.	$11\frac{1}{2}-13.$	Cautious.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Selfrespect.	$12-14.$		Coward.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
	Selfrespect.	$11-11\frac{1}{2}:12-16\frac{1}{2}.$		Fear.	$13\frac{1}{2}-14.$
Talking back.	$11\frac{1}{2}-14:14\frac{1}{2}-15\frac{1}{2}.$		Foolhardy.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Touchiness.	$11-12.$			Foresight.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$
	Touchiness.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12:12\frac{1}{2}-13.$	Indiscreet.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Backward.	$11-11\frac{1}{2}.$		Reckless.	$13\frac{1}{2}-14.$	
	Backward.	$11-13:13\frac{1}{2}-14\frac{1}{2}.$	Venturesome.	$13-13\frac{1}{2}.$	
Daydreaming.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12:13-13\frac{1}{2}.$		Wary.	$13-14.$	
	Daydreaming.	$11-11\frac{1}{2}:12-12\frac{1}{2}.$			
Flattery.	$11\frac{1}{2}-12\frac{1}{2}:13-14.$				
	Flattery.	$11-12.$			
Listless.	$11-12:12\frac{1}{2}-14\frac{1}{2}.$				
	Listless.	$12-13.$			



## Records showing Decrease in Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.

Scottish.			American.		
Boys.	Girls.	Ages.	Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Meekness.		11½-12:13-13½.			
Self denial.	Meekness.	11½-12.			
	Self denial.	12-12½.			
Shy.		11-11½.			
	Shy.	11½-14.			
Tattling.		12½-15.			
	Tattling.	12-12½:13-14.			
Timid.		12½-13½.			
	Timid.	12-15.			
Anxiety.		11½-12.			
	Anxiety.	13½-14½.			
Coward.		12-13½.			
	Coward.	12-12½.			
Falter.		11-11½:12-13½.			
	Falter.	13-13½.			
Fear.		11-12:12½-13:13½-15.			
	Fear.	11-12:13-13½.			
Foolhardy.		12½-13½:14-14½.			
	Foolhardy.	12½-13½.			
Indiscreet.		12-13:14-14½.			
	Indiscreet.	11-12:13-13½.			
Reckless.		11-11½:12½-13.			
	Reckless.	11½-14.			
Venturesome.		11-11½:13-14½.			
	Venturesome.	12-15.			
Worry.		12½-13:14-14½.			
	Worry.	12½-13:14-14½.			
	Worry.	11½-12:12½-13½.			
	Worry.	11-12:12½-13:13½-14½.			

## Records showing Increase in Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs.

Flirting.	11-11½:14-14½.	Flirting.	13-14½.
Indulgence.	11-12½:13½-15.	Ingratitude.	14-14½.
	11½-15½.	Neglect.	13-13½.
Ingratitude.	11½-12½:13½-14.	Passion.	13-13½.
	11½-13:13½-14½.	Partiality.	13-13½.
Neglect.	11-15½.	Stinginess.	13-13½.
	12½-13:13½-14½.		13½-14.
Passion.	11½-12:13-14.	Tender.	
	11-11½:12½-13:13½-14½.	Cad.	13-13½.
Stinginess.	11-11½:13-15½.	Exclusiveness.	13-13½.
	11½-13:13½-14½.		13-13½.
	11½-12:13-14.	Hermit.	13-13½.
		Intolerance.	13-14½.



## Records showing Increase in Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs.

Scottish.		
Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Cad.	Cad.	11½-12:12½-13:14-14½.
Clubs.	Clubs.	11-11½:12-14.
Gangs.	Gangs.	11½-15.
Intolerance.	Intolerance.	11½-12½:13-14:14½-16.
Prejudice.	Prejudice.	11-11½:12½-13:13½-14½.
Suerness.	Suerness.	11-12:12½-13:13½-15.
Selfishness.	Selfishness.	13½-15½.
Shrewd.	Shrewd.	12½-16.
Unsociable.	Unsociable.	13½-14½.
Anger.	Anger.	11-12:12½-13:13½-15½.
Fighting.	Fighting.	12-12½:14½-16.
Grudge.	Grudge.	11½-12:14-15½.
Indignant.	Indignant.	12½-13:13½-14½.
Rage.	Rage.	11-12:13-14½.
Revenge.	Revenge.	11-12:14-14½.
Supine.	Supine.	11-11½:12½-13:14-15.
Temper.	Temper.	11-11½:12½-13:14-15.
Unfeeling.	Unfeeling.	12½-13:14½-15.
Wrath.	Wrath.	11-11½:12½-13:13½-14½.

American.		
Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Prejudice.	Prejudice.	14-14½.
Suerness.	Suerness.	13-13½.
Selfishness.	Selfishness.	13-13½.
Shrewd.	Shrewd.	13-14.
Anger.	Anger.	13-13½.
Fighting.	Fighting.	13-13½.
Grudge.	Grudge.	13-13½.
Indignant.	Indignant.	13-13½.
Passive.	Passive.	15-15½.
Rage.	Rage.	13-13½.
Revenge.	Revenge.	13-13½.
Temper.	Temper.	13-14½.
Unfeeling.	Unfeeling.	13-13½.
Wrath.	Wrath.	13-13½.

## Records showing Decrease in Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs.

## Scottish.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Flirting.		$11\frac{1}{2} - 12\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Ingratitude.	$12 - 12\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Neglect.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Tender.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
Cad.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Intolerance.	$12 - 12\frac{1}{2}$ .
Prejudice.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
Self-sacrificing.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Shrewd.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Unsociable.	$11\frac{1}{2} - 12\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Anger.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Fighting.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Grudge.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Indignant.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
Passive.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Rage.	$11\frac{1}{2} - 12$ .
	Revenge.	$11\frac{1}{2} - 12$ .
Submissive.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
Supine.		$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Temper.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Unfeeling.	$11 - 11\frac{1}{2}$ .

## American.

Boys.	Girls.	Ages.
Flirting.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Indulgence.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Ingratitude.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Neglect.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Passion.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Partiality.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Stinginess.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Tender.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Cad.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Exclusiveness.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Gangs.	$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Hermit.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Intolerance.		$13 - 14$ .
Prejudice.		$13 - 14$ .
Queerness.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Selfishness.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
	Unsociable.	$13\frac{1}{2} - 14$ .
Anger.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Grudge.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Rage.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Revenge.		$13 - 13\frac{1}{2}$ .
Submissive.		$13 - 14$ .
Supine.		$13 - 14$ .
Temper.		$13 - 14$ .
Unfeeling.		$13 - 15$ .

## Question II, 2.

From the percentages on the scroll record of Questions II, 1, 2, and 3, graphs were constructed showing the percentages of each sex, age, and nationality underlining the various words considered "worst". See Graphs 65 to 76.

Then results were gathered showing at what ages the highest percentages of the various groupings of children (Scottish boys, Scottish girls, American boys, and American girls) marked the various "wrongs" as "worst". The table of results follows on pages 379, 380, and 381.

Thus, for example, it was at 11 years that the largest percentage of Scottish boys considered "bullying", "flattery", "anxiety", and "fear" as the worst of the list presented to them; at 12 years, the largest percentage of Scottish boys said "talking back" and "reckless" were worst; and so forth.

Records showing at which ages the highest percentages of children voted the various "wrongs" to be the "worst" ones.

### Scottish Children.

#### Self-regarding Wrongs.

Age.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
------	-------	----------------------	--------	----------------------

11. Bullying.  
Flattery.  
Anxiety.  
Fear.

4.

Boasting.  
Meddlesome.  
Overdressing.  
Talking back.  
Praise.

5.

11½.

Self-possessed.  
Flattery.

0.

2.

12. Talking back.  
Reckless.

2.

Bullying.

1.

12½.

0.

0.

13.

0.

Reckless.

1.

13½.

0.

Daydreaming.

1.

14. Meddlesome.

1.

0.

14½. Boasting.

1.

0.

#### Socialization Wrongs.

Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
-------	----------------------	--------	----------------------

Anger.

1.

Selfishness.  
Fighting.  
Grudge.  
Indignant.

4.

Selfishness.  
Grudge.

2.

Rage.

1.

Gangs.

0.

1.

Revenge.

0.

Flirting.

1.

0.

0.

Temper.

0.

1.

Anger.

0.

1.

Flirting.  
Cad.  
Clubs.  
Exclusiveness.  
Gangs.  
Intolerance.  
Unsociable.  
Fighting.  
Rage.

9.

Ingratitude.  
Stinginess.  
Revenge.  
Unfeeling.

4.



Records showing at which ages the highest percentages of children voted the various "wrongs" to be the "worst" ones.

15. Overdressing. Tattling. Coward. Foolhardy.	4.	0.	3.	2.
15½. Listless.	Tattling. Coward. Fear. Indiscreet.	Ingratitude. Neglect. Passion. Temper. Wrath.	Neglect. Passion. Intolerance.	
	1.	4.	5.	3.

### American Children.

Ages.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
13.	Boasting. Confident. Backward. Daydreaming. Meekness. Tattling. Venturesome.	7.	Meddlesome. Touchiness. Reckless.	3.	Flirting. Ingratitude. Passion. Stinginess. Tender. Selfishness. Grudge.	7.	Neglect.	1.
13½.	Meddlesome. Touchiness. Shy. Timid. Anxiety. Reckless.	6.	Talking back.	1.	Wrath.	1.	Flirting.	1.
14.	Coward.	1.	Boasting. Bullying.	2.	Cad. Revenge.	2.	Gangs. Selfishness. Unsociable.	3.

Records showing at which ages the highest percentages of children voted the various "wrongs" to be the "worst" ones.

## Self-regarding Wrongs.

Ages.	Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
14½	Bullying. Talking back. Foolhardy.	3.	Daring. Daydreaming.	2.
15.	Listless.	1.		0.
15½		0	Self-possessed. Backward. Shy. Timid. Cautious. Coward. Venturesome.	7.
16.		0	Flattery. Tattling. Indiscreet.	3.

## Socialization Wrongs.

Boys.	no. of Traits	Girls.	no. of Traits
		Temper.	1.
Fighting. Temper.	0. 2.	Ingratitude.	1.
Neglect. Clubs. Intolerance. Jealousness. Rage.		Jealousness. Grudge.	
	5.		2.
Gangs. Shrewd. Unsociable. Anger. Unfeeling.		Stinginess. Cad. Anger. Fighting. Rage. Revenge.	
	5.		6.

## Question II, 3.

The tests given to the American children furnished no results for this question.

In this question, "least bad" means "best", because the children were directed to mark none of the words which they had marked before, either as "bad" or as "worst". In the case of both the boys and the girls, the traits which were marked by the various ages were self-regarding traits.

The results were graphed. See Graph 77.

The record of the results follows on page 383.

*Confident*  
*self-regarding*  
*Reliance*  
*Confident*  
*self-regarding*  
*Reliance*

Records showing at which ages the highest percentages of children voted the various "wrongs" to be the "least bad" ones.

### Self-regarding Traits.

Ages.	Boys.	no. of Traits.	Girls.	no. of Traits.
11.		0.		0.
11½.		0.		0.
12.		0.		0.
12½.		0.		0.
13.		0.		0.
13½.		0.		0.
14.		0.		0.
14½. Dignity.		1.		0.
15. Self respect.		1.		0.
15½. Patience. Confident.		2.	Confident. Dignity. Self respect. Patience.	4.



## Question III.

For this question, the table of percentage-results from the scroll record follows on page 385.

The figures underneath the respective ages are the percentages of the boys and girls choosing the various reasons, as they are numbered in the test from "1" to "8". The American percentages are inserted at their proper places in pencil instead of ink.

Thus, for example, at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years: no boys, either Scottish or American, chose answer "1"; 4% of the American girls chose "1"; 7% of the Scottish boys chose "2"; 10% of the American boys chose "2"; 2% of the Scottish girls and 12% of the American girls chose "2"; and so forth.

The results of Question III were graphed. See Graphs 78 and 79.

"Why should you be Good?"

No. of the answer.	Age.	11.	11½.	12.	12½.	13.	13½.	14.	14½.	15.	15½.	16.	16½.
1.	Boys.	0	0	0	0	.01	0 0	0 0	.04 0	0 .06	.03 0	0 0	0 0 0
	Girls.	.06	0	0	.01	0 0	.01 0 0	0 0	.04 .02	0 0	0 0	0 0	0
2.	Boys.	0	0	.02	.08	.01	.10 .05	.08 .10	.08 .07	.10 .06	.06 0	.05 0	.18 .50 0
	Girls.	.03	.03	.01	0	.03	.04 .02 0	.10	.12 .02	.12 .02	.06 0	.28 .14	.14 .25 .11
3.	Boys.	.09	0	.10	.15	.24	.30 .07 .08	.10 0	.28	.05 .18	.13 0	.05 .16	.06 0 .42
	Girls.	.03	.14	.06	.05	.08	.12 .08 .08 .02	.02 .07	0 .09	.09 .06	0 0	.07 0	.11
4.	Boys.	.69	.84	.66	.59	.66	.40 .64 .48 .58	.52 .63 .40	.54 .42 .63	.50 .33	.60 .50	0	
	Girls.	.78	.70	.62	.93	.77	.60 .81 .64 .66	.48 .78	.52 .67 .45	.66 .63	.63 .70	.36 .55	
5.	Boys.	.03	.0	.14	.01	.05	.10 .04 .32 .06	.24 0	.05 0	.03 0	.10 0	.12 0	.14
	Girls.	0	.03	.01	.05	.05	.04 .05 .08 .08	.18 0	.08 .11	.16 .06	.07 .14	.07 .25	.11
6.	Boys.	.06	.11	.06	.07	.06	0 .04 0 .10	0 .07 .05 .12	.06 .09	0 .16	.06 0	0	
	Girls.	.03	.03	.05	.06	.05	0 .03 .04 .10	.06 .05 .08 .12	0 .18	0 .28	.14 .25	0	
7.	Boys.	0	0	0	.02	.01	0 .01 0 .02	.04 0	.05 0	.03 .09	.20 0	0 0 0	
	Girls.	.06	.03	0	.03	.01	.04 .01 0 .01	.04 0	.08 0	0 0	0 0	0 0 0	
8.	Boys.	0	.08	.02	.10	.11	0 .16 0 .14	0 0	0 .12	0 .09	0 0	0 0 0	
	Girls.	0	.03	.11	.03	.07	0 .05 0 .05	0 .02	0 0	0 0	0 .14	0 .12	0

In Question III there was given opportunity to write in an original answer. There follow herewith some typical answers.

#### Scottish Boys.

13½ years: If I am good at my work my teacher will give me a good character.

13½ years: Because when I am good I think of it and know I am pleasing God and then I have a better feeling inside myself.

13 years: When I am good my parents are proud of me.

13 years: By being good I am fulfilling my work and showing an example to others.

12½ years: If you are good your conscience does not trouble you, therefore you are able to face the world without flinching.

12½ years: If you are good and applying for work the employer asks certain questions and if you turn out to be bad then you don't get the job but if you are good you get the job.

12½ years: We can look the whole world in the face.

12 years: Because when you are good you can help other people. When you are good you are willing to run errands.

12 years: If I was bad I would hurt God and I would go to "Hell". When you are good and please God you go to "Heaven".

#### Scottish Girls.

15½ years: I know my dead mother would like me to be good like herself.

14 years: When I am good, I know I am good, I respect myself.

16½ years: When I am good I feel better inside, as I have a clear conscience. There is no reason why everybody should not be good.

14 years: When I am good, I am helping children younger than myself, because young children especially try to imitate older people.

16½ years: Because it pleases those I love best in this world, besides pleasing God.

16 years: A good person is an example to others.

16 years: If you are good it pleases you to think that perhaps if someone takes an example from you, they will not have a bad one to get.

15 years: I should be good because we are here to make the very best of our life. Besides, it is selfish to be otherwise, as we are hurting others.

14½ years: I should be good because it is everybody's first and foremost aim in life and also every one's duty.

13½ years: Because it might make other people bad if we didn't try to be good too.

13 years: When you are bad your conscience troubles you.

13 years: When I am good luck comes my way.

12½ years: I should be good because I was made to be good.

12 years: When I am bad I feel worried and afraid.

12½ years: If I am good my mother thinks more of me.



## American Boys.

13½ years: I should be good because God, my mother, and father, and every one else would respect me more.

13½ years: Because there are those who trust me.

13 years: It is not friends who decide your after life, but it is GOD.

14 years: When I am good, I seem to get along better with everybody.

15 years: It pleases God when you are good, for He put you here to be good and wants you to be that way.

15½ years: Because it does please God and everybody else.

16 years: There is one yet better than number 4 - that is, I am good because of ammother's trust and love.

16½ years: If I want to get along, I must obey my mother and father and respect old folks at all times. (Coloured boy).

## American Girls.

15½ years: Because when I am good, the world is full of sunshine.

15½ years: The Lord wishes for all to love one another so when we die he will take us to Heaven on high. (coloured).

15 years: So that I may have other friends.

15 years: If you are good and it pleases God, every one else will think well of you.

14½ years: When I am good, it pleases God, and he will do things to please me. And I will be more happy.

14 years: Because it not only pleases the Heavenly Father,

but it pleases all and the ones that RESPECT you.

14 years: When I am good my mother respects me more.

13 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: Because people will like you better and think more of you. And God shall think more of you.

13 years: I think you get to go more places. (Coloured girl ).

#### Question IV.

The replies to the question "What do you think it means to be good?" fell into ten groups:

- 1.Obedience to superiors, parents, teachers, etc.
- 2.The religious meaning, such as obedience to God, follow Christ, etc.
- 3.Concrete specifications, mostly prohibitions, such as "do not lie", "do not steal", etc.
- 4.Abstractions, such as "do what is right","don't sin", etc.
- 5.Platitudes, such as "be pure in thought, word, and act", etc.
- 6.An altruistic meaning, such as "help others".
- 7.Enlargements and prolonged explanations.
- 8.Public approval, such as "to have a good reputation".
- 9.Self-respect, such as "you are not ashamed to look people in the face".
- 10.Approval of conscience, expressed in such ways as "to be good is to have a clear conscience", "to do what you think is right", etc.

A section of the percentage-results from the scroll record of Question IV follows on page 390.

"What does it mean to be good?"

Ages. 11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$ . 12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$ . 13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

1. Submit.

Boys. .30 .28 .34 .22 .38 .20 .25 .08 .30 .06 .21 .10 .30 .10 0 .05 .06 0 0 .14

Girls. .42 .33 .33 .35 .42 .08 .41 .20 .42 .26 .33 .16 .14 .13 .06 .14 .07 .07 0 .11

2. Religious.

Boys. .27 .24 .10 .21 .26 0 .24 0 .10 .08 .10 .15 .56 .07 .42 0 .18 .12 .16 .14

Girls. .24 .30 .20 .28 .21 .16 .27 .20 .23 .12 .59 .16 .26 .13 .42 .07 .33 .21 0 0

3. Concrete

Boys

Girls.

Etc.

Thus, for example, at the age 13: 38% of the Scottish boys, 20% of the American boys, 42% of the Scottish girls, and 8% of the American girls, gave submission to their elders as the meaning which "being good" had for them, their content of morality. At the same age, 26% of the Scottish boys, none of the American boys, 21% of the Scottish girls, and 16% of the American girls gave as their meaning of "being good", to "obey God", or some other similar religious criterion.

These results of Question IV were graphed. See Graphs 80 and 81.

There follow some typical answers to this question.

Scottish Boys.

15 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: To be good in the sight of God. To do what you think is right.

15 years: To do what one thinks he will not regret afterwards. To do what one thinks one's conscience will not prick him for doing it. To be obedient to your father and mother.

14 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: If we are not good we will feel very unhappy.

14. years: To be good is to have a clear conscience.

13 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: To keep doing what you think God likes and not to do what you think is good because other people think so.

13 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: To be good is to behave yourself and respect other people and do what you think is correct.

13 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: To be obedient when it is right.

13 years: To be good is to please God and to serve our fellows.

12 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: To be good means to do everything pleasing



in the sight of God and do nothing you will be ashamed of.

12½ years: To be pure in thought, word, and act, and to love and obey God and parents. To be unselfish and goodnatured.

12 years: To be happy and helpful and honest.

11 years: To be good is to be unselfish, generous, forgiving, sympathetic and obedient.

Scottish Girls.

17 years: To do what one's conscience tells one.

16½ years: When you are good you know you are good, and will be much respected.

16 years: To try to do everything in a straightforward way and not say or do anything which you would be ashamed of or which would be unpleasant to anyone.

16 years: To have nothing on your conscience to fear.

16 years: To be honourable and honoured by other people. You have no bad points against your name.

15½ years: To do what your instinct tells you is the right thing.

15½ years: Never to mind what other people think about you, but to do just what you yourself think is right.

14 years: To do what one thinks is right and what would please God. Not to tell lies, and help others to be good.

13 years: To be obedient and do things which you think will please God and your parents. Not to think wrong of anyone and to try and keep a clear conscience.

12½ years: To be good is to be kind to other people, to help those who are worse off than yourself, to obey your

elders, and have a clear conscience.

11 years: To obey and do what you are told.  
American Boys.

13 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: It means you feel better and your friends respect you more.

14 years: It means a place in the world among men.

14 years: Do the best you can at all times.

14 years: By being good it means to have a good clean spirit. Get everything out of life there is to be gotten, and don't forget your friends.

15 years: You have an easy feeling.

15 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: If you are good you please everyone, make life more comfortable, and you get along better in the world.

14 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: When you are good you are kind to everyone you meet, even you enemies. To obey your parents and God.

14 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: Follow the Golden Rule.

American Girls.

16 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: It means to be friendly to everybody and not to do the things that are wrong. When you get so old you ought to know right from wrong.

16 years: Good means to have respect for yourself and if you aren't good it all goes upon your reputation.

15 years: It means you have some self-respect for yourself and others. And any one can trust you.

15 years: To obey and do things you would do in front of anybody.

14 $\frac{1}{2}$  years: You should respect your name.

14 years: Being good is to do the things which you know are right. And doing unto others as you would have them do unto you.

13½ years: To be good it means to obey all of your teachers, to be respectful, kind. When you are good, and can say you are, you have accomplished something.

13 years: To be good means to do what is right because you want to and not because you fear punishment.

13 years: It means you have some respect for yourself and for others.

#### Conclusions.

#### Question I,1.

Girls, both Scottish and American, customarily choose men as their ideals more than the boys choose women. Scottish girls show this tendency more than do the American girls. See Graphs 1 and 2.

As experiences multiply, the children's interest spread increases, and the field from which ideals are chosen shows a corresponding broadening; ideals are the synthesizations of experienced goods. See pages 359 to 362.

Desirable traits are ascribed by the children to their hero-ideals whether these latter possess those traits or not. As the children advance in years and experience, the degree of this naive idealization decreases, and they, with more exactness and care ascribe to their ideals fewer and more carefully selected traits. See pages 359 to 362.

#### Question I,2.

Graphs 11, 12, 13, and 14 show the ages at which the

various traits manifest their highest percentages of choice by the children. These graphs show a pubertal disturbance in the development of moral ideas: in the case of the Scottish boys, no year between 13 and  $14\frac{1}{2}$  inclusive shows any self-regarding trait as having received the highest average of choice; in the case of the Scottish girls, the years 13 to 15 show the same phenomenon; that is, for the Scottish children, a pubertal disturbance seems to extend from about 13 to 15 years. In the case of the socialization traits, this spread for boys is  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, and for girls, 13 to 15 years. In the case of the American children: for the boys, the self-regarding traits show the pubertal disturbance from 14 to 15 years, with a strange exception at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, which maintains throughout the test; for the socialization traits, the boys manifest the pubertal disturbance from 14 to 16 years, with the same exception at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years; in the case of the American girls, the socialization traits show the disturbance at 14 to 15 years, with a very few scattering exceptions. It appears that between the years 13 and 15, both Scottish and American children show a pubertal disturbance in the development in moral ideas.

At the earlier ages of 11 and 12 years, the children light upon traits which are customary, trite, socially approved, "orthodox", such as "good", "helpful", "kind", and "loving". It is only at later ages that they become sensitive to such traits as "morally brave", "persevering", "self-sacrificing" - traits which are experienced later, noticed later in other



people, traits to choose which presupposes a wider experience and more thoughtfulness than the former ones.

#### Question I, 2.

In the case of Scottish boys, the percentages of choice show an increase, between the years  $13\frac{1}{2}$  and 14, in 17 traits, namely, beautiful, famous, firm, influential, brave, persevering, good, humble, unselfish, gentle, humane, self-sacrificing, honest, honoured, patriotic, sociable, and solitary. Between the same years, there is a decrease in the percentages of 14 traits, namely, athletic, brave, strong, wealthy, cautious, modest, obedient, steadfast, aid, charitable, kind, cheerful, courteous, and obliging. During the year 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$ , there was an increase in the percentages of 12 traits, namely, athletic, brave, cautious, good, humble, peaceful, temperate, aid, forgiving, helpful, friendly, and honest: and there was a decrease in the percentages of 26 traits. During the period  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years, there was an increase in the percentages of 27 traits, and a decrease in those of 14 traits. See Graphs 3 to 6, supplemented by 15, 17, 19, and 21.

In the case of Scottish girls, from the same graphs, it appears that there is an increase in the percentages of 6 traits between 13 and  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, 9 traits between  $13\frac{1}{2}$  and 14, 11 traits between 14 and  $14\frac{1}{2}$ , and 31 traits between  $14\frac{1}{2}$  and 15: there is a decrease in 34 traits between 13 and  $13\frac{1}{2}$ , 34 traits between  $13\frac{1}{2}$  and 14, 34 traits between 14 and  $14\frac{1}{2}$ , and 6 traits between  $14\frac{1}{2}$  and 15.

The table of the increases and decreases in these percentages for the Scottish children follows on page 397.

number of traits showing Increase and also decrease in their percentages, during the years of Pubertal disturbances.

Scottish Children.

years.	Boys.		Girls.	
	no. of traits with Increased Percentages.	no. of traits with Decreased Percentages.	no. of traits with Increased Percentages.	no. of traits with Decreased Percentages.
13-13½.			6.	34.
13½-14.	17.	14.	9.	34.
14-14½.	12.	26.	11.	34.
14½-15.	27.	14.	31.	6.

From the table on page 397, it is seen that, in the case of the Scottish boys, the ratio between the number of increased percentages and the number of decreased percentages is smallest at the age 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, that is, 12 to 26. The conclusion is, that for the Scottish boys, the pubertal disturbance in the case of the development of moral ideas, is at its height at the age 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years.

The corresponding ratio for the Scottish girls is 6 to 34, at the age 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years. The pubertal disturbance in the case of the Scottish girls is at its height at the age 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, a year precedent to the boys.

In the case of the American children, the table showing the same phenomenon follows on page 399.

In the case of the American boys, the ratio between the number of traits with an increased percentage and the number with a decreased percentage is smallest at the age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years. The conclusion is, that the pubertal disturbance in the development of moral ideas is, in the case of the American boys, at its height at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years.

In the case of the American girls, this ratio is smallest, that is, 4 to 9, at the age 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years. Our conclusion is, that, for the American girls, the pubertal disturbance in the development of moral ideas is at its height at the age 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, a good year precedent to the American boys.

For the American results, see Graphs 7 to 10, supplemented by 16, 18, 20, and 22.

number of traits showing Increase and also Decrease in their percentages, during the years of Pubertal Disturbance.

# American Children.

## Boys.

## Girls.

Years.	no. of Traits with Increased Percentages.	no. of Traits with Decreased Percentages.	no. of Traits with Increased Percentages.	no. of Traits with Decreased Percentages.
13-13½.	1.	2.	4.	9.
13½-14.	7.	12.	8.	13.
14-14½.	26.	7.	12.	16.
14½-15.	8.	31.	13.	24.



## Question I,3.

Is this pubertal disturbance which is manifest in the choice of characteristics the children like, also shown in their choice of preferred traits? That is, does Question I,3, as well as Question I,2, show this disturbance?

Graphs 31, 32, 33, and 34 show the ages at which the greatest percentages of children chose the various traits. There is here manifested again a paucity of high percentages at or near puberty. In the case of the Scottish boys, the self-regarding traits show the disturbance at 12 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years - that is, there is at those years a lack of sensitivity to those traits. There is an exception to be noted here, namely, at 14 years. In the case of the socialization traits, the lack of sensitivity or the pubertal disturbance is shown at 12 to 14 years.

For the Scottish girls, the self-regarding traits show the disturbance at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years; and the socialization traits show it at 13 to 14 years.

For the American boys, the pubertal lack of sensitivity is shown to the self-regarding traits at 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, and to the socialization traits at 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years.

For the American girls, the disturbance is shown by the self-regarding traits at 14 to 15 years ( where again the exception of the age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  is noticeable ), and by the socialization traits at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years.

Our conclusion is, that in their choice of "preferred traits", as well as in their choice of "liked traits", the

children show a disturbance, at or near puberty, in the development of moral ideas.

Graphs 3 to 10 show that the curves of the girls' results are more regular than those of the boys': the boys show a greater individual variation, their development seems to be more irregular than that of the girls; the girls seem to develop more smoothly than the boys.

From Graph 48 it is to be drawn that the pubertal disturbance, in the case of traits regarded as "wrong", is manifest, but not so clearly and consistently as in the case of traits which the children voted as "liking" and "preferring". Scottish boys, in the self-regarding wrongs, tend to show the disturbance at the age  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to 14 years; in the socialization wrongs, at 12 to 14 years. The Scottish girls, in self-regarding wrongs, show the disturbance at 13 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years; in the socialization wrongs, at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to 14 years. The American boys, in the self-regarding wrongs, show the disturbance at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years; and in the socialization wrongs, at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years. The American girls, in wrongs related to self-regard, show the disturbance at 15 years; in wrongs related to socialization, at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years.

Our conclusion is, that the pubertal disturbance is manifest in the results of Question II,1, but not so clearly and consistently as in those of Question I,2. The sensitivity to wrongs shows less clearly and with less chronological exactness and consistency, the pubertal disturbance, than did the record of the development of the sensitivity to desirable traits.

Which, if either, develops first - sensitivity to traits having to do with self-regard, or those bearing upon socialization? From Graphs 15 and 17, it is seen that from 12 to  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years, in the case of Scottish boys, 2 traits of self-regard show an increase in sensitivity, and no traits of socialization; at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years to 13 years, 1 trait of self-regard and none of socialization, and so forth. The record of the traits which show the increases in sensitivity, follows on page 403, for the Scottish children, and 404 for the American. The graphs for the American results are 16 and 18.

From the tables on pages 403 and 404, we draw the following conclusions.

Scottish boys show sensitivity to self-regarding traits earlier than to those of socialization. Sensitivity to the latter begins immediately after the height of pubertal disturbance has been reached and passed, that is, at the age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years. However, the development of the two overlap, and the greatest step in the development of sensitivity to self-regarding traits synchronizes with the greatest step in the development of sensitivity to socialization traits.

Scottish girls show gradual development of sensitivity to both self-regarding and socialization traits until the age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, when sensitivity to socialization traits takes its first big step in development.

The age  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years seems to be a crucial year.

Self-regarding sensitivity tends to precede socialization sensitivity.

Record of the Traits, sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

Scottish Children.

Boys.

Years.	no. of Traits	
	Self-regard.	Socialization.
12-12½.	2.	0.
12½-13.	1.	0.
13-13½.	1.	0.
13½-14.	4.	0.
14-14½.	6.	0.
14½-15.	13.	6.
15-15½.	13.	8.
15½-16.	7.	8.

Girls.

	no. of Traits	
	Self-regard.	Socialization.
	2.	2.
	3.	2.
	4.	3.
	5.	3.
	7.	4.
	11.	20.
	11.	21.
	6.	18.



Record of the Traits sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

## American Children.

### Boys.

Years.	$\frac{\text{no. of Traits}}{\text{Self-regard.}}$	$\frac{\text{no. of Traits}}{\text{Socialization.}}$
13-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	0.	1.
13 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14.	6.	1.
14-14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	14.	12.
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15.	3.	5.
15-15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	10.	6.
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ -16.	5.	7.

### Girls.

$\frac{\text{no. of Traits}}{\text{Self-regard.}}$	$\frac{\text{no. of Traits}}{\text{Socialization.}}$
2.	2.
5.	3.
9.	3.
5.	8.
5.	18.
16.	6.

From the tables on pages 403 and 404, the following conclusions are to be drawn with respect to the American children.

American boys show an increase in sensitivity to self-regarding traits from  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years onward; the increase in sensitivity to socialization traits begins at 14 years. Both increases show the pubertal disturbance at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years. From  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years upward, sensitivity to socialization traits develops gradually, also more steadily than sensitivity to the self-regarding traits.

American girls show the pubertal disturbance at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years in both sensitivity to self-regarding traits and also sensitivity to socialization traits. Sensitivity to self-regarding traits develops a bit earlier than that to socialization traits. The latter develops suddenly after  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years - that is, after pubertal disturbance.

All children, Scottish and American, showed a development to traits of socialization following immediately upon the period of pubertal disturbance. Sensitivity to self-regarding traits develops earlier than sensitivity to socialization traits. During the period of pubertal disturbance, such traits as symbolize active beneficence to the degree, for example, of self-sacrifice, are less numerous than self-regarding traits such as beautiful, dashing, wealthy, and such simpler socialized traits as honesty, generous, helpful, and merciful.

Question II, 1.

Which, if either, develops first - sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs or sensitivity to socialization wrongs? That is, do the findings based upon Question II,1, agree with those based upon Question I,2 ?

Graphs 49, 50, 53, and 54 are the basis for our conclusions here regarding the Scottish children, and Graphs 57, 58, 61, and 62 for the conclusions regarding the American. On pages 407 and 408 are the records of the wrongs, sensitivity to which shows an increase at the various ages. From these tables, we draw the following conclusions.

Scottish boys increase in sensitivity to both self-regarding wrongs and socialization wrongs up to the age of  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, and then show a decrease. Scottish girls show a corresponding disturbance at 14 years. Here again there is manifested the pubertal disturbance.

Scottish boys, at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, show a sharp increase in sensitivity to wrongs, but the girls seem to be already sensitized at 13 years. Here there may be a basis for suspecting the manifestation of conscience.

The conclusions from Question II, 1, neither support nor refute the conclusion that sensitivity to self-regarding traits develops before that to socialization traits.

Record of Wrongs, sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

## Scottish Children.

Boys.			Girls.	
Years.	no. of Self-regarding Wrongs.	no. of Socialization Wrongs.	no. of Self-regarding Wrongs.	no. of Socialization Wrongs.
13-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	1.	2.	8.	11.
13 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14.	13.	16.	12.	17.
14-14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	17.	22.	7.	13.
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15.	13.	7.	15.	13.
15-15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	10.	5.	11.	9.
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ -16.	1.	0.	1.	6.



Record of Wrongs, sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

# American Children.

Years.	Boys.		Girls.	
	no. of self-regarding Wrongs.	no. of socialization Wrongs.	no. of self-regarding Wrongs.	no. of socialization Wrongs.
13-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	5.	2.	19.	19.
13 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14.	1.	2.	6.	3.
14-14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	0.	0.	2.	5.
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15.	1.	0.	0.	0.
15-15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	1.	2.	0.	0.
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ -16.	0.	0.	0.	0.

From the table on page 408, the following conclusion regarding the American children can be drawn.

American boys, and to a slight degree American girls, show an earlier development in sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs than in sensitivity to socialization wrongs.

Our next problem is, "Which, if either, boys or girls, develop sensitivity to wrongs first, considering again both wrongs relating to self-regard and those relating to socialization?"

Graphs 49 and 50 for the Scottish children, and 57 and 58 for the American, furnish the basis for the following conclusions, regarding the self-regarding wrongs.

Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in the development of sensitivity in 8 traits; Scottish girls precede the boys in the development of sensitivity in 10 traits. American boys precede American girls in developing sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs in 6 cases; American girls precede American boys in 21 traits.

It seems that in the development of a sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs, girls precede the boys.

Graphs 53 and 54 for the Scottish children, and 61 and 62 for the American, are the basis for the following conclusions regarding the development of sensitivity to socialization wrongs.

Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in developing sensitivity to socialization wrongs in 10 cases. Scottish girls precede the boys in 6 cases. Here is a lone case of

reversal of precedence.

American boys precede American girls in developing sensitivity to 5 wrongs. American girls precede American boys in developing sensitivity to 21 wrongs.

The conclusion is, that in the American results, the girls ran true to form in preceding the boys in the development - in this case, the development of sensitivity to socialization wrongs. In the Scottish results, there is a reversal of the customary precedence - the boys preceding the girls in developing a sensitivity to a larger number of wrongs.

Our next problem is, "Which, if either, boys or girls, precede in the loss of sensitivity to wrongs, considering both self-regarding and socialization wrongs?".

Graphs 51 and 52 for the Scottish children, and 59 and 60 for the American, are the basis for our conclusions regarding the loss of sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs.

Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in decrease of sensitivity to 7 wrongs. Scottish girls precede Scottish boys in decrease of sensitivity in the case of 16 wrongs.

American boys precede American girls in decreased sensitivity to 19 wrongs, and American girls preceded American boys in 4 cases.

That is, in the loss of sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs, Scottish girls precede Scottish boys, but American boys precede American girls. American girls attain this sensitivity earlier, and retain it longer than, American boys.

Graphs 55 and 56 for the Scottish children, and 63 and 64 for the American, are the basis for our conclusions regarding the precedence in the loss of sensitivity to socialization wrongs.

Scottish boys precede Scottish girls in a decrease in sensitivity to socialization wrongs in 8 cases. Scottish girls precede the boys in loss of sensitivity to 14 wrongs.

American boys precede American girls in a decreased sensitivity to 23 wrongs relating to socialization. American girls lose this sensitivity first in 2 cases.

The conclusion is that Scottish girls precede Scottish boys, but American boys precede American girls in a decrease in sensitivity to socialization wrongs.

Collecting the data regarding the priority of development in the case of boys and girls, it is to be said that girls precede the boys as follows:

1. In development of interest spread, as shown in their choices of heroes.
2. In the appearance of the pubertal disturbance.
3. In increase in sensitivity to self-regarding traits.
4. In increase in sensitivity to socialization traits.
5. In increase in sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs.

Boys precede the girls in one instance, namely, American boys precede American girls in loss of sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs and socialization wrongs.

The general conclusion is that girls precede boys in



development, except that American boys lose sensitivity to wrongs before American girls.

Question I,4.

Based upon the Scottish results, Graph 35, we draw the following conclusions.

Of the boys of  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, the age of greatest pubertal disturbance, a decreased number report that they would choose Jesus as their ideal if they did it over; and increased number recoil from His sufferings, popular hatred, and shortened life. A decreased number report themselves ashamed to name Jesus as their ideal. A decreased number say they admire another more, or that He was too mild, or not manly enough.

At 15 years, there is a decided upward curve in the number who report Him as an acceptable ideal if He is brought to their attention.

In the case of the girls, at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, the age of the greatest pubertal disturbance, a slightly decreased number say they would choose Jesus if they did it over.

Question II,2.

Our next problem is, "Which develops first, sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs voted the "worst", or sensitivity to socialization wrongs voted the "worst" ?. Based upon Graphs 65 to 76, is the following table of "worsts", sensitivity to which shows an increase at the various ages. See next page, 413, for the Scottish, and page 414 for the American table.

Record of "worsts", sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

### Scottish Children.

Boys.			Girls.		
Years.	no. of Self-regarding "worsts".	no. of Socialization "worsts".	no. of Self-regarding "worsts".	no. of Socialization "worsts".	
11-11 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	4.	1.	5.	4.	
11 $\frac{1}{2}$ -12.	0.	2.	2.	1.	
12-12 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	3.	0.	1.	1.	
12 $\frac{1}{2}$ -13.	0.	1.	0.	1.	
13-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	0.	0.	1.	0.	
13 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14.	0.	0.	1.	1.	
14-14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	1.	0.	0.	1.	
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15.	1.	9.	0.	4.	
15-15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	4.	3.	0.	2.	
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ -16.	1.	5.	4.	3.	

Record of "worsts", sensitivity to which shows an Increase at the various ages.

### American Children.

Years.	Boys.		Girls.	
	no. of self regarding "worsts".	no. of socialization "worsts".	no. of self regarding "worsts".	no. of socialization "worsts".
13-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	7.	7.	3.	1.
13 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14.	6.	1.	1.	1.
14-14 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	1.	2.	2.	3.
14 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15.	3.	0.	2.	1.
15-15 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	1.	2.	0.	1.
15 $\frac{1}{2}$ -16.	0.	5.	7.	2.
16-16 $\frac{1}{2}$ .	0.	5.	3.	6.

From these tables are drawn the following conclusions. Scottish boys and girls both develop sensitivity to self-regarding "worsts" earlier than to socialization "worsts". In the development of this sensitivity, the Scottish girls precede the Scottish boys.

The same conclusion follows in the case of the American children.

In the case of both the Scottish and American children, there is manifest a tendency toward lack of sensitivity at or near puberty. The pubertal disturbance is not clearly defined, but it is faintly discernible.

#### Question II,3.

Graph 77 shows the developing sensitivity toward the "wrongs" which are voted to be the "least bad".

The conclusion arrived at from the graphs is, that at the age when the tests stop, Scottish children have not yet developed to the point of view of active positive self-sacrificing beneficence, which would include such traits as generosity, friendly, tender, affectionate, devoted. The traits voted the "least bad", that is, those voted the "best", are all self-regarding traits.

#### Question III.

Graph 78 for the Scottish children, and 79 for the American, are the basis for our conclusions as to the ethical motive active in the children's minds.

The conclusions for the Scottish children are the following.



In the case of the boys, it is at 14 years that conscience is given most frequently as a motive for morality.

Girls begin to name conscience as a motive at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, after which it increases in frequency as a motive. That is, it becomes frequent at the time of the pubertal disturbance.

Boys give worldly success as a motive to a larger extent than do the girls. This motive is high at the age of the greatest pubertal disturbance, both in the case of the boys and in that of the girls.

Girls are higher in the religious motive than are the boys.

The religious motive shows a tendency to decrease as age increases.

In the case of the girls, conscience and social approval increase as motives with the increase in age.

In the case of boys, all motives tend to fall up to 16 years. Basing our conjecture upon the cases we have, we may say that after 16 years, boys again tend to develop the motives of conscience and religion.

In the case of girls, conscience and social approval are the motives which rise after all have fallen.

During the period of the pubertal disturbance, the motives which are active are: for the girls, punishment, and success, with religion secondary; for the boys, success, with religion and conscience secondary.

The conclusions for the American children are the following.

Boys give conscience as a motive after the period of

pubertal disturbance, that is, after  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years. It is then a secondary motive only.

During pubertal disturbance, worldly success is the boys' greatest motive. Religion and social approval as motives are both low.

The Religious motive is higher in the case of the girls than with the boys.

Girls give conscience as a motive after  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, that is, after the pubertal disturbance. A second rise comes at about  $15\frac{1}{2}$  years.

Boys give success as a motive more than do the girls.

Boys give social approval as a motive to a decreasing degree up to and through the period of pubertal disturbance.

Girls give as motives during the pubertal disturbance, success, religion, and social approval.

#### Question IV.

The results of this question are graphed - 80 for the Scottish children, and 81 for the American. The conclusions to be drawn are the following.

In the case of the Scottish boys.

As a content of the good, external authority falls off all along the way, showing a sudden drop after pubertal disturbance. The religious content is low during pubertal disturbance, after which it shows a sudden rise.

Altruism as a content falls off during pubertal disturbance.

Self-respect develops as a content very slowly all the way.

Conscience as a content of morality develops after a decrease at the pubertal disturbance.

In the case of the Scottish girls.

Obedience as a content of being good begins to fall at 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years, that is, at about the time of the pubertal disturbance.

The religious content shows a sudden rise after the pubertal disturbance.

Public approval is higher than in the case of the boys.

Self-respect as a content is low at the pubertal disturbance.

After that it develops.

Conscience as a content is higher than in the case of the boys.

It rises somewhat sharply after the pubertal disturbance.

In the case of both boys and girls, external authority as a content of the moral life drops after the pubertal disturbance; and the religious content and conscience both rise after the pubertal disturbance.

The conclusions for the American boys are the following. External authority gradually vanishes as a content of the moral life.

The religious content is high at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, but then, that is, after the pubertal disturbance, it drops away.

Altruism rises after the pubertal disturbance.

Self-respect begins to drop away as a content at the time of the pubertal disturbance.

Conscience as a content is absent during the pubertal disturbance, after which it rises.

The conclusions for the American girls are the following.

Obedience to external authority as the content of being good

falls after the pubertal disturbance.

The religious content is high at the pubertal disturbance. Then it falls.

Altruism rises after the pubertal disturbance.

Self-respect falls after the pubertal disturbance.

Conscience rises up to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years - through the pubertal disturbance.

In the case of both American boys and American girls, submission to external authority as a content of good living falls away, especially after the pubertal disturbance. Religion in the case of both boys and girls falls as a content after the pubertal disturbance, when it was high.

For both boys and girls, altruism as a content of the good life rises after the pubertal disturbance.

For both American boys and American girls, self-respect as the content of the good life falls after the pubertal disturbance.

#### Comparison of Conclusions.

##### Comparison of Scottish and American Boys.

Question 1,2. The pubertal disturbance is practically synchronous, at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years.

##### Comparison of Scottish and American Girls.

Question I,2. The pubertal disturbance is synchronous - at 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years.

Question III. Both groups of girls give conscience as the motive for morality after the pubertal disturbance - from  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years upward.



## Comparison of Scottish and American Children.

Question I,2. American children precede Scottish in the appreciation of socialization traits. The gang spirit is especially manifest in the comparison of the Scottish with the American votes on the word "tattling". See Graphs 17, 18, 37, and 43.

Question I,2. Scottish children lose the sensitivity to self-regarding traits earlier than do the American. See Graphs 19, 20.

Comparison between the Developments shown with regard to Self-regarding traits and Socialization traits; Self-regarding Preferences and Socialization Preferences; Self-regarding and Socialization Wrongs; and Self-regarding and Socialization Worsts.

### Scottish Boys.

Question I,2. No self-regarding trait showed its highest average during the years 13 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . No socialization trait during the years  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to  $14\frac{1}{2}$ .

Question I,3. Self-regarding traits show pubertal disturbance at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years; socialization traits at 12 to 14.

Question I,2. Sensitivity to self-regarding traits precedes that of socialization traits.

Question II,2. Sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs precedes that to socialization wrongs. After  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years, both decrease.

Question II,1. Sharp increase in sensitivity to all

wrongs is apparent at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years.

#### Scottish Girls.

Question I,2. No self-regarding or socialization trait showed a highest average between the ages 13 and 15 years.

Question I,2. Development in sensitivity to self-regarding traits precedes that to socialization traits.

Question I,3. Self-regarding traits show disturbance at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years; socialization traits at 13 to 14 years.

Question II,1. Girls already sensitized to wrongs at 13 years.

Question II,2. Sensitivity to self-regarding traits develops before that to socialization traits. Sensitivity to both develops up to 14 years, at which a dullness to both categories sets in.

#### American Boys.

Question I,2. Self-regarding traits show disturbance at 14 to 15 years; socialization traits at 14 to 16 years.

Question I,2. Self-regarding sensitivity precedes socialization sensitivity.

Question I,3. Self-regarding traits and socialization traits show disturbance at 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years.

Question II,1. Development in sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs precedes that to socialization wrongs.

Question II,2. Development in self-regarding worsts precedes that to socialization worsts.

#### American Girls.

Question I,2. Self-regarding traits show disturbance at

14 to 15 years; so too do socialization traits.

Question I,2. Self-regarding traits precede socialization traits in development.

Question I,3. Self-regarding traits show disturbance at 14 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years; socialization traits at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years.

Question II,1. Sensitivity to self-regarding wrongs precedes slightly that to socialization wrongs.

Question II,2. Self-regarding wrongs and socialization wrongs show almost a simultaneous development in the sensitivity toward them; if either precedes, it is self-regarding ones.

All children showed a development of sensitivity to socialization traits immediately following the pubertal disturbance. Sensitivity to self-regarding traits develops earlier.

During the pubertal disturbance, active self-sacrificing traits are not yet chosen; instead, the traits chosen as ideal are the self-regarding ones.

After which appear to the children are generally those of the self-regarding category, rather than of the socialization category.

6. At the height of the pubertal disturbance, a decreased percentage of the children would choose Jesus as their ideal.

7. During the period of pubertal disturbance, the English girls hold as motives for being moral, pious, and virtuous with religion secondary as a motive. The girls hold as motives of goodness, with religion and respect.

### Summary of Conclusions.

1. Children imagine their ideals to embody all desirable traits, until they learn that they do not; then the children transfer these traits to imagined heroes.

2. Before the age of 12 years, approximately, children accept orthodox, customary standards of action; after 12 they tend to develop individual standards of their own.

3. Girls as a rule precede boys in the steps of their moral development.

4. There is manifest in all children a disturbance in their development along the line of moral ideas at or near the period of puberty. This pubertal disturbance appears in the case of Scottish boys at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years at its height; in the case of Scottish girls, its height appears at 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years; in the case of the American boys, at  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 15 years; and in the case of the American girls at 13 to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years.

5. During the pubertal disturbance, the traits of character which appeal to the children are generally those of the self-regarding category, rather than of the socialization category.

6. At the height of the pubertal disturbance, a decreased percentage of the children would choose Jesus as their ideal.

7. During the period of pubertal disturbance, the Scottish girls hold, as motives for being moral, punishment and success with religion secondary as a motive; the Scottish boys hold desire of success, with religion and respect



for conscience secondary; the American boys hold desire of success as their chief motive; the American girls, hope of success, religion, and love of social approval.

8. As a rule, categories pertaining to self-regard precede in development those pertaining to socialization.

9. Boys show greater individual variations: the girls tend toward the orthodox and customary.

10. There is some basis in our results for suspecting the noticeable appearance of the operation of conscience at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  years in Scottish boys, and before that in the Scottish girls. The same suspicion has some basis in the case of the American children.

11. Conscience as a motive for morality rises after the pubertal disturbance.

12. Obedience to conscience as the content of moral living rises as some other contents fall.

13. Boys give success as a motive for good living more generally than do the girls. Girls give the religious motive more generally than do the boys.

14. As the content of the good life, submission to an external authority decreases from the time of the pubertal disturbance.

15. As the content of the good life, religion rises in the case of the Scottish children after the pubertal disturbance. In the case of the American children, it is altruism which thus rises.

16. American children precede the Scottish in the appre-

ciation of socialization traits. Scottish children precede the American in the loss of sensitivity to self-regarding traits. It seems that in the case of the American children, gregariousness becomes manifest more pronouncedly and earlier than in the case of the Scottish children.

17. At the age when the tests stop, the children have not yet come to the point of saying that they think that traits of active, self-sacrificing beneficence are the best.



Question I, 1. Scottish Children. Girls in Red. Boys in Blue. 1.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$ . 12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$ . 13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Scottish  
History.

British  
history.

Other Nations.

Living  
men.

Cinema  
stars.

Literature.

Philanthropists.

Athletes.

Royalty.

Friends.

Teachers.

Seity.

Girls choose men:  
Boys choose women.



Question I, 1. American Children. Girls in Red, Boys in Blue. 2.

13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

American  
History.

Other  
Nations.

Living  
men.

Cinema  
Stars.

Literature.

Philanthropists.

Athletes.

(Residency)









Royalty.

Friends.

Teachers.

Deity.

Girls choose  
men; boys  
choose  
women.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Athletic.

Beautiful.

Brave.

Brilliant.

Dashing.

Famous.

Firm.

Heroic.


Influential.

Morally  
Brave.

Persevering.

Strong.

Wealthy.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cautious.

Good.

Humble.

Modest.

Obedient.

Peaceful.

Pure.

Respectful.


Retiring.

Reverent.

Steadfast.


Temperate.

Unselfish.






11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

















13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$





13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .


Cautious.




Good.



Humble.



Modest.



Obedient.



Peaceful.



Pure.



Respectful.



Retiring.




Reverent.



Steadfast.



Temperate.



Unselfish.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Aid.



Charitable.



Forgiving.



Generous.



Gentle.



Helpful.



Humane.




Kind.



Loving.



Merciful.



Self-sacrificing.



Sincere.



Sympathetic.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cheerful.

Chummy.

Courteous.

Friendly.

Honest.

Honoured.

Loyal.

Obliging.


Patriotic.

Peculiar.

Politician.

Sociable.

Solitary.





## 11.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$  12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$  13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

Athletic.

Beautiful.

Brave.

Brilliant.

Dashing.

Famous.

Firm.

Heroic.

Influential.

Morally Brave.

↓  
Persevering.

strong.

Wealthy.

Cautious.

Good.

Humble.

Modest.

Obedient.

Peaceful.

Time

Respectfully,

Retiring

Reverend.

steadfast

Temperature


Ungelli-Is

unabhängig.



Question I, 2. Graph Showing Pubertal Disturbance.  
Scottish Children.


12.





Question I, 2. Graph showing Pubertal Disturbance.  
American Children.

13.





14.

13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

Aid  
Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

Gentle.

Halbzahl.

humane.

Kind.

Loving.

Merciful.

Self-sacrificing.

Sincere.

Sympathetic.

Cheerful.

Chemistry.

Courteous -

Friendly.

Honest.

Honoured.

loyal.  
all.

Weging.  
st.  $\Delta$

Parish.

Cellular.  
P.O.T.


1001-1010

solitary

## Summary




Question I, 2. years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits. 15.  
Scottish Children.





Question I, 2. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits.  
American Children.

16.





Question I, 2. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Traits.  
Scottish Children.

17.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

Gentle.

Helpful.

Humane.

Kind.

Loving.

Merciful.

Self-sacrificing.

Sincere.

Sympathetic.

Cheerful.

Courteous.

Friendly.

Honest.


Honoured.

Loyal.

Obliging.


Patriotic.

Sociable.






Question I, 2. years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Traits. 18  
American Children.





Question I, 2. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits. 19  
 Scottish Children.





Question 7. 2. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Traits. 20.  
American Children.


13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Athletic.	
Beautiful.	
Brave.	
Brilliant.	
Dashing.	
Famous.	
Firm.	
Heroic.	
Influential.	
Morally Brave.	
Persevering.	
Strong.	
Wealthy.	
Cautious.	
Good.	
Humble.	
Obedient.	
Peaceful.	
Pure.	
Respectful.	
Reverent.	
Steadfast.	
Temperate.	
Unselfish.	



# Question I, 2. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Socialization Traits. 21. Scottish Children.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.





Question I, 2. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Socialization Traits. 22.  
American Children.

American Children.

13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Aid.

Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

gentle.

Helpful.

humane.

Kind.

Loving.

Self-sacrificing

Sincere.

Sympathetic.

cheerful.

Chemmy.

Courteous.

Friendly.

Honest.

honoured.

loyal.

Patriotic.

socialle.



11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$  12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$  13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

Athletic.

Beautiful.

Brave.

Brilliant.

Dashing.

Famous.

Firm.

Heroic.

Influential.

Morally  
Brave.

Preserving.  $\triangle$


Strong.

Wealthy.




11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cautious.



Good.




Shumble.




Modest.



Obedient.




Peaceful.




Pure.




Respectful.



Retiring.




Reverent.



Steadfast.



Temperate.



Unselfish.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Aid.

Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

Gentle.

Helpful.

Humane.

Kind.


Loving.

Merciful.

Self-sacrificing.

Sincere.


Sympathetic.






11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.


Cheerful.




Chummy.



Courteous.



Friendly.



Honest.



Honoured.



Loyal.




Obliging.




Patriotic.




Peculiar.




Politician.



Sociable.



Solitary.





13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Athletic.

Beautiful.

Brave.

Brilliant.

Dashing.

Famous.

Firm.

Heroic.

Influential.

Morally  
Brave.

Preserving.


Strong.

Wealthy.



13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cautious.




Good.




Humble.



Modest.



Obedient.



Peaceful.



Pure.



Respectful.



Retiring.



Reverent.



Steadfast.



Temperate.



Unselfish.





13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Cid.

Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

Gentle.

Helpful.

Humane.

Kind.







Loving.

Merciful.

self-sacrificing.

Sincere.

Sympathetic.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.


Cheerful.



Chummy.



Courteous.



Friendly.



Honest.




Honoured.




Loyal.



Obliging.



Patriotic.



Peculiar.

Politician.

Sociable.




Solitary.



Question I, 3. Graph showing Pubertal Disturbance.  
Scottish Children.

31.





Question I, 3. Graph showing Pubertal Disturbance.  
Scottish Children.

32.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$  12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$  13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

## Socialization Traits.

Qid.

Charitable.

Forgiving.

Generous.

Gentle.

Helpful.

Humane.

kind.

loving.

Merciful.

Sacrificing

Sincere.

Sympathetic.

Cheerful

Chemistry.  
Antacids

Friend for

honest

Honoured.

Journal.

plaining

Patriotic.

Peculiar.

Politician.

variable.

solitary.

$$\nabla$$



Question I, 3. Graph showing Pubertal Disturbance.  
American Children.

33.






## 34.

13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$     14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$     15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$     16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

Aid.  
 Charitable.  
 Forgiving.  
 Generous.  
 Gentle.  
 Helpful.  
 Humane.  
 Kind.  
 Loving.  
 Merciful.  
 Self sacrificing.  
 Sincere.  
 Sympathetic.  
 Cheerful.  
 Chummy.  
 Courteous.  
 Friendly.  
 Honest.  
 Honoured.  
 Loyal.  
 Obliging.  
 Patriotic.  
 Peculiar.  
 Politician.  
 Sociable.  
 Solitary.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

A.

B.

C.

D.


E.

F.

G.

H.

I.





Question II, 1. Scottish Children. page. 1. Self-regarding Traits: 36.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Boasting.

Bullying.

Confident.

Daring.

Dashing.

Dignity.

Middle-some.


Over-dressing.

Self-  
Possessed.

Self-  
Respect.

Talking  
Back.

Tuchiness.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Backward.

Day-dreaming.

Flattery.

Listless.

Meekness.

Patience.

Praise.


Reserve.

Self-denial.

Shy.

Tattling.

Timid.





Question II, 1. Scottish Children. page 3. Self-regarding Traits. 38.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$ . 12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$ . 13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Anxiety.

Cautious.

Coward.

Falter.

Fear.

Foolhardy.

Foresight.


Indiscreet.

Rckless.

Venturesome.

Wary.

Worry.






Question II, 1. Scottish Children. Socialization Traits.

39.

page 4.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Affectionate.



Devoted.



Flirting.



Generosity.



Indulgence.



Ingratitude.



Neglect.



Passion.



Partiality.



Stinginess.



Tender.



Thoughtful.





Question II, 1. Scottish Children. page 5. Socialization Traits. 40.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cad.

Clubs.

Exclusiveness.

Friendly.

Gangs.

Hermit.

Intolerance.


Prejudice.

Queerness.

Selfishness.

Shrewd.

Unsociable.





Question II, 1. Scottish Children. Socialization Traits.

41.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anger.

Fighting.

Grudge.

Indignant.

Passive.

Rage.

Revenge.


Submissive.

Supine.

Temper.

Unfeeling.

Wrath.





13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

## Boasting.

## Bullying.

Confident.

Daring.

Dashing.

dignity.

Meddlesome.

Over-dressing

Self-  
assessed.

Self-respect.

Talking  
back. ▽

Touchiness.



13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Backward.

Day-  
dreaming.

Flattery.

Listless.

Meekness.

Patience.

Praise.


Reserve.

Self-  
denial.

Shy.

Tattling.

Timid.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anxiety.

Cautious.

Coward.

Falter.

Fear.

Foolhardy.

Foresight.



Indiscreet.

Reckless.

Venturesome.

Wary.

Worry.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Affectionate.

Devoted.

Flirting.

Generosity.

Indulgence.

Ingratulation.

Neglect.








Passion.

Partiality.

Stinginess.

Tender.

Thoughtful.





# Question II, 1. American Children. Socialization Traits.

46.

page 11.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cad.

Clubs.

Exclusiveness.

Friendly.

Gangs.

Hermit.

Intolerance.


Prejudice.

Quickness.

Selfishness.

Shrewd.

Unsociable.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anger.

Fighting.

Grudge.

Indignant.

Passive.

Rage.

Revenge.


Submissive.

Supine.

Temper.

Unfeeling.

Wrath.





Question II, 1. Increase and Decrease of Sensitivity to  
Self-regarding Traits and Socialization Traits, by Groups. 48.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.


Scottish Boys.




Scottish Girls.



American Boys.




American Girls.



The development of the 36 Self-regarding traits  
shown in solid line: the development of the  
sensitivity to the 36 Socialization traits  
shown in broken line.

Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs. 49.  
Scottish Children.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.





Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs. 50.  
Scottish Children.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Foolhardy.



Foresight.


Indiscreet.

Reckless.

Venturesome.

Wary.

Worry.





II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Self-regarding wrongs. 5%  
Scottish Children.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$ . 12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$ . 13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Boasting. \_\_\_\_\_

Bullying. \_\_\_\_\_

Confident. \_\_\_\_\_

Daring. \_\_\_\_\_

Dashing. \_\_\_\_\_

Dignity. \_\_\_\_\_

Meddlesome. \_\_\_\_\_

Overdressing. \_\_\_\_\_

Self-possessed. \_\_\_\_\_

Self-respect. \_\_\_\_\_

Talking Back. \_\_\_\_\_

Touchiness. \_\_\_\_\_

Backward. \_\_\_\_\_

Day-dreaming. \_\_\_\_\_

Flattery. \_\_\_\_\_

Sitless. \_\_\_\_\_

Meekness. \_\_\_\_\_

Patience. \_\_\_\_\_

Praise. \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve. \_\_\_\_\_

Self-denial. \_\_\_\_\_

Shy. \_\_\_\_\_

Tattling. \_\_\_\_\_

Timid. \_\_\_\_\_

Unmity. \_\_\_\_\_

Cautious. \_\_\_\_\_

Forward. \_\_\_\_\_

Falter. \_\_\_\_\_

Fear. \_\_\_\_\_



Question II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrong. 52.  
Scottish Children.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Foolhardy.

Foresight.


Indiscreet.

Reckless.

Venturesome.

Wary.


Worried.






Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 53.  
Scottish Children.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.





Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 54.  
 Scottish Children.





55.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$ . 12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$ . 13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Affectionate.	—	
Devoted.		
Flirting.	—	
Generosity.		
Indulgence.		
Ingratitude.		—
Neglect.	—	
Passion.		
Partiality.		
Stinginess.		
Tender.	—	
Thoughtful.		
Cad.	—	
Clubs.		
Exclusiveness.		
Friendly.		
Gangs.		
Hermit.		
Intolerance.		—
Prejudice.	—	
Queerness.		
Selfishness.	—	
Shrewd.	—	
Unsociable.	—	
Anger.	—	
Fighting.	—	
Rudge.	—	
Indignant.	—	
Passive.	—	
Rage.	—	



Question II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 56.  
Scottish Children.

11. 11½ 12. 12½ 13. 13½ 14. 14½ 15. 15½ 16. 16½

Revenge.

Submissive.

Supine.

Temper.

Unfeeling.

Wrath.




Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.  
American Children.

57.

	13.	13½.	14.	14½.	15.	15½.	16.	16½.
Boasting.								
Bullying.								
Confident.								
Daring.								
Dashing.								
Dignity.								
Meddlesome.								
Overdressing.								
Self-possessed.								
Self-respect.								
Talking back.								
Touchiness.								
Backward.								
Daydreaming.								
Flattery.								
Listless.								
Meekness.								
Patience.								
Praise.								
Reserve.								
Self-denial.								
Shy.								
Tattling.								
Timid.								
Anxiety.								
Cautious.								
Toward.								
Falter.								
Fear.								



Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs. 58.  
American Children.





Question II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Self-regarding Wrongs.  
American Children.

	13.	13½.	14.	14½.	15.	15½.	16.	16½.
Boasting.	—							
Bullying.	—							
Confident.	—							
Daring.	—							
Dashing.								
Dignity.		—						
Maddlesome.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Overdressing.	—							
Self-possessed.	—	—	—	—				
Self-respect.	—	—	—	—				
Talking back.	—							
Touchiness.	—							
Backward.								
Daydreaming.								
Flattery.								
Listless.								
Meekness.								
Patience.								
Praise.								
Reserve.								
Self-denial.	—	—	—	—				
Shy.								
Tattling.	—							
Timid.	—	—	—	—				
Anxiety.								
Cautious.	—							
Coward.	—							
Falter.								
Fear.		—						



Question II, 1. Years of decrease of sensitivity to self-regarding Wrong. 60.  
American Children.

13. 13½ 14. 14½ 15. 15½ 16. 16½

Foolhardy.

—

Foresight.

—

Indiscreet.

—

Reckless.

—

Venturesome.

—

Wary.

—

Worry.



Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 61.  
American Children.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Affectionate.

Devoted.

Flirting.

Generosity.

Indulgence.

Ingratitude.

Neglect.

Passion.

Partiality.

Stinginess.

Tender.

Thoughtful.

Cad.

Clubs.

Exclusiveness.

Friendly.

Gangs.

Hermit.

Intolerance.

Prejudice.

Queerness.

Selfishness.

Shrewd.

Unsociable.

Anger.

Fighting.

Grudge.

Indignant.

Passive.

Rage.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.



Question II, 1. Years of Increase of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 62.  
American Children.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Revenge.



Submissive.

Supine.

Temper.



Unfeeling.



Wrath.





# Question II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs. 63.

American Children.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Affectionate.

Devoted.

Flirting.

Generosity.

Indulgence.

Ingratitude.

Neglect.

Passion.

Partiality.

Stinginess.

Tender.

Thoughtful.

Cold.

Clubs.

Exclusiveness.

Friendly.

Stangs.

Hermit.

Intolerance.

Prejudice.

Jealousness.

Selfishness.

Shrewd.

Unsociable.

Anger.

Fighting.

Grudge.

Indignant.

Passive.

Page.

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Question II, 1. Years of Decrease of Sensitivity to Socialization Wrongs.  
 American Children.

64.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Revenge.

\_\_\_\_\_

Submissive.

\_\_\_\_\_

Supine.

\_\_\_\_\_

Temper.

\_\_\_\_\_

Unfeeling.

\_\_\_\_\_

Wrath.



11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Boasting.




Bullying.




Confident.



Daring.



Dashing.



Dignity.




Maddlesome.




Over-dressing.




Self-possessed.




Self-respect.




Talking back.



Touchiness.









11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Backward.

Day-dreaming.

Flattery.

Listless.

Meekness.

Patience.

Praise.

Reserve.

Self-denial.

Shy.

Tattling.

Timid.



Question II, 2. American Children. page 8. Self-regarding Traits. 68.

13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$ . 14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . 15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$ . 16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$ .

Backward.

Day-  
dreaming.

Flattery.

Listless.

Meekness.

Patience.

Praise.





Reserve.

Self-  
denial.

Shy.

Tattling.

Timid.





page 4.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$  12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$  13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$

Affectionate

Devoted.

Flirting.

Generosity.

Indulgence.

Ingratitude.

Neglect.

Passion.


## Partiality.

Stinginess.

Tender.

Thoughtful.









Question II, 2. Scottish Children. page 5. Socialization Traits.


71.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.


Cad. 

Clubs. 

Exclusiveness. 


Friendly. 

Gangs. 

Hermit. 

Intolerance. 

Prejudice. 

Sneerness. 

Selfishness. 


Shrewd. 

Unsociable. 



13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Cad.



Clubs.




Exclusiveness.



Friendly.



Gangs.



Hermit.



Intolerance.



Prejudice.



Queerness.




Selfishness.



Shrewd.



Unsocial.





Question II, 2. American Children. page 9. Self-regarding Traits. 73.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anxiety.



Cautious.




Coward.



Falter.



Fear.



Foolhardy.



Fore sight.



Indiscreet.



Reckless.



Venturesome.



Wary.



Worry.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anxiety.



Cautious.



Coward.



Falter.



Fear.




Foolhardy.



Foresight.



Indiscreet.



Reckless.



Venturesome.



Wary.



Worry.





Question II. 2. Scottish Children. page 6. Socialization Traits.


75.

11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Anger.




Fighting.




Grudge.




Indignant.




Passive.



Rage.




Revenge.



Submissive.




Supine.



Temper.



Unfeeling.




Wrath.





13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.





11. 11½. 12. 12½. 13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

Confident.



Dignity.



Self-possessed.



Self-respect.




Patience.





III.  
Scottish Children.

11.  $11\frac{1}{2}$  12.  $12\frac{1}{2}$  13.  $13\frac{1}{2}$  14.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  15.  $15\frac{1}{2}$  16.  $16\frac{1}{2}$






Question III.  
American Children.

79.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.


1.



2.



3.



4.



5.



6.



7.



8.







Question IV.  
American Children.

81.

13. 13½. 14. 14½. 15. 15½. 16. 16½.

1.




2.




3.



4.




5.




6.



7.



8.



9.



10.



## Table of Children Tested.

## Acetland.

Age.	11.	11½.	12.	12½.	13.	13½.	14.	14½.	15.	15½.	16.	16½.	17.	Totals.
Boys.	34	26	51	98	117	113	49	14	17	11	6	2		538
Girls.	35	35	66	105	146	139	104	42	45	16	15	8	12	768
Acetland Totals.	69	61	117	203	263	252	153	56	62	27	21	10	12	1306

## America.

	10	13	25	19	29	19	17	7		139
Boys.										
Girls.	23	25	48	26	42	15	15	9	8	211
American Totals.	33	38	73	45	71	34	32	16	8	350

Grand Totals. Boys. Acetland 538

American 139

Girls. Acetland 768

American 211



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